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Abstract 
France's Algeria Policy (1988-1995). Discourse, Motives and Means is a 
study of the French response to political upheavals in Algeria. The October 1988 riots 
in Algeria sparked off a fast-track democratisation process which was, however, 
rapidly brought to an end. Following Algeria's Winter 1991/92 first free 
parliamentary elections through which Islamism imposed itself as the most popular 
form of political change, a coup d'etat was staged by the Military -- the everlasting 
nucleus of power in Algeria. Since the coup d'dtat in January 1992 and the 
subsequent clobbering of the Islamist opposition, Algeria has foundered in a sea of 
violence. Until now, all political initiatives to bring back the country on the path of 
civil peace have failed. 
Starting from the premise that France's long-run foreign policy objective has 
always been to preserve its rank as Algeria's "senior foreign partner", this study seeks 
to determine what policy France implemented in order to achieve its goal in the context 
of Algeria's turmoil. The central finding brought to the fore in this thesis is that 
France's Algeria policy was a shifting policy. From the 1992 coup d'dtat until the 
May 1995 French presidential elections, shifts in policy occurred both under the Left 
and the Right. In successive stages, the socialist Cresson and Beregovoy 
governments as well as the right-wing Balladur government supported both 
"conciliation" and "eradication" in Algeria, which translated into varying degrees of 
support to the Algerian new rulers. France's shifts from supporting conciliation to 
backing eradication (January 1993) and from buttressing eradication to calling for 
conciliation (September 1994) are analysed in the light of three themes that permeate 
this study : discourse, motives and means. 
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Introduction 
France and Algeria have a long common history, even though the tie that 
originally brought them together -- conquest and colonisation -- was negative. Taking 
part in Europe's nineteenth century colonial expansion, France conquered Algerian 
lands then under Ottoman rule, in 1830. In contrast with the Moroccan and Tunisian 
French protectorates, the Algerian colony was made an integral part of France and the 
latter renounced its colonial possession only after seven years of bloodshed (1954- 
62). Despite the fact that, under colonial rule, Algerians encountered France's 
"civilising mission" only through the plundering of lands and colonial apartheid 
society and despite the sufferings of the War of Liberation, political Independence did 
not bring about a break in the relationship between the two countries. To the contrary, 
a series of economic, technical, cultural and immigration "co-operation accords", 
which were originally designed to preserve France's colonial advantages in return for 
massive economic aid and which were thereafter fashioned to accommodate changes 
in the bilateral relationship, have kept the two countries bound together. 
Colonisation and the War of Liberation have also marked collective attitudes 
on both sides so that the context within which the Franco-Algerian relationship has 
been unfolding is highly emotional. Policy measures implemented by each of the two 
states or events happening in each of the two countries have often been understood as 
discriminatory, as having the unpleasant taste of neocolonialism for the Algerians and 
of radical nationalism for the French. Slight disagreements over particular aspects of 
bilateral relations have sometimes degenerated into a (verbal) questioning of the whole 
relationship. Dramatisation has been reinforced by the civil societies' often passionate 
meddling with such issues as the maintenance of French cemeteries in Algeria, 
children abductions, racist attacks against Algerians immigrants in France, etc... 
Considering the emotions surrounding the relationship, no one will be surprised that it 
has often been described as one of attraction/repulsion, or as similar to the love and 
2 
hate relations of an old couple who never crossed the line of divorce. 
Because of France's continued economic and cultural presence in Algeria, the 
international community has generally considered Algeria as "France's backgarden" 
and it was by reference to the French position that the international community at first 
reacted to political upheavals in Algeria. It is, therefore, quite logical that in relation to 
Algeria, France's foreign policy, more than any other state's, should be the focus of 
study -- which, in itself, does not mean that other states' policies are of no interest. 
The question this research seeks to answer is quite simple : what was France's Algeria 
policy over the period October 1988 - May 1995 and why was this policy adopted? 
Before sketching out the main findings of this study, the time frame which is 
proposed to conduct the analysis must be justified and the existing academic literature 
on the subject must be referred to. 
The time frame 
This study of French foreign policy towards Algeria opens in October 1988, 
that is with the riots that then occurred in Algeria. This choice is dictated by the 
political significance of the riots. Throughout the 1980s, Algeria's authoritarian ruling 
elite was faced with several uprisings. However, in October 1988, Algeria's youth 
storming into the streets of the country's major cities, destroying public goods, state 
enterprises and public institutional buildings, generated, after the harsh repressions, 
an unexpected response : fast-track democratisation. The one-party system was 
brought down and multiparty politics established only five months after the uprising. 
October 1988 is also the moment of the advent of the Islamist movement2 into the 
I To quell the rebellion, a state of siege was declared in Algiers, a curfew imposed and the tanks sent 
to the streets. 159 persons were officially recorded to have been shot by the Army throughout the 
country. Unofficial sources put the death toll over 500. Arrests were conducted en masse, and 
disturbing cases of torture were reported. For details on the unfolding of the October 1988 riots, see 
among others K. Duran (1989). 
2 In recent years a consensus has taken root in the academic literature dealing with contemporary 
Islamic revival as to the terminology to use in order to describe religiopolitical movements which 
endeavour to reconstruct the social and political order of their societies within a framework inspired 
by the Islamic scriptures and which do so by aiming at state power. Direct intervention in politics 
differentiates these movements (now designated under the generic term "Islamism") from 
"fundamentalist" ones, which restrict their religious activism to the moral sphere of private life 
without contesting the prevalent social and political order of their societies. On the issue of 
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Algerian political arena. The Algerian Islamist movement, in fact, arose in the late 
1970s and crystallised in the 1982 platform defended by Sheik Soltani, Sheik 
Sahnoun and Abassi Madani. This platform enjoined the Algerian regime to remain 
true to its Islamic tradition and represented the movement's first clear step into 
politics. Nevertheless, it is Black October that allowed the Islamist movement to show 
itself as a significant political force. Indeed, without sparking off the riots, the 
Islamists managed to channel the people's anger and, as their leaders were received by 
president Chadli Benjedid in the wake of the October riots, the Islamist movement 
established itself as a mediator between the regime and the people. As the events were 
to demonstrate, the Islamist movement, although not united behind Abassi Madani 
and All Benhadj, was the major beneficiary of democratisation. The Islamic Salvation 
Front (FIS), which was recognised as a political party in 1989, triumphed in Algeria's 
first free local and regional elections (June 1990) and in the first round of the 
parliamentary elections of December 1991. The second round never took place and the 
FIS was outlawed, thus abruptly bringing democratisation to an end. Since the 
January 1992 coup d'dtat, repression and counter-violence have been the major items 
on Algeria's political agenda. Today, the country is in a virtual state of war between 
official troops and various Islamist guerrilla forces, both having enlarged their battle 
so far as to terrorise the population. Political dialogue between the regime and the 
banned FIS as well as other political parties occurred but could not bring a lasting 
solution to Algeria's protracted crisis because the Algerian regime never saw political 
dialogue as something else than a tool to legitimise its own rule. 
Starting with Algeria's democratisation process in 1988 allows to put into 
perspective France's reaction to political developments in Algeria after 1992. The 
study of France' response to the events that followed the coup had to be brought to an 
end at some stage. Partly in light of my timetable for submission, I chose May 1995 
simply because the French presidential elections, which then took place, marked the 
coming into power of a new Administration in France. Although the time frame of this 
terminology, see F. Burgat (1988b). 
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analysis roughly corresponds to President Mitterrand's second mandate, it is not "a 
study of France's Algeria policy under Mitterrand" but, first and foremost, a study of 
the French response to political upheavals in Algeria. 
The academic literature 
Whereas Algeria's fast-track, but short-lived, democratisation experience 
generated much academic interest, very few scholars have shown an equal curiosity in 
France's Algeria policy since 1988 otherwise than as a rapid side treatment of their 
own subject of study. To my knowledge and up to the time of writing, only four 
articles specifically dealing with France's Algeria policy since 1988 were published3. 
Most are "intervention essays". They either seek to "wake up minds" by denouncing 
France's role in the Algerian political deadlock4 or to formulate proposals for French 
policy both in the short- and long-terms. Jocelyne Cesari's article6 is perhaps the only 
paper that could be described as being within the academic tradition. It rapidly lays out 
the main features of France's Algeria policy from January 1992 to early 1995 in a 
manner which is relatively close to my own understanding. Cesari also raises the 
question of French perceptions of Islamism. In addition, she explains why the 
Algerian crisis has been transformed into a "French business" notably through the 
issue of the Islamists' attacks against gallicised Algerian intellectuals and through the 
immigration issues which have been raised by the Algerian conflict (political refugees 
from Algeria and re-Islamisation among the Muslim community settled in France). 
These issues are also dealt with in this thesis. Given that not much has yet been 
written on the time frame that concerns us, I do not find it appropriate to follow the 
literature review tradition usually required in the doctoral academic exercise. I shall 
thus say within the body of the thesis where I disagree with the authors concerned. 
As regards France's Algeria policy and Franco-Algerian relations prior to 
3 Two borderline cases may, however, be identified : IF. Daguzan (1993/94) and P. Naylor (1992) 
whose articles respectively deal with the periods 1962-92 and 1980-90. 
4 H. Roberts (1994b). 
5 D. David (1995) ; Editorial of Esprit, 208, janvier 1995. 
6 J. Cesari (1994/95). 
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1988, they were unexpectedly little studied. Few books and articles are entirely 
devoted to Franco-Algerian relations7. Much of what can be found on France's 
Algeria policy lies within the literature dealing with French foreign policy worldwide8 
or towards certain geographic areas (Africa, the Middle East and North Africa)9 or in 
the literature relating to Algerian foreign policy10. Although this material is very 
helpful in understanding the evolving context of Franco-Algerian relations in the post- 
Independence era, I do not find it particularly useful to review it in great depth on two 
main counts. 
First, this body of academic literature is characterised by a virtual absence of 
explicit theoretical frameworks. With the exception of Bouhout El Mellouki Riffi, 
who clearly inscribed his analysis of France's "co-operation policy" with the Maghreb 
within the dependency theory view of the exploitation of the periphery by the capitalist 
centre11, most authors have drawn on the central concepts of International Relations 
theories and of Foreign Policy Analysis without abiding by the substantive claims of 
these theories. Such concepts as the "national interest", "interdependence", "structural 
dependence" and "foreign policy decision-making" are all referred to, most often in 
conjunction, but are used in their common language sense. To give but one example, 
it is not because Paul Balta speaks of France's "greater interests" in the Maghreb12, 
that he accepts the neo-Realist claim that the anarchical nature of the international 
system leads states to struggle for their survival by optimising their power position in 
the international system and that "national interest" means maximisation of power13. 
Inasmuch as these scholars did not intend to explain French foreign policy 
towards Algeria in terms of particular theoretical models, it seems quite inappropriate 
7 S. Mouhoubi (1989) ; N. Grimaud (1986) ; I. Brandell (1981). Articles dealing with specific 
aspects of Franco-Algerian relations were also published. See e. g. A. Sydnes (1989) ; I. Zartman & 
A. Bassani (1987) ; N. Grimaud (1984b) ; Conseil economique et social (1983) ; N. Grimaud (1983) 
and (1982). 
8 Se e. g. C. Wauthier (1995) ; D. Colard (1978) ; E. Kolodziej (1974). 
9 B. El Mellouki Riffi (1989) ; D. Beauchamp et. al. (1987) ; P. Balta (1986) ; J. Damis (1984) ; P. 
Balta & C. Rulleau (1973). 
10 N. Grimaud (1984a). 
11 B. El Mellouki Riffi (1989). 
12 P. Balta (1986), p. 239. 
13 Drawing upon H. Morgenthau (1949), Neo-Realism has been developed in particular by K. Waltz 
(1979). 
6 
to look for the theoretical shortcomings of their analyses. It would also be somewhat 
ill-suited because my own work is not an attempt at theory-building in Foreign Policy 
Analysis. Rather, it is inspired by the traditional decision-making approach of Foreign 
Policy Analysis which claims that an understanding of the way in which foreign 
policy is made is necessary to the grasping of its substance. As opposed to 
International Relations theories which look at the structures of the international system 
in order to explain state international behaviour, thus leaving the state as a black box, 
the modus operandi of the decision-making approach is that the black box must also 
be opened in order to unveil the causes of foreign policy behaviour. Throughout the 
thesis, the reader will thus recognise several themes which were developed by the 
extremely varied decision-making approach to foreign policy14. Such themes 
concern : formal decision-making structures (notably in the context of French 
"cohabitation" between a socialist president in the Elysee and a right-wing government 
in Matignon) ; bureaucratic politics (in the context of the rivalry between the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs -- the Quai d'Orsay -- and the Ministry for the Interior -- place 
Beauvau -- under the premiership of Edouard Balladur) ; civil society and its relation 
to foreign policy formulation (in the context of the French presidential elections) ; 
incremental decision-making (in the context of shifting policies) and elite perceptions 
(with regard to Algerian society and Islamism). 
The second reason why I find it not particularly useful to review the major 
themes developed by the academic literature on France's Algeria policy prior to 1988 
is that it was written in a specific setting which did not produce the same questions as 
today's. Indeed, it was written in the light of an apparently stable and strong Algerian 
state. Today, the political configuration of Algeria is altogether different. The regime, 
which has almost completely lost its civilian facade hitherto provided by the National 
Liberation Front, the FLN single party, is challenged by several political parties and 
most importantly by political Islam. The emergence of Islamism as a significant 
14 Given the diversity of foreign policy decision-making approaches, I prefer to refer the reader to A. 
Groom & C. Mitchell (1978, pp. 153-71) who provide a sound glimpse at all the foundational texts 
of Foreign Policy Analysis. 
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political force in the Algerian political arena is the key issue to understand France's 
Algeria policy today since it is around the issue of Islamism that the triggering and the 
resolution of Algeria's crisis has revolved. By extension, it is also around the issue of 
Islamism and, thus, of regime stability that France had to define its policy towards 
Algeria. Inasmuch as these issues were not yet on the agenda before Algeria got on 
the path of democratisation, much of what was written before then cannot really help 
us to understand today's French policy towards Algeria. The only lesson that can be 
drawn from the existing literature is that France has always sought to maintain its 
economic, political and cultural influence in Algeria because of the multi-dimensional 
benefits it generates and that it has sought a good neighbourliness relation with 
Algeria because of the historical and human ties between the two countries. If 
influence and good neighbourliness can be described as the major goals that have 
hitherto guided France's Algeria policy, then the question that needs to be answered is 
how France has sought to pursue these goals in face of the rise of Islamism in Algeria 
and of instability that has accompanied it since the coup d'dtat in January 1992. 
What policy and why ? 
As mentioned earlier, the basic aim of this study is to analyse what France's 
Algeria policy was particularly after the January 1992 coup d'dtat and why the French 
governments adopted a particular foreign policy course. These two questions are 
reflected by the organisation of the thesis in two parts. Part one is meant to provide 
answers to the issue "what policy ? ". By confronting words and deeds, I sought to 
unveil what the French governments exactly did as opposed to just what they said 
they were doing. Confronting the official discourse to actual policy measures -- the 
means -- was conducted in relation to both the successive French socialist 
governments (1988-1993) in chapter one and Edouard Balladur's right-wing 
government (1993-95) in chapter two. The first conclusion that can be drawn from the 
findings in part one is that there was not one policy but several policies in relation to 
Algeria. Both the Left and the Right changed the initial course they had chosen for 
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their Algeria policy at one stage or another. Chapter one thus explains that, under the 
socialists, the official reaction to the January 1992 coup d'dtat was rather negative, 
even though there were divisions within the Socialist Party as to how France should 
have reacted. The Cresson government was far from being pro-Islamist but also 
dreaded the risk of a repressive drift which was not seen as the best way to contain the 
force of political Islam in Algeria. Through behind-the-scenes diplomacy, the Cresson 
government advocated a compromising solution with the Islamist mainstream. It did 
not call for a formal integration of the FIS in the government but suggested that a 
political personality capable of engineering a synthesis between the Islamic and 
secular nationalist traditions of Algeria be propelled to the forefront of Algerian 
politics. The Quai d'Orsay hoped that such a solution would be acceptable to 
everybody in Algeria, that it would preserve stability in Algeria and ensure the 
everlastingness of the way in which relations between France and Algeria have always 
operated. In January 1993, however, a shift occurred to the effect that the socialists 
saw political stability in Algeria as mere regime stability. In chapter two, the Balladur 
government's Algeria policy is analysed in terms of the shift that occurred around 
September 1994. Prior to September 1994, the Right also equated political stability 
with regime stability and subsequently buttressed the Algerian regime's "eradicator" 
trend. By contrast, after September 1994, conciliation in Algeria was truly advocated. 
However, conciliation did not make unanimity in the Balladur government and, in 
practice, the French government did not seek to dragoon the Algerian regime into 
conciliation. In each of these two chapters, the major events that took place in Algeria 
are recalled so as to allow the reader to follow the logic of French responses. 
Part two seeks to provide rationales for the specific policy of opposing a FIS 
takeover by violence or by a negotiated settlement -- a policy which under the Left and 
the Right translated into French support to the Algerian regime at one stage or the 
other. Chapter three, which elaborates on motives, makes up part two on its own. It 
brings forward and assesses two types of motives for French opposition to the FIS. 
One relates to the foreseen risks of the FIS coming into power. The other one deals 
9 
with the ideological and psychological dimensions of the French political elite's 
opposition to the FIS. Perceived risks entailed by the FIS coming into power are 
analysed in terms of four issue-areas corresponding to the concerns expressed by the 
French political establishment with more or less emphasis : political instability in the 
Mediterranean by domino effect ; immigration issues ; national security issues and 
economic issues. Immigration issues raised by a FIS takeover or an inclusion of the 
FIS within the political process are identified as the central motive behind the French 
hostility to the banned party. The other factors are understood as having played a 
contributory role, especially insofar as opposing conciliation in Algeria was 
concerned. Opposition to the perspective of the FIS coming into power (by violence 
or not) is also explained by ideological and psychological factors. It will be argued 
that, if French opposition to the FIS on ideological grounds was similar to most 
Western states' wincing at a new form of nationalism involving the ideological and 
cultural spheres, it was primarily motivated by the fact that this challenge to Western 
political culture came specifically from Algeria, that is from a country that has 
emotionally remained a part of France in the French collective imaginary. The FIS 
vote was lived in France as a "psychological trauma" because it implied that part of the 
Algerian people did not recognise itself in France and its political paradigms. This was 
difficult to accept. This was also incomprehensible to the French political elite whose 
restricted contacts with the Algerian gallicised elite have nourished a truncated vision 
of Algerian society. 
In the conclusion, the issue of France's shifting policy towards political 
upheavals is reassessed in the light of recent developments under the new Chirac 
Administration. 
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Part One 
Words and Deeds 
Analysing foreign policy is always a difficult task. To determine what foreign 
policy a government is implementing in relation to a specific international event, 
official discourse is a necessary but also an insufficient tool for analysis. Officials' 
speeches need to be studied if only because they reflect the image that a government 
wishes to project to its own people and to its external environment. Official talk also 
needs consideration because it is sometimes true to actual foreign policy. Even when it 
is not a complete replica of the actual foreign policy course, it always comprises 
elements of truth. In some cases, official discourse may just be a pack of lies, but 
more often it is steeped in ambiguities. 
Official discourse can, therefore, never be taken at its face value. One way of 
ascertaining what foreign policy a government is effectively pursuing is to confront 
the content of its discourse with its actual attitude and its concrete policy measures. 
Confronting words and deeds is the method that was chosen in this work in order to 
determine what France's Algeria policy really was under the Left (chapter one) and the 
Right (chapter two). 
11 
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Chapter One 
The socialist governments (October 1988 - March 1993) 
Under the socialists, France's Algeria policy could best be understood in 
terms of three distinct periods corresponding to changed circumstances in Algeria. 
The first period opens with the October 1988 riots and ends with the January 1992 
coup d'dtat in Algeria. The repressive turn of the October 1988 events caused 
embarrassment in the French political establishment which had supported the Chadli 
regime ever since the arrival of Francois Mitterrand to the presidency in May 1981. 
But, as the riots played the role of a catalyst in the progress towards democratisation, 
the French government did not condemn the repression. Instead, it brought its support 
to Chadli's democratisation initiative as well as to his economic liberalisation 
programme. Algeria's democratisation process was concluded with the December 
1991 free parliamentary elections which were interrupted in January 1992 as a result 
of the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the first round. The coup d'dtat 
generated a slight shift in French policy which, until January 1993, can be described 
as one of mixed support to the Algerian new rulers. The interruption of the 
democratisation process, indeed, generated a cool reaction in Paris. Although the 
French government did not wish, to say the least, a complete FIS parliamentary 
victory, it dreaded the consequences of the coup, notably the clobbering of. the FIS 
which was likely to be responded by violence and, in turn, by greater 
authoritarianism. The discrepancy between the French president's discourse, 
emphasising France's strong reservations about the coup, and the foreign affairs 
minister's, stressing non-interference, should not be understood as a mere double-talk 
that allowed France to save face while effectively supporting the coup. It was a 
deliberate double-act meant to show France's dissatisfaction while at the same time 
maintaining the lines of communication open between Paris and Algiers. Indeed, 
France sought to influence the course of events in Algeria. It suggested that, in order 
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to avoid the aggravation of the political crisis and of the security situation, a political 
personality, belonging to the National Liberation Front (FLN) but able to rally the 
Islamists' allegiance through his religious legitimacy, was needed. The proposal was 
judged as profoundly improper in Algiers and relations between the two states became 
strained because of France's unwillingness to effectively throw its weight behind 
Algeria's new rulers despite an official discourse of support and solidarity. In January 
1993 -- the starting-point of the third period -- France initiated a rapprochement with 
the Algerian authorities. The minister for foreign affairs went to Algiers and invited 
the Algerian prime minister to Paris. Economic aid followed promptly. The 
underlying reasons for this firmer backing still remain mysterious for it occurred just 
when the socialists were about to be defeated in the March 1993 French parliamentary 
elections whose results were rightly forecasted. It is possible that the change in 
French Ambassadors to Algiers played a role in the redefinition of French policy and 
that a reassessment of the power struggle between the Islamist armed groups and the 
authorities led Paris to alter its views. 
In the following account, the French socialists' Algeria policy from October 
1988 to March 1993 is thus analysed in terms of these three distinct periods : 
1) support to Chadli's democratisation and economic liberalisation from October 
1988 to January 1992 ; 2) mixed support throughout 1992 ; and 3) renewed support 
from January 1993 to March 1993. It is preceded by a brief account of the Franco- 
Algerian relationship from 1981 to 1988 which allows us to assess the state of the 
bilateral relationship when the events that shook Algeria occurred. In each of these 
three sections, the marking events that occurred in Algeria are accounted for so as to 
understand the circumstances in which French foreign policy-making was made. 
1. Franco-Algerian relations in the 1980s 
When Francois Mitterrand was elected president of the Fifth Republic in May 
1981, special attention was given to Algeria. Under Valery Giscard d'Estaing's 
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presidency (1974-81), Franco-Algerian relations had been very tense and the 
Mitterrand Administration, which numbered several pro-Algeria politicians, thus 
endeavoured to revive the strained relationship. In addition to the Mauroy 
government's willingness to "relaunch" bilateral relations, Algeria fitted quite well in 
the socialists' general frame for foreign policy based on North/South co-operation and 
the promotion of non-alignment. Very soon, however, several aspects of the bilateral 
relationship generated frustrations on both sides. Whether under the Fabius 
government (1984-86) or under the right-wing government of Jacques Chirac (1986- 
88), relations were lukewarm and sometimes on the crisis borderline. Nevertheless, 
Mitterrand's re-election in May 1988 was accompanied with promises of better days 
for Franco-Algerian relations and the October 1988 riots in Algeria were to be the test 
of friendship. 
During these seven years, despite ups and downs in the bilateral relationship, 
France perceived the Chadli regime as much more open to co-operation and 
compromise than the Boumediene regime had been. Chadli's steps towards economic 
liberalisation were welcomed in France if only because this economic reform was 
beneficial to French business. Algeria's retreat from Third World activism was also 
greeted because the socialists' own Third World policy had lost much of its content as 
of 1984. Thus, throughout the 1981-88 period, the factors that brought tense relations 
were principally due to the wealth of the ties linking the two countries and to the 
somewhat over-passionate climate that has surrounded them since Independence. For, 
on the whole, compromise was always found and France welcomed undergoing 
changes in Algeria. 
1.1. Evolution from 1981 to 1988 
One of Mitterrand's 110 electoral propositions had been to establish privileged 
ties with Algeria' within the general framework of a foreign policy which would put 
emphasis on North/South co-operation and which would back, in the context of the 
I F. Mitterrand (1981), p. 324. 
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Cold War, Third World states' non-alignment strategies. The privileged relationship 
also aimed at "relaunching" Franco-Algerian relations. These had deteriorated, both in 
their political and economic aspects, under Giscard d'Estaing, primarily as a result of 
French support to Morocco on the Western Sahara issue, a dispute over gas prices, 
and racist attacks against Algerians in France which led Boumediene to suspend 
emigration in 1973 before France closed its frontiers to immigration flows in 1974. 
Considering the third-worldist approach to international affairs of Claude Cheysson -- 
then French minister for external relations -- as well as his fondness for Algeria, 
stemming from his collaboration in the 1960s with the Algerian regime in developing 
oil resources, and his feeling that France had to compensate for its large responsibility 
for the state of underdevelopment of Algeria, it was not surprising that he would wish 
to reinvigorate the relationship between the two states. In the early 1980s, the 
"impassioned" relationship which Cheysson had promised took shape symbolically 
with mutual presidential visits : Mitterrand went to Algiers in October-November 1981 
and received Chadli Benjedid in November 1983, his official trip being the first visit 
of an Algerian president to France since Independence. Concretely, the revival of 
Franco-Algerian relations came in the form of an over-market-price gas agreement 
(February 1982) and a protocol of economic co-operation (June 1982). Both were 
representative of the "co-development' plan sponsored by Claude Cheysson and Jean- 
Pierre Cot (minister for co-operation and development). These agreements allowed for 
a recovery of bilateral trade and of lucrative contracts. For, as it had been nicely put 
by Mitterrand, "To help the Third World is [also] to help oneself (... )"2. 
As from 1984 the euphoria of the early 1980s toned down. There were several 
reasons for this. Cot's resignation in 1982 was symptomatic of resistances within the 
French political establishment to a real application of third-worldist principles to 
French foreign policy. The replacement of the Mauroy government by that of Fabius 
in July 1984 confirmed the retreat from grand designs for French-sponsored 
2 F. Mitterrand (1986), p. 359 (Speech at the UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries, 
September 1981). All translations from French into English are mine except when otherwise 
indicated by the bibliography. 
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development in the Third World -- a retreat also driven by the effects of the economic 
crisis in France. In addition, several ministers who were "friends of Algeria", such as 
Cheysson and Rocard, for various reasons left the Fabius government. From the 
Algerian point of view, several aspects of the relationship generated frustrations : low 
French oil imports ; reduced gas imports ; restricted credits ; insufficient interest of 
French firms in creating joint-ventures ; limitations on immigration ; and France's 
"policy of equilibrium" seeking to maintain good relations with each of the three 
Maghrebi states. On the other hand, the French government had its own grievances on 
such issues as the maintenance of French cemeteries in Algeria, the transfer of the 
Pieds-noirs' assets and the custody of divorced mixed-couples' children. 
Under the right-wing government of Jacques Chirac (1986-88), some of these 
problems continued to hinder a warming of political relations. Nevertheless, the latter 
were not wholly strained. In particular, the French interior minister, Charles Pasqua, 
maintained good relations with his counterpart, Hedi El Khediri. Algiers intervened 
for the release of the French hostages in Lebanon and in the stopping of Iran-backed 
terrorist attacks in France. In return, the French Interior Ministry muzzled Algerian 
political opponents exiled in France and, it seems, accommodated the Algerian 
Military Security in covering up the murder of one of them, A. M&cili3. Economic 
relations were, however, on the decline. The 1985/86 oil countershock dramatically 
reduced Algeria's capacity to import and invest, affecting thereby French exports to 
Algeria and the signature of big contracts. In addition, disagreements over the renewal 
of the 1982 gas contract envenomed the relationship. When it was suggested that an 
international arbitration should settle the case, Chadli warned that the entire bilateral 
relationship would suffer4. As a matter of fact, retaliation measures were taken against 
French firms which were not paid for their services or not chosen for import or 
delocalisation projects. 
Thus, Franco-Algerian relations, without being icy, were somewhat chilly 
when Mitterrand was re-elected president in May 1988. As in 1982, the socialist 
3 For a detailed account of this nasty business, see M. Naudy (1993). 4 Le Monde, 20 novembre 1987. 
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government saw in a solution to the gas conflict a way of "relaunching" the 
relationship on a healthier basis, all the more because a new problem had emerged : 
the Algerian authorities wanted to retrieve the premises of the lycee Descartes in 
Algiers, which would have put an end to the education in French of the children of 
mixed-couples and of well-to-do Algerians. The issue, which concerned only a 
limited number of French persons, was taken with high emotion in France. Perceived 
in France as one aspect of Algeria's relentless nationalism, the measure in fact 
symbolically answered the grievances of Arabic-educated Algerians who, because of 
the incoherence of Algeria's Arabisation policy, are often confronted with dead-end 
jobs. The visit of the French minister for foreign affairs, Roland Dumas, to Algiers on 
September 3-4,1988 was aimed at defusing the lurking crisis before the trip of 
Mitterrand scheduled for October. Dumas succeeded by managing to draw up a firm 
schedule for the resumption of the gas dispute and by inscribing the prospect of the 
new accord within the larger framework of bilateral economic and financial co- 
operations. The October riots then occurred. 
1.2. Changes in Algeria under Chadli and their welcoming in Paris 
(1979-1988) 
Despite the problems referred to above during this period, the Chadli regime 
was perceived in Paris as more open to co-operation with France and as much less 
dogmatic than that of Boumediene, particularly on the economic and foreign policy 
fronts. This is why, in general, France's policy has been characterised throughout this 
period by a willingness to support the Algerian authorities. 
5 For a detailed account of Franco-Algerian relations under V. Giscard d'Estaing, see in particular N. 
Grimaud (1984a). For the period 1981-1988, see P. Naylor (1992) ; B. El Mellouki Riffi (1989) ; S. 
Mouhoubi (1989) ; N. Grimaud (1986), (1984b) and (1983) ; and the yearly international chronicle of 
Algeria published in Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord. Claude Cheysson explained the goals of French 
policy towards Algeria from 1981 to 1984 in an interview with the author (March 22,1994). For 
technical details on the 1980-82 gas negotiations, see the debate between B. Abdesselam (1990) and 
A. Brahimi (1991) ; A. Sydnes (1989) ; I. Zartman & A. Bassani (1987); and N. Grimaud (1982). As 
for the 1986-89 gas negotiations, A. Sydnes covers part of the bargaining. For a complete story that 
still needs to be written in full, see the articles of Le Monde particularly from August 1987 to 
September 1988. F. Fritsher and V. Maurus's article (14 janvier 1989) does, however, produce a 
summary of the main issues at stake. 
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1.2.1. Economic liberalisation 
The arrival to power of Chadli Benjedid in 1979 ushered in a new era in the 
field of economic policy, even though Boumediene had suggested towards the end of 
his life that an economic reform was necessary. Boumediene's development 
strategy -- formally aimed at reducing Algeria's dependence on the world capitalist 
market -- had been based upon strong state-capitalism and the model of 
"industrialising industries" whereby investment in heavy industries and, in particular, 
in energy-related industries, was expected to have a stimulating effect upon other 
sectors of the economy. A 1980 Assessment of the Economic and Social Results of 
the 1967-1978 Decade, prepared by the Algerian Ministry for Planning, pinpointed 
the shortcomings of the development strategy : continued reliance on the capitalist 
world market through exports of hydrocarbons and the resort to international finance ; 
lack of inter-sectoral integration leading to numerous shortages, bottlenecks, and 
blockages ; excessive centralisation ; neglect of the agrarian sector ; lack of efficiency 
and productivity, etc. 6. In the light of this assessment, the June 1980 FLN's 
extraordinary congress defined a series of liberalising reforms to be implemented 
through the 1980-84 plan, and this orientation was accentuated in the 1985-89 plan. 
In the meantime, the latent economic crisis, sparked in 1986 by the oil countershock, 
fostered economic liberalisation measures and the self-implementation of a structural 
adjustment programme7. From 1980 to 1988, major reforms were thus undertaken on 
all economic fronts, with a clearer emphasis on the transition to a market economy as 
from 1987-88. The reappraisal of the industrialisation strategy was accompanied by a 
redefinition of macro-economic priorities away from investments in heavy industry 
towards emphasis on light, consumer goods industries, social, infrastructures 
6 For an account of Algeria's strategy of development under Boumediene and its shortcomings, see 
e. g. A. Lamchichi (1991) ; R. Lawless (1984). 
7 General literature on Algeria's liberalisation policy can be found in K. Pfeifer (1992) ; A. Brahimi 
(1991) who was minister for planning in 1979-84, before being appointed prime minister for the 
period 1984-88 ; M. Ecrement (1986). For a critical assessment, and notably an analysis of the 
political goals pursued through the restructuration of the public enterprises (dismantling centres of 
power and patronage increasingly resistant to central authority), see M. Bennoune (1988) ; M. 
Ollivier (1987). 
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(housing, health, education), and agriculture. The private sector was reintegrated as a 
positive force contributing to national economic development. It was thenceforth let to 
operate, despite some restrictions, in industry and services (1982-83) and in the 
agrarian sector (1981-83 and 1987)8. An overture towards foreign investments in 
industry and hydrocarbons was made in 1982 and 1986, even though foreign partners 
were limited to a minority share9. In parallel, state intervention and regulation was 
progressively reduced. The planning system was decentralised, with greater powers 
being delegated to enterprises and local government. It was also loosened to become 
indicative rather than directive (1987-88). Before rendering their management free 
from state intervention and being applied a competition regime (January 1988), public 
enterprises were dismantled into smaller units (1981) and their finances were 
reorganised (1984)10. The monopoly of state enterprises on foreign trade was also 
relaxed through different measures in 1984 and in July and September 198811. In 
addition, state intervention and regulation was progressively diminished in such 
domains as subsidies to consumer goods and state-owned firms, pricing and wage 
policies. 
Algeria's progressive liberalisation programme was seen by the French 
political establishment rather positively. Indeed, although the socialists had hoped, 
upon their arrival to power, to lead France on the path of economic recovery through 
an expansionist and state-led growth policy, the strategy of "Keynesianism in one 
country" failed to prevent the recession from deepening. Austerity measures 
implemented as early as June 1982 were accompanied under the Fabius government 
(1984-86) by a return to neoclassical formulae tempered by the principle of the "social 
market economy", which has been the credo of the Socialist Party ever since. There 
was, thus, no contradiction of doctrine in the evolution of both states' economic 
policies. Inasmuch as no state has an interest in seeing an economic partner on the 
8 On the liberalisation of the private sector, see J. Leca & N. Grimaud (1986). On agrarian reforms, 
see K. Sutton & A. Aghrout (1992). 
9 On foreign investments, see R. Zouaimia (1991) ; R. Abdoun (1989) ; M. Issad (1984). 
10 On the restructuration of state enterprises, see R. Saadi (1984). 
11 On the liberalisation of foreign trade, see A. Guesmi (1991) ; N. Bouzidi M'Hamsadji (1989). 
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verge of economic collapse -- even though brilliant performances are not necessarily 
welcome either -- there was no reason for the French government not to approve the 
liberalisation measures, all the more because the reappraisal of priority sectors for 
investments was realised primarily to the benefit of French business. Indeed, the June 
1982 governmental protocol of economic co-operation gave rise to a series of sectorial 
accords on investment projects in the field of housing and public works (June 1982), 
transport infrastructures (November 1982), and agribusiness (January 1983) for 
which the services of French firms and banks were appealed to. On the whole, 
Algeria's progressive liberalisation policy was, thus, apprehended with satisfaction by 
both the French political establishment and the business community. 
1.2.2. Algeria's retreat from activism and radicalism in Third World 
politics 
In the realm of foreign policy, Algeria adopted as soon as the early years of 
the Chadli regime a more moderate approach to its Third World politics. This was not 
to the dislike of the French government whose own North/South policy was on the 
decline. Under Ben Bella and Boumediene, Algeria's foreign policy had been based 
upon the principles of non-alignment and the struggle against (neo)colonialism and 
imperialism. Thanks to the constant activism of Algeria's leadership in promoting the 
unity of the Third World and a restructuring of the world political economy, Algeria 
became in the mid-1970s the centre of all initiatives aimed at creating a "New 
International Economic Order" (NIEO)12. Upon his arrival to power, Chadli Benjedid 
signalled no spectacularly change in foreign policy. In his 1979 speeches, he 
maintained Algeria's foreign policy orientations as defined by the 1976 National 
Charter13. He appointed as foreign minister a veteran of the NIEO negotiations, 
Mohammed Benyahia. In matters of concrete policy, Chadli seemed to honour 
12 For details on Algeria's role in promoting the cause of the less developed countries and in 
spearheading the Third World in the mid-1970s, see A. Lassassi (1988), N. Grimaud (1984a), and R. 
Mortimer (1984a). 
13 See, for instance, his speeches of March 13 and October 30,1979 in Minister de ('information et 
de la culture (1979), vol.!, p. 17,31 and 32. 
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Algeria's commitment to the Third World's cause. Several Third World summits or 
conferences, while not of the same standing as those of 1973-75, were hosted in 
Algeria14. Most importantly, at the sixth summit of the Non-Aligned Movement 
(Havana, September 1979), Chadli introduced the principle of global negotiations on 
international economic co-operation, development, monetary and financial issues, 
primary commodities and energy, for which, as chairman of the Group of the 
Seventy-seven, Algeria had prepared a blueprint's. 
This continuity in Algeria's foreign policy led Robert Mortimer to write that 
"There [was] little reason to expect any substantial revision in doctrine or 
militance. "16 Yet, despite Chadli's radical proposal at Havana, there were perceptible 
signs of Algeria's retreat from its radicalism and activism. In Cuba, Chadli supported 
Tito's conception of non-alignment as opposed to that of Castro, operating thereby a 
shift away from Boumediene's equation of non-alignment with militant anti- 
imperialism towards a classical definition of non-alignment as a policy of equidistance 
between the USA and the Soviet Union17. Algeria also became less active within the 
Non-Aligned Movement. It was not a member of the bureau for the preparation of the 
ninth Conference of Foreign Ministers (New Delhi, February 1981) and for the 
preparation of the seventh summit (New Delhi, March 1983), whereas it had always 
been one throughout the 1970s1s. Furthermore, although Algeria continued to assume 
the chairmanship of the expert-group on the Co-operation of Broadcasting 
Organisations, which it was assigned in 1978, its function within the group proved to 
be more technical and administrative than ideological. Indeed, it did not participate in 
the meetings in 1981 and 1982 of the inter-governmental council for the co-ordination 
of the Non-aligned Countries on the participation of the movement in the struggle for 
14 E. g. the meetings of the Committee of Co-operation of Broadcasting Organisations of the non- 
aligned countries in May and June 1979 and March 1982 (0. Jankowitsch & K. Sauvant (eds. ), 
respectively (1986), vol. VII, p. 169 ; (1989), volX, p. 179 and 321) ; extraordinary meeting of the 
Non-Aligned Movement's co-ordinating countries on the Namibian issue in April 1981 (0. 
Jankowitsch & K. Sauvant (eds. ) (1986), vol. Vll, p. 51) ; two meetings on South/South co- 
operation in May 1982 (JR. Henry (1984), p. 467). 
15 R. Mortimer (1984a), pp. 167-8 ; Le Monde, 11 septembre 1979. 16 R. Mortimer (1984b), p. 20. 
17 J. Entelis (1986), pp. 201-4 ; R. Mortimer (1984a), p. 145. 18 See 0. Jankowitsch & K. Sauvant (eds. ) (1986), vol. VII, p. 51. 
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a New International Information and Communication Order19. In parallel, it is 
noteworthy that in 1980 Chadli Benjedid's public speeches made few references to the 
Non-Aligned Movement and its struggle for international restructuring20. 
These contradictory dynamics in Chadli's early foreign policy were brought to 
an end in 1983, which marked a clear shift away from Algeria's activism in Third 
World fora towards a focus on regional politics (the Maghreb and Southern 
Europe)21. Algeria's clear pulling back in 1983 was triggered by its failure to rally the 
Non-Aligned in New Delhi behind a common declaration calling for global 
negotiations and the adoption there of a softer bargaining strategy with the North22. 
Since then, Algeria's activism has ceased. This is best illustrated by its refusal to lead 
the eighth summit of the Non-Aligned Movement which was symbolically-charged 
since it marked the Movement's twenty-fifth anniversary23. Algeria's radicalism also 
tuned down as a consequence of the general trend towards conciliation within the 
Third World since it failed to impose its demands on the North and of Algeria's own 
economic interests which lay in the core of the industrialised capitalist economies 
rather than in the South. Thus, at the seventh United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD, Geneva, July-August 1987), the Algerian delegation 
made no reference to the NIEO even though it still argued for South/South co- 
operation. When referring to the North/South dialogue, it ceased to present it in a 
conflictive perspective and stressed co-operative concepts such as "international co- 
operation", "interdependence", and "joint-responsibility" which were practically non- 
existent in its previous discourse24. As a practical step, Algeria's withdrawal in 1986 
from the Non-Aligned Countries' co-ordinating group in the field of transnational 
19 O. Jankowitsch & K. Sauvant (eds. ) (1989), vol. IX, p. 159 and 310 ; vol. X, p. 179,190,321 and 
403. 
20 See, for instance, his speech to the National Popular Assembly on October 30,1980 in Ministöre 
de 1'information et de la culture (1981), vol.!!, pp. 120-1. 
21 This transpires in all articles dealing with Algeria's foreign policy under Chadli. See N. Grimaud 
(1993) ; R. Mortimer (1992), B. Korany (1991); J. Entelis (1986). 
22 R. Mortimer (1984a), pp. 167-8. 
23 JR. Henry (1987), P. 544. 
24 See the comparative statistical analysis of the statements given to the plenary meetings of 
UNCTAD in R. C16mengon (1990), tables 17,19,20,21,22 and 24. 
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corporations and foreign investment25 is highly significant, since this group had 
constantly condemned the activities of multinationals in less developed countries. This 
stance had become contradictory to Algeria's own policy of openness to foreign 
investments. 
In 1981, in accordance with the doctrine of the Socialist Party on Third World 
policy26, Mitterrand had advocated the establishment of a "New International 
Economic Order", within which North/South relations would be dissociated from 
East/West competition and whose rules of the game would be reformed to the benefit 
of the Third World (increased decision-making power within the Bretton Woods 
institutions and increased financial liquidities granted on better terms). In addition -- 
and following Algeria's 1979 proposal -- Mitterrand called for North/South global 
negotiations on such issues as the stabilisation of primary commodities prices, 
technology transfers, development of new and renewable energy and food self- 
reliance. The principle of global negotiations, which Mitterrand had supported at the 
UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries (Paris, September 1981)27, was 
accepted by the industrialised countries at the Ottawa G7 summit (July 1981) and at 
the North/South Conference of Cancun (October 1981). At the 1982 G7 summit, held 
in Versailles, the preliminary steps towards the organisation of global negotiations 
were to be taken. Instead, the Seven simply renewed their agreement to open 
negotiations. Thereafter, the disunity within the G77 and the rally of many Non- 
Aligned Countries to India's moderate bargaining strategy allowed the industrialised 
countries to withdraw from their original promises. Mitterrand continued, with more 
or less emphasis, to defend the Third World at all G7 summits. However, by 1984 
his propositions concerned the strategy of debt management rather than ambitious 
international restructuring28. In parallel, the vast programme for a reform of French 
25 See the list of member in 0. Jankowitsch & K. Sauvant (eds. ) (1993), vol. XI, pp. 426-8. 26 For details see J. Touscouz (1981). 
27 See the president's speech in F. Mitterrand (1986), pp. 355-65. Mitterrand explained his general 
propositions in C. Manceron & B. Pingaud (1981), pp. 146-7. 
28 Fora glimpse at the evolution of Mitterrand's discourse within the G7, see Le Monde, 19-20 
juillet 1981 ;8 juin 1982 ; 31 mai 1983 ;9 juin 1984 ;5 mai 1985 ;7 mai 1986 ; 22 juillet 1988 ; 
16-17 juillet 1989 ; 12 juillet 1990; 18 juillet 1991 ; 11 juillet 1992 ; 10 juillet 1993. 
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co-operation policy with the Third World, aimed at stripping it from its neocolonial 
features, was never undertaken seriously29. In this context, Algeria's retreat from its 
traditional radicalism and activism in supporting the Third World could only be seen 
with a willing eye by the French authorities, notably after Cot's resignation. 
Algeria's rising role throughout the 1980s as an international mediator 
(mediation with Iran for the release of the American hostages, mediation between Iran 
and Iraq, between the members of OPEC, and between the various factions of the 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation, PLO)30 was generally perceived as a matured 
way of conducting foreign policy. As indicated earlier, from 1985 to 1987 France also 
benefited from Algeria's new international role through its mediation for the release of 
French hostages held in Lebanon and the obtaining of a "cease-bombing" in Paris. 
On specific foreign policy issues, there were no major disagreements, and the 
evolution of events generally favoured a rapprochement. This was the case, for 
instance, on the issue of the Iran-Iraq war. After the mysterious crash in May 1982 of 
the plane taking the Algerian foreign minister to a negotiating round between the two 
belligerents, Algeria continued to argue for a negotiated solution to the conflict but 
was in favour of France's delivery of offensive fighting jets to Iraq in 198331. On the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Mitterrand's support for the 1978 Camp David accords as 
opposed to the 1980 European Venice Declaration and his refusal to recognise the 
PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians were far from Chadli's own views 
on the issue. However, the Algerians wholly agreed to Mitterrand's 1982 trip to Israel 
since he was to appeal there for the creation of a Palestinian state. In addition, Algiers 
could not fail to notice that Yasser Arafat's life had been saved twice thanks to the 
French32. France and Algeria eventually co-operated in an operation for the exchange 
of Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners against Israeli ones33. Although the French 
29 Material on the third-worldist spirit of French policy towards the developing world and its failures 
can be found in F. Favier & M. Martin-Roland (1990) ; J. Adda & MC. Smouts (1989) ; D. Levy 
(1987) ; JF. Bayart (1984) and JP. Cot (1984). 
30 For details, see N. Grimaud (1993), pp. 414-9 ; B. Allouche (1989). 
31 P. Favier & M. Roland-Martin (1991), p. 24. 
32 Interview with Claude Cheysson, April 22,1994. 
33 P. Favier & M. Roland-Martin (1991), pp. 37-8. 
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presence in Africa contradicts Algeria's formal condemnation of neocolonialism, a 
community of interests was found in the conflict between Libya and Chad : French 
fighting-planes were authorised to fly over Algeria's air-space and to refuel on its 
territory during the 1983 Manta operation against Libyan troops34. The most 
contentious issue between France and Algeria related to France's policy of equilibrium 
in the Maghreb once relations with Algeria had been brought back to parity with those 
between France and Morocco and Tunisia. In particular, Mitterrand's private visit to 
Hassan II in late August 1984 when Morocco was organising a referendum on the 
union treaty signed with Libya was perceived in Algiers as bringing a caution to an 
alliance that was to its disadvantage. Algeria may have been disillusioned as to the 
power of the pro-Algeria lobby within Mitterrand's Administration. However, it was 
well-understood, albeit not well-accepted, in Algiers that France could not afford a 
deterioration of its relations with Morocco and Tunisia, and that, subsequently, it 
could not go beyond its neutralist stance on the Western Sahara dispute35. 
Although the period 1981-1988 was not all rosy for the daily unfolding of 
Franco-Algerian relations, the Mitterrand regime had thus a rather positive attitude 
towards its Algerian counterpart which undertook to liberalise its economy and to shift 
from Third World activism to international mediation. The October 1998 uprising in 
Algeria was to bring Paris even closer to Algiers. 
2. French support to Chadli Benjedid's economic and political 
liberalisation policy (October 1988 - January 1992) 
The October 1988 riots were to change the political face of Algeria. Indeed, 
they sparked off a fast-track democratisation process which lasted for over three years 
before being brought to an end with the coup d'&tat of January 1992. During these 
three years, Algeria experienced an exceptional degree of political freedom in the Arab 
world. Civil society was freed. The one-party state system was brought down as 
34 L. Blin (1990), footnote 123, p. 415. 
35 Interview with Claude Cheysson, April 22,1994. 
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political parties were allowed. Free local and regional elections took place in June 
1990 and their results were accepted, thus bringing the FIS to power in the majority 
of local and regional councils. A setback occurred in June 1991 when martial law was 
enforced as a result of protests organised by the FIS against a new electoral law which 
gerrymandered the constituencies. The subsequent imprisonment of the FIS's leaders 
let to presage what was to happen later on. However, to all appearances, the Algerian 
government seemed prepared to organise parliamentary "clean and fair" elections. In 
parallel with democratisation, Algeria accelerated its economic liberalisation 
programme. 
In face of the crushing of the 1988 riots, the Rocard government chose the 
"telling silence" in the range of diplomatic formulae. It then proceeded to argue that 
Algiers needed help, not remonstrance, to overcome the socioeconomic problems that 
led to popular discontent. Backing Chadli in the wake of Black October also came 
down to demonstrate support for the man himself at a time when he was challenged 
both from below and from within the political establishment. With democratisation on 
track and economic liberalisation accelerated, France brought its support to Chadli. 
Mitterrand went to Algiers in 1989. Significant economic aid was granted although, to 
Hamrouche's despair, France refused to be accommodating with regard to Algeria's 
bilateral debt. The June 1991 setback led the French foreign minister to call for a rapid 
holding of the parliamentary elections which were seen as the only means through 
which an Algerian government could get the legitimacy it had always been lacking. If 
the French government had foreseen the FIS's victory, it probably would have argued 
for "the proper circumstances to be met" before holding the elections. 
2.1. The October 1988 uprising and the French response : non- 
interference and solidarity 
As seen previously, despite the recurrent ups and downs in the Franco- 
Algerian relationship, the French authorities had supported the Chadli regime 
throughout the 1980s. When the brutal crushing of the popular rebellion occurred in 
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October 1988, the Rocard government (May 1988 - May 1991) was faced with a 
dilemma. As explained by a high civil servant, "supporting Chadli (... ) mean[t] 
backing the repression, but supporting the Algerian people and freedom [came] down 
to disavow Chadli. "36. While Algeria's youth was being shot at by the Army, the 
French foreign minister resorted to the traditional diplomatic phraseology by saying 
that the French government was very closely following a situation that "appeared" 
worrying37. This foreshadowed the official position of non-interference in Algeria's 
domestic affairs spelt out both by the spokesman for the Elysde38 and the Quai 
d'Orsay. On October 12,1988 Dumas argued at the National Assembly39 that co- 
operation between Paris and Algiers should not be affected by these events. He 
explained that the French government had to express its solidarity towards Algeria 
because turning its back on the Algerian regime would not help solving the problems 
that were at the root of popular discontent. Dumas described the riots as an expression 
of the people's dissatisfaction with their socioeconomic plight resulting from the deep 
developmental crisis affecting Algeria. He also mentioned the popular demand for 
greater political freedom, but, quite logically, hushed up the problem of the legitimacy 
crisis of the Chadli regime which had transpired during the riots through various 
slogans expressing only contempt for the president40. Dumas proposed to show 
France's solidarity by finding a solution to the gas dispute within the larger 
framework of bilateral economic and financial co-operation -- a proposal that he had 
already made in September during his visit to Algiers. 
36 Quoted in Liberation, 11 octobre 1988. 
37 Interview, October 8,1988, quoted in Le Monde, 11 octobre 1988. 
38 See H. V6drine's address quoted in ibid 
39 MAE (Septembre-Octobre 1988), p. 86. See also his interview on France-Inter, October 10,1988 
in ibid., pp. 71-2. 
40 Despite this silence, Dumas's explanation of the 1988 riots is close to that found in the academic 
literature. In general, authors are split on two issues. Firstly, whether the uprising was primarily a 
"semolina riot" (e. g. M. Akacem (1993), p. 52) or whether it was essentially the product of a 
political crisis (e. g. H. Roberts (1993a), pp. 434-6). Secondly, whether the rebellion was a 
spontaneous reaction to economic and political privations (e. g. J. Entelis & L. Arone (1992), pp. 24- 
6; L. Rummel (1992) ; K. Duran (1989), pp. 407-12), or whether the Youth had been manipulated 
either by the conservative trend of the FLN as a means to destabilise the Chadli regime, or by the 
presidency itself as a means to undermine the FLN party (see PR. Baduel (1994), pp. 8-12 ; A. Kapil 
(1992), pp. 515-21 and F. Rouziek (1990), pp. 583-5). Whether or not the Youth was manipulated, it 
should not be forgotten that the 1988 riots represent the peak of a movement of social discontent that 
had begun in the early 1980s. 
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Apart from the fact that the French government had perhaps already got wind 
of Chadli's political reforms proposals made in his speech to the nation on the evening 
of October 10 (see below), the decision to support Chadli seems to have been taken 
primarily in light of his potential removal from power. In Liberation, A. Valladao 
suggested that French support to Chadli was motivated by the fear that the military 
establishment might return to the forefront of political affairs41. This was a prospect 
that the French government wanted to avoid, most certainly. For, even though the 
military has always been the centre of power in Algeria, its direct management of 
political affairs would have had the effect of sapping the presentability stamp provided 
by the civilian government and would have entailed risks of greater authoritarianism. 
But, in addition to this general issue, the maintenance in power of Chadli himself was 
at stake. Indeed, the nomination of the unique candidate for the next presidential 
elections was on the agenda of the FLN's sixth congress scheduled for December 
1988. Now, not only was Chadli openly challenged from below, but his policies had 
also alienated the conservative trend of the FLN party42. Relations between the 
presidency and the Boumedienist trend of the FLN were particularly tense before the 
October riots broke out. The fact that part of the FLN party was pitted against Chadli 
boded ill for his nomination for the presidential elections, even though, in the last 
resort, the decision lay with the Army. 
In an interview with the author, Dumas confirmed that the French government 
41 Liberation, 11 octobre 1988. 
42 The FLN party absorbed the various nationalist movements at the time of the War of Liberation 
and thus became a coalition of different trends. It has never ruled Algeria despite its status of unique 
party. Its role has been limited to the control and mobilisation of the civil society -- a function that it 
did not fulfil that well since Boumediene had to rely on communist activists to organise the Agrarian 
Revolution and since, in the early 1980s, an anti-establishment movement appeared both with the 
Berber and the Islamist mobilisations. Despite its weak position in the Algerian political system, the 
FLN had, nevertheless, a nuisance capability. This appeared clearly in 1985 during the debates around 
the "enrichment" of the 1976 National Charter. The issue that crystallised opposition from the 
conservative or Boumedienist trend was Chadli's economic liberalisation project. Some also argue 
that behind-the-scenes discussions on a reform of the FLN were at the root of the hardliners' 
discontent. It is true that the official recognition of one of the three Algerian Human Rights Leagues 
and the easing of the conditions for the creation of associations in 1987 infuriated Mohammed Cherif 
Messaadia, head of the permanent secretariat of the Central Committee, precisely because it 
questioned the FLN's control over the mass and professional organisations, and, in the longer term, 
the FLN's status as unique party. On the relations between the presidency and the FLN hardline 
conservatives, see A. Kapil (1992) ; F. Rouziek (1990) and (1989). 
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wished Chadli to be maintained in power after the FLN congress43. Chadli was 
thought to be able to get his country out of crisis and his policies pleased the French 
government. In addition, the eventuality of his removal from power could only be 
apprehended with concern in Paris because of the uncertainty as to who would replace 
him and as to the future policies that would be implemented. French support to Chadli 
Benjedid did not imply that the French had a say in the nomination of Algeria's 
president. It did, however, signal that, with Chadli in power, the French authorities 
would be ready to help Algeria with its economic difficulties. The decision to back 
Chadli was thereafter reinforced by the Algerian president's democratisation measures 
and his continued economic liberalisation policy. 
2.2. France stands behind Algeria's political and economic 
liberalisation (October 1988 - June 1991) 
2.2.1. Liberalisation in Algeria 
The bloody October 1988 events triggered a move towards political 
liberalisation. In his speech to the nation on October 10, Chadli Benjedid promised, 
among other things, political reforms. On October 13, whereas the state of siege and 
the curfew had ended, the president announced a national referendum on a 
constitutional reform for November 3,1988. He proposed to reorganise the executive 
power through the strengthening of the prime minister's function, henceforth 
encharged with the conduct of domestic affairs and responsible to the National 
Assembly. On October 25, the presidency proposed a reform of the FLN party, 
claiming that it had to "definitively liberate itself from the temptation of hegemonic and 
direct exercise of responsibilities within the state apparatus, elected assemblies, the 
economy, and within the social and professional organisations"44. In effect, the 
43 Interview with Roland Dumas, May 16,1995. 
44 Quoted in F. Rouziek (1990), p. 591. See also Rouziek's article for all events, dates and figures 
indicated for the year 1988. Algeria's democratisation experience until the January 1992 coup d'6tat 
has been accounted for in many books and articles by now. Among them see e. g. JJ. Lavenue 
(1993) ; J. Entelis & L. Arone (1992) ; R. Mortimer (1991). 
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presidency proposed the abolition of the one-party state system. After the dismissal of 
Mohammed Cherif Messaadia and his replacement by Abelhamid Mehri on October 
30,1988, the FLN endorsed the reform at its sixth congress (November 27-29, 
1988). It also designated Chadli Benjedid as the unique candidate for the presidential 
elections. Benjedid was reelected for a third mandate on December 22,1988. Two 
months later, on February 23,1989, a new Constitution, opening the path to political 
openness, was put to referendum and accepted at 73.4% of the popular vote. The 
Constitution omitted reference to major ideological principles of the Republic, notably 
socialism, non-alignment, third-worldism and the promotion of a NIEO. Mention of 
the FLN was done only in relation to its historical role in winning Independence from 
France. The Constitution fortified the separation of powers while reinforcing the 
presidential prerogatives. It secured the guarantee of civil liberties (freedom of 
expression, of association, right to strike, etc. ) and introduced multipartism by 
allowing for the creation of "associations of a political character". Moreover, article 24 
no longer referred to the National Popular Army as the "Guardian of the Revolution" 
and confined its activity to the sole defence of the territory45 . 
From February 1989 to June 1991, and particularly under the premiership of 
Mouloud Hamrouche (September 1989 - June 1991), political liberalisation effectively 
took place46. During this period, the Army, without relinquishing its de facto 
predominance within the Algerian political system, withdrew from its positions in the 
direct management of political affairs : in March 1989, its officers left their functions 
in the FLN's Central Committee and, in July 1990, President Benjedid renounced his 
function as defence minister. In June 1991, he also relinquished his function as head 
of the FLN. The protection of civil liberties seemed secured with the April 1989 
parliamentary approval of the UN convention against torture and the ratification of 
various international conventions on human rights, as well as the official recognition 
of the Algerian Association for the Defence of Human Rights headed by Ali Yahia 
45 On the constitutional reform and for a reprint of the Constitution, see C. Rulleau (1989), pp. 159- 
87. 
46 The following marking events are drawn from the chronology provided in P. Eveno (1994) ; F. 
Rouziek (1992) and (1991). 
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Abdennour in November of that year. The civil society was let to organise itself :a 
plethora of associations emerged, the press was freed, and political parties were 
allowed by statute 89-11 of July 5,198947. A year after the promulgation of this law 
twenty-one parties had officially been recognised. On the eve of the first round of the 
parliamentary elections (December 1991), there were fifty48. The break with the past 
was symbolised by the return to Algeria of such opponents as Hocine Alt Ahmed, 
leader of the Front of Socialist Forces (FFS) in exile for twenty-three years and 
Ahmed Ben Bella, Algeria's first president who had spent fifteen years in prison 
before being released under Chadli Benjedid in 1980 and who thereafter went into 
exile in Europe. Anticipating the local and regional elections of June 12,1990, the 
various political parties organised numerous demonstrations which were allowed. 
Democratisation was also patent in the authorities' acceptance of the verdict of the 
June 1990 elections where the FIS triumphed over the FLN (see table 2). 
On the economic front, the appointment of Mouloud Hamrouche as prime 
minister gave a new impulse to the transition to a market economy. Hamrouche 
represented the FLN's reforming trend. Under the authority of the presidency, he had 
supervised a study workshop whose mission was to find solutions to the Algerian 
economic crisis. The fruit of this work was published in 1989 in Les Cahiers de la 
reforme49. It strongly inspired Hamrouche's own programme. The latter insisted on 
the necessity to associate all economic agents (unions, associations, etc. ) to the reform 
aimed at abolishing state-controlled economy. Under Hamrouche, the reform towards 
the managerial autonomy of state enterprises went ahead. State monopoly over foreign 
trade was further relaxed (August 1990) before being formally abolished (February 
1991). Following the provisions of the March 1990 law of credit and money, the 
47 The text of this law is reprinted in A. Djeghloul (1990), pp. 200-5. 48 F. Rouziek (1993), pp. 639-40. The multiplication of parties and newspapers has generally been 
seen in the West as a sign of the vitality of Algeria's civil society. Although this is not to be denied, 
it should be noted that some parties seem to have been formed only to receive state-sponsored 
financial aid. State-financing of political parties renders their subscribers eminently suspect as to their 
independence, and parties, such as the FFS and the FIS, refused it. As regards the press, journalists 
wishing to create their own newspaper were guaranteed a three year salary by the state. The issue of 
their independence is thus also at stake (A. Yefsah (1994), footnotes 27 and 28, p. 93). 
49 The contents of Les Cahiers de la reforme can be found in G. Corm (1993), pp. 12-16. 
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monetary and financial sectors were deregulated, the Central Bank was made 
independent from the Ministry of Finance, and restrictions on foreign investments 
were removed. In accordance with an IMF programme accompanying a standby credit 
(April 1991), the Hamrouche government devalued the Algerian Dinar and introduced 
price deregulation and a new wage system meant to reflect productivity50. However, 
Hamrouche's endeavour to liberalise the economy was not achieved without difficulty 
as it questioned some well-established vested interests. In particular, foreign trade 
liberalisation directly threatened the tidy commissions pocketed by the Army officers 
selecting foreign suppliers. The reform of public enterprises also prevented their 
infiltration by the Military Security. The June 1991 events offered the opportunity to 
remove Hamrouche from his function. 
50 See G. Corm (1993) ; F. Rouziek (1993), (1992) and (1991). 
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Table 2: Results of the Algerian local and regional elections, June 1990 
Parties Votes Expressed 
Votes 9'o 
Registred 
Votes % 
APC 
910 
APW 
90 
FIS 4 331472 54.3 33.7 853 55.4 32 66.7 
FLN 2245 798 28.1 17.5 487 31.6 14 29.2 
Independents 931278 11.7 7.3 106 6.9 1 2.1 
RCD 166104 2.1 1.3 87 5.6 1 2.1 
Others 310136 2.1 2.4 8 0.5 - - 
I Total 7 984 788 100.0 62.2 * 1541 100.0 48 100.0 1 
Reg. voters 12 841769 
Table 3: Results of the first round of the Algerian parliamentary elections, December 
1991 
Parties Votes Expressed 
Votes % 
Registred 
Votes % 
Seats 
% 
FIS 3 260 222 47.3 24.5 188 43.7 
FLN 1 612 947 23.4 12.1 15 3.5 
FFS (b) 510661 7.4 3.8 25 5.8 
Hamas (ne) 368 697 5.3 2.8 - 
Independents 309 264 4.4 2.3 3 
RCD 200 267 2.9 1.5 - - 
MNI (ne) 150 093 2.2 1.1 - - 
MDA (b) 135 882 2.0 1.0 - - 
Others 349 386 5.1 2.6 - - 
Total 6 897 419 100.0 1 51.7 * 231 53.0 
Reg. voters 13 314 771 
Legend : APC : Assembl6e Populaire Communale (local council) 
APW : Assemblee Populaire de Wilaya (regional council) 
*: Participation rate 
(b) : boycotted the 1990 elections. 
(ne) : non-existant at the time of the 1990 elections. 
Mft : The numbers of votes given in table 2 correspond only to the local 
elections. Results of the regional elections (held simultaneously) were 
similar. J- 
Source : Tables respectively compiled from the data in F. Rouziek (1992) 
and (1993). 
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2.2.2. French support 
In France, after the "telling silence" on the crushing of the riots, the official 
stance was one of solidarity with the Algerian authorities. The appointment of Kasdi 
Merbah to the premiership had initially provoked some surprise. Merbah had headed 
the Military Security under Ben Bella and Boumediene and was not, therefore, the 
perfect incarnation of the democratisation process announced by Chadli. Yet, it was 
also thought that as a man of authority, having good relations with the Military, and 
having headed several ministries under Chadli, Merbah had the required experience 
and firmness to get the country out of crisis51. France's support was expressed 
through a diplomatic backing, illustrated by Mitterrand's visit to Algiers on March 9- 
10,1989. There, he declared himself satisfied with Algeria's evolution towards 
pluralism and democracy52. As promised by Dumas, economic support was 
channelled through the settlement in January 1989 of the disagreement over the 
renewal of the 1982 gas accord53 and the signature of a financial aid accord of 
FF 7 billion (over $ 1.1 billion) in February 1989. This financial package comprised 
a FF 3 billion commercial credit line. It was also made up of a new financial device :a 
FF 4 billion financial protocol constituted of long-term governmental credits (30 
years) and of Coface guaranteed long-term private loans (10 years). The sum was to 
be paid out in two equal instalments in 1989 and 1990 and was meant to ease 
Algeria's balance of payments deficit and finance developmental projects54. This 
financial protocol indicated the French government's willingness to back the Algerian 
economy through state development aid, since, previously, French official 
51 Interview with Jean Audibert (France's Ambassador to Algiers from January 1989 to September 
1992), June 7,1995. 
52 See his speech in MAE (mars-avril 1989), p. 16. 
53 The deadlock on the renegotiation of the 1982 gas contract opened in July 1986. It stemmed from 
disagreements between Sonatrach and Gaz de France (GDF) over the pricing formula and quantities. In 
addition to these problems, disagreements between the two companies appeared in late 1986 as 
Sonatrach continued to bill GDFs imports according to a temporary pricing agreement signed in 
March 1986 and designed to counterbalance the effects of depressed oil prices on the price of gas 
(pegged on the price of oil since 1982). The 1989 gas accord imposed a compromise between the 
positions of the companies and provided that GDF would pay the arrears (FF 850 million) 
corresponding the difference between the price paid by GDF and that billed by the Sonatrach. For 
details on the gas contract, see L. Blin & E. Gobe (1991), pp. 486-7. 
54 L. Blin & E. Gobe (1991), p. 486. 
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development aid to Algeria had been very low55. 
In the last months of his premiership, Merbah had been in open conflict with 
Chadli Benjedid over issues concerning the powers of the prime minister. Partly 
because of this quarrel, which was detrimental to governmental policy stability, the 
nomination of Mouloud Hamrouche was welcome in Paris. Hamrouche was a 
"president's man". He had been general secretary of the presidency since 1986. There 
were, thus, few risks of disagreements with the presidency. In addition, Hamrouche 
incarnated the FLN's reforming trend. His government comprised many young 
renovators. This gave credibility to his programme of reforms which he applied 
consistently and which was praised by the French political establishment56. 
Prior to the visit of the French foreign affairs minister to Algiers on May 24- 
25,1991, Hamrouche had stated in an interview with Le Monde that "things were not 
going that well since 1988" between France and Algeria57. This was quite surprising 
since, as shown above, gestures of support had not been lacking even when Merbah 
was prime minister. When Hamrouche was himself in government, bilateral relations 
had been managed rather smoothly. Two marking events occurred when Hamrouche 
was leading the govemment : the Algerian elections and the Gulf crisis (August 1990 - 
April 1991). Neither had, however, a particular impact on Franco-Algerian relations. 
The June 1990 elections which brought the FIS to power in the majority of 
local and regional councils did not create a panic effect in France. As a consequence, 
they generated neither a stronger support to the Algerian regime than that existing nor 
an attitude of prudence toward the Islamist political force. The Islamist phenomenon 
was understood in Paris essentially as an expression of popular discontent deriving 
from Algeria's problems of economic development and its democratic deficit58. It 
55 Throughout the 1980s French official development aid to Algeria amounted on average to FF 300 
million, accounting for 1 to 2% of French total official development aid (OECD, document obtained 
on request and ratios calculated from data in this document and the OECD's Development and 
Cooperation yearly reviews). 
56 Interview with Jean Audibert, June 7,1995. For an example of the French government's praise of 
Chadli and Hamrouche's reforms, see Dumas's press conference in Algiers on May 25,1991 in MAE 
(mai-juin 1991), p. 41. 
57 Le Monde, 28 mai 1991. 
58 This analysis was held by the French minister for foreign affairs and the co-operation minister as 
early as 1988. See respectively MAE (septembre-octobre 1988), p. 72 and Le Monde, 13 octobre 
36 
was, thus, thought that the FIS vote of 1990 did not mean popular adherence to an 
ideology and that, subsequently, the popular protest which the FIS's success 
incarnated could be defused. This was the French Ambassador's message to the 
Elysee. It was also that of Algerian political figures, and notably of Hamrouche who 
went on a secret visit to Paris right after the elections59. There, he may also have 
explained that, however unexpected the extent of the FIS's success was, it would help 
undermining FLN hardliners who protested against the Hamrouche government's 
liberalising economic measures. The French reaction to the result of the Algerian local 
elections -- largely inspired by what was being said in Algiers -- could not, therefore, 
be at the root of Hamrouche's harsh words. 
As regards the effects of the Gulf War on Franco-Algerian relations, the issue 
is complex because of the different positions of the various actors involved. As in 
other parts of the Arab world60, Algerian public opinion -- in particular, the Youth 
and some intellectuals -- was in favour of Saddam Hussein, in part in reaction to the 
disproportionate means engaged by the multinational coalition to destroy Iraq and the 
triumphal tone of the French news which are watched by about 12 million Algerians 
thanks to parabolic antennas. In their great majority, political parties also adopted a 
pro-Iraqi stance. The most active -- Ben Bella's Algerian Democratic Movement 
(MDA) and the FIS -- initiated a parallel diplomacy, travelling to various Middle 
Eastern capitals hoping to find a mediating solution. The FIS organised rallies, called 
on the government to dispatch volunteers to defend Iraq, and announced its intention 
to set up military training camps61. This pro-Hussein activity must be partly 
understood in relation to the domestic context of Algeria and, notably, the run-up to 
the parliamentary elections. Denouncing the multinational coalition was a means to 
differentiate one's policy from that of the government. 
The Algerian government, like other members of the Arab League, first 
1988. 
59 Interview with Jean Audibert, June 7,1995. 
60 See G. Joff6 (1993b), pp. 186-90. 
61 For details on Algeria's policy during the Gulf crisis as well as the parallel diplomacy of the MDA 
and the FIS, see R. Mortimer (1992), pp. 261-2 or N. Grimaud (1991), pp. 31-33. 
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reacted by condemning Saddam Hussein and calling for an unconditional withdrawal 
of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. However, while not making infuriated declarations 
against the coalition, the government did not lend its support to Saudi Arabia. At the 
Cairo Extraordinary Arab Summit on August 10,1990, it abstained on a firm 
condemnation of Iraq and the sending of a pan-Arab force to Saudi Arabia. Its 
position was to argue for an Arab-monitored and peaceful settlement. Chadli Benjedid 
attempted a mediation and turned, among others, to France which had sought a 
compromise. At the UN in September 1990, Mitterrand had advocated a proposal to 
resolve the various conflicts besetting the region after the Iraq-Kuwait conflict would 
have been settled. In addition, although French forces were sent to the Gulf, they 
were not part of the multinational coalition until the offensive was launched62. The 
French and Algerian positions, while not similar, were, thus, not far apart and 
Mitterrand agreed to meet Chadli in Paris on December 22,1990. There, each party 
promised to do everything they could to avoid the war, even though they had doubts 
about their chances of success63. 
There was in France, particularly in the press and among certain politicians 
such as Cheysson64, a certain fear that the Gulf War would provoke a fracture 
between France and Algeria. This perception was due to the trenchant discourse of the 
Algerian foreign minister. During his visits to France in January and February 1991, 
Sid Ahmed Ghozali had, indeed, been vehemently critical of France's participation in 
the Desert Storm operation which he denounced as submissiveness to the USA. 
However, Ghozali's position, although backed by a group within the FLN, was 
marginal within the Hamrouche government. This fact, underlined by the then French 
Ambassador to Algiers, also transpired in an interview with Georges Morin, 
responsible for the Maghreb at the International Secretariat of the Socialist Party. 
During the Gulf crisis, Morin went twice to the Maghrebi capitals as part of different 
62 For a chronology of the conflict and the French proposals, see B. Kodmani-Darwish & M. 
Chartouni-Dubarry (1991), pp. 37-47. 
63 Interview with Jean Audibert, June 7,1995. 
64 Cheysson, who is a close friend of Ghozali, criticised Mitterrand's decision to fight Iraq as a "blind 
fidelity" to the Allies (interview with the author, April 22,1994). 
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initiatives to explain to the governments and the civil societies of the region that 
France's policy did not constitute a crusade against the Arabs. He affirmed that if, in 
general, France's intervention in the Gulf was criticised by the civil society, 
governments understood France's position and that, when Ghozali was virulent in his 
talks with Dumas, he was essentially trying to reflect the doxa65. It thus seems that 
the Gulf War did not have a strong detrimental effect on bilateral governmental 
relations, and that, in any case, Hamrouche's declaration that Franco-Algerian 
relations had not been at their best since 1988 was not motivated by a quarrel over the 
Gulf issue. 
The only plausible explanation left refers to bilateral financial relations -- an 
issue pointed out by Hamrouche in his interview with the daily ; which proves that, in 
foreign affairs, what is perceived as the tip of the iceberg is sometimes the iceberg 
itself. In his interview, Hamrouche had reproached the lack of enthusiasm of French 
firms in investing in Algeria. More emphatically, he had criticised the French financial 
establishment for what he depicted as its negative attitude in relation to Algeria's 
proposal for a bilateral rescheduling of its debt towards France. The issue of Algeria's 
debt and its reluctance to sign a classical rescheduling operation sanctioned by an IMF 
accord is examined in chapter two. Suffice to say here that France, which holds about 
a quarter of Algeria's debt, has always been unwilling to satisfy Algeria's demand. 
There were two main reasons for this. Firstly, financial orthodoxy played its part. The 
rule has always been that countries in payment difficulties go through a structural 
adjustment programme as a counterpart to a debt rescheduling. The French 
government has never agreed to depart from it. As a compromise, it has proposed, 
particularly after January 1992, to plead in favour of Algeria to obtain important funds 
from regional and international organisations and good lending conditions from the 
IMF. Secondly, when Algeria first formulated its demand in 1989, there was an 
65 In August 1990, Morin accompanied Pierre Mauroy (ex-prime minister) who was sent by the 
Elysee in order to deliver France's message to Hassan II, Benjedid, Ben Ali and Arafat. In March 
1991, Morin returned to the Maghreb, heading a socialist delegation of fifteen French people's 
representatives natives of the Maghreb. The delegation met members of government, opposition 
parties and the human rights leagues (Interview with Georges Morin, June 29,1994). 
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important contentious matter over the payment by Algeria of the bills due to French 
firms. As part of the 1982 economic co-operation agreement, many French enterprises 
had participated to the construction of infrastructures and equipments. Payments 
(FF 3 to 4 billion) had been blocked as a retaliation measure against the litigious gas 
negotiations of 1986-89. In times of financial difficulties, the Algerian government 
tried as much as possible to further delay them. The French Finance Ministry 
considered that, in these circumstances, the kind of help the Algerians were asking for 
should not be granted66. 
Hamrouche may not have been that bitter over France's rejection of bilateral 
"reprofiling" if Italy had not agreed on May 3,1991 to release a credit of $ 7.2 billion 
out of which $ 2.5 billion were meant to reschedule part of Algeria's short and 
medium term official debt towards that country67. For, on the whole, France's 
attitude towards Algeria was not frosty. In July 1990, it had renewed its bilateral 
financial aid and had approved the principle of a rescheduling of part of Algeria's non- 
guaranteed debt by a international bank syndicate headed by the Credit Lyonnais -- an 
operation that was not, however, concluded yet when Hamrouche formulated his 
grievances68. In addition, France was active in promoting the European Community's 
"Redirected Mediterranean Policy". 
Nevertheless, the French minister for economic and financial affairs, Pierre 
Beregovoy, was sent to Algiers on July 29,1991 in order to respond to the Algerian 
authorities' grievances. Old commercial credits amounting to FF 1.3 billion as well as 
a credit line of FF 100 million for the creation of joint-ventures were reopened. The 
revolving guaranteed credit of FF 3 billion was increased to FF 4 billion and a loan 
was granted for the import of cereals. Beregovoy also promised to help in speeding 
up the Credit Lyonnais's debt reprofiling operation and argued for "a new impulse" in 
Franco-Algerian economic relations69. His visit, although dominated by economic 
issues, partly aimed at providing political support to the new government that had 
66 Interview with Jean Audibert, June 7,1995. 
67 M. Hernando dc Larramendi (1993), p. 504. 
68 Le Monde, 26 juillet 1990. 
69 M. Hernando de Larramendi (1993), pp. 520-1 and 560. 
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been appointed in June 1991. 
2.3. The Quai d'Orsay urges elections (June - December 1991) 
2.3.1. The June 1991 events in Algeria 
The parliamentary elections announced by Benjedid for June 1991 were 
eventually postponed to the end of the year in a highly volatile political context since 
on June 5,1991 martial law was enforced again and Hamrouche dismissed70. At the 
root of the street fighting that occurred between Islamist militants and the police forces 
in early June was the controversy over a new electoral law which gerrymandered the 
constituencies. The secular parties denounced the bill, which also limited the number 
of candidates to two (as opposed to three as initially planned) at the second round, 
imposing the probable choice between the FLN or the FIS. The FIS's opposition to 
the law was reinforced by the adoption of decrees regulating the use of mosques and 
forbidding the Friday prayers to be turned into political rallies. It called for a general 
strike in Algiers on May 25,1991 asking for the abrogation of the law and 
simultaneous parliamentary and presidential elections. The general strike was not 
followed but the FIS organised a sit-in at the main squares of Algiers for more than 
ten days. While on June 3 Abassi Madani had agreed with the Hamrouche 
government to end the demonstration, the gendarmerie was sent during the night to 
clear up the squares. The next day, demonstrations continued and, in the night of 
June 4, the Army intervened. Official sources recorded 17 dead and 219 wounded71. 
Sporadic street fighting continued throughout the Summer72 as the Army cracked 
down on FIS militants. Benhadj and Madani warned that armed resistance would be 
organised to meet the authorities' clampdown. Arms hide-outs had earlier been 
discovered and the FIS leaders were arrested on June 30,1991 on charges of 
70 The following account is drawn from A. Charef (1994), pp. 131-74 and F. Rouziek (1993), pp. 
597-610. 
71 A. Charef (1994), p. 167. 
72 By August 1,1991 official reports accounted for 55 dead, 326 wounded and 2 976 arrests and 
interpellations since June 5,1991. In ibid., p. 174. 
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conspiracy against the state. Several members of the FIS majlis ash shura 
(Consultative Council) were also arrested. 
2.3.2. France urges elections 
Following the enforcement of martial law in Algeria, the spokesman for the 
Quai d'Orsay deplored the violence whichever its origin73. The French minister for 
foreign affairs wished for calm to return and for a prompt resumption of the electoral 
process74. This was his constant message until December 1991 -- his argument being 
that the elections were the key to political stability in Algeria : 
"I think that Algeria will find a real balance only when the elections take place. These 
elections have to be held as soon as possible. (... ) It is evident that [France] also has an 
interest in having an interlocutor whose governmental stability is confirmed. "75 
Surely, Dumas would not have been so insistent in calling for a rapid holding of the 
elections if he had believed the FIS would win a parliamentary majority. He 
confirmed that he assumed the FIS would not carry such a majority76. His statement 
is corroborated by Claude Silberzahn, head of the French secret services, who 
deplored that the French government had disregarded the DGSE's warnings that the 
FIS would win77. 
At this juncture, reference must be made to the issue as to whether the 
Algerian authorities themselves expected the results of the first round of the December 
1991 parliamentary elections (see table 3). Pierre Ddvoluy and Mireille Duteil have 
argued that these results came as a complete surprise in Algiers78. Their argument is 
supported by the then French Ambassador to Algiers79. By contrast, Abed Charef and 
George Joff6 have suggested that, not only did the Algerian Army know about the 
73 Liberation, 6 juin 1991. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Interview, June 27,1991 in MAE (mai juin 1991), p. 137. 76 Interview with Roland Dumas, May 16,1995. 
77 C. Silberzahn (1995), p. 292. 
78 P. Devoluy & M. Duteil (1994), pp. 24-9. 
79 Interview with Jean Audibert, June 7,1995. 
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FIS's electoral victory, but that it had also favoured it in order to prove to foreign 
opinion that Chadli was incompetent, which justified the coup d'6tat that followed the 
first round of the parliamentary elections80. 
The contention that the results were unexpected in Algiers relies on internal 
information and can, therefore, prove as much the truth as misinformation. It is based 
upon the claim that the Algerian Ministry for the Interior's assessments conjectured 
that the votes would be divided in about three thirds with a big third for the FIS, 
another for the FLN and the rest for the various contending parties. This implied that 
an alliance between the FLN and the various parties in the future Assembly would put 
the FIS in the minority. The authorities' conviction that the FIS would not do badly, 
but not well enough to reach a majority, would have derived from three main factors. 
Firstly, there was a far greater choice in the parliamentary elections than in the local 
ones : fifty contesting parties as opposed to eleven in June 1990. Secondly, it was 
believed that the FIS had lost much of its popularity as a consequence of its 
management of the local and regional councils. The idea, conveyed in the Algerian 
and French press, that local Islamic governance had been catastrophic proved to be 
somewhat more partisan than objective. Economic results were perhaps not better than 
they had been. However, through various charitable activities, FIS-governed localities 
managed both to bring relief to the needy and to provide an activity for the young 
hittistes81. Equipping the slums with dustbins ; regularly picking-up the rubbish ; 
offering free tutoring ; setting up small shops managed by the unemployed ; offering 
lower prices in the Islamic souq 82; all this had made this brand of politicians much 
closer to the needs of their constituency than most of the FLN officials had ever been. 
With regards to the most publicised and contested measures allegedly implemented by 
the FIS, such as sexual segregation on the beaches, the ban on swimwear and shorts, 
or on alcohol sales, John Entelis has argued that he saw no evidence of such 
80 A. Charef (1994), pp. 222-31 and G. Joffe (1994a), p. 8. 
81 The hittistes, literally those who hold up the wall, are the many young unemployed who spend 
their days outside, leaning back against the walls, waiting for time to pass. 82 See the interview of R. Bekkar on the FIS policy measures in Tlemcen in H. Davis (1992), 
pp. 12-5. 
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restrictions in the Tipasa commune, and that "Islamic zealousness", although existent, 
had actually been much less important than the press had suggested83. 
Thirdly, the Algerian authorities' belief in the FIS's partial defeat would have 
been grounded in the view that the FIS was crippled by internal rifts. Discord within 
the FIS appeared during the crisis of May-June 1991 and touched upon three main 
issues : the alliance of the FIS with other Islamist parties, which Abassi Madani had 
refused ; the organisation of the strike to protest against the controversial electoral 
law ; and the participation to the legislative elections. Dissidence even occurred as 
three members of the FIS's Consultative Council criticised Abassi Madani's 
leadership on Algerian national television. After Madani and Benhadj were 
imprisoned, disunity was reinforced by the competition between the various currents 
making up the FIS for the party's leadership. During the Batna Congress of July 26, 
1991, this power struggle was eventually concluded by the takeover of the djeza'ara 
current, led by Abdelkhader Hachani and gathering nationalist technocrats arguing for 
an Islam to the colours of Algeria, over the salafiyyists who saw the "Islamic 
solution" as one to be applied in the entire Islamic world. The Batna Congress also 
allowed to marginalise proponents of the armed struggle who formed the FIS's third 
trend, bringing together (although not exclusively) veterans of the war in Afghanistan, 
the "Afghans"84. Hachani, president of the FIS provisional executive bureau, was 
then jailed for a month. Upon his release in late November 1991, he maintained the 
suspense as to the FIS's eventual boycott of the elections if the paramount FIS leaders 
were not discharged. Eventually, the decision to participate in the legislative elections 
was announced on December 14, that is, just two weeks before the first round85. 
Whereas Ddvoluy and Duteil argued that the Algerian authorities viewed the 
83 J. Entelis (1992), pp. 78-9. Francois Burgat (1994, pp. 207-8) maintains for his part that some of 
the facts the FIS was reproached with were pure fabrications on the part of an Algerian press whose 
objectivity and independence is still not really up to the mark. This argument partly undermines the 
view that the Algerian authorities would have done everything they could in order to boost the FIS's 
electoral success. 
84 On the various components of the FIS, see S. Labat (1994), pp. 41-67. 85 On the divisions within the FIS, see A. Charef (1994), pp. 108-18 and 214-22 and JJ. Lavenue 
(1993), pp. 122-7 and 162-6. 
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FIS's internal feuds as a factor undermining its electoral strength86, Audibert -- who, 
besides, agreed with the contention that the results were unexpected and the coup not 
premeditated -- affirmed that it was thought in Algiers that, neither the quarrels 
between the members of the majlis ash shura, nor the hesitations of the new 
leadership in boycotting or not the elections, would affect the FIS's clientele. For, the 
FIS was leading campaign in the mosques87. 
Charefs and Joffd's argument is that a clan, linked in some way to Major 
General Larbi Belkeir (the new Algerian Interior Minister appointed in the reshuffle of 
October 16,1991 to supervise the forthcoming elections) and to the FLN 
Boumedienist trend, was very well aware of the FIS's electoral import for the simple 
reason that it had bolstered it. These authors underlined several troubling elements. 
One is the release of Hachani as well as the suspension of the ban on the FIS press 
one month prior to the elections. Another is that the amendments to the new electoral 
law (passed on October 13) were of secondary importance. If gerrymandering to the 
benefit of the FLN was not questioned, nor was the majority vote principle whereas 
the latter favoured large parties and, as such, the FIS. Finally, Prime Minister Ghozali 
seemed to do everything he could to undermine the FLN party and to sponsor 
independent candidates in place of hardline ones, who by drawing upon the heritage 
of the Boumediene era, might have succeeded in prolonging the FLN's spell. The 
overall aim of this clan in preparing the FLN's bankruptcy would have been to 
demonstrate that Chadli, who had been the first to use the FIS as a means to 
undermine the Boumedienists, was "incompetent at being able to control the genie it 
had itself unleashed. "88 Deliberately bringing the country in front of a simple 
alternative -- a FIS takeover or a coup -- this clan would, thus, have been seeking to 
make it obvious that a coup was the only reasonable path for Algeria. 
Conspiracy or not in Algiers, Paris did not expect the FIS's razzia of the 
parliamentary seats. The idea that many FIS voters would withdraw their support as a 
86 P. Mvoluy & M. Duteil (1994), p. 26. 
87 Interview with Jean Audibert, June 7,1995. 
88 G. Joffe (1994a), p. 8. 
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consequence of the party's intolerant policies was relayed by the Algerian authorities 
in their contacts with the French political establishment89. Despite Dumas's claim that 
he was never won over by the Algerians on that point90, it seems that the argument 
was rather well accepted in Paris. Inasmuch as the extent of FIS support within the 
population was not properly gauged, there was no risk in calling for rapid elections. It 
was quite logically thought that, even though the FIS might be included in the 
government, the elections would bring the popular legitimacy that all Algerian regimes 
had hitherto been lacking and, thus, would provide the governmental authority 
required to bring back Algeria on the track of political stability and economic 
recovery. 
3. A hesitating support (Winter 1992 - Winter 1993) 
Algeria's first free elections eventually occurred in late December 1991. The 
results of the first round indicated that the FIS would get a parliamentary majority. 
The Algerian Army subsequently intervened, staging a "constitutional coup d'dtat" 
which removed President Chadli Benjedid from power. New ruling institutions were 
created and headed by a veteran of the Independence War, Mohammed Boudiaf, who 
accepted the generals' proposition and returned to Algeria after a long exile. Although 
Boudiafs coming into power generated hopes among the population, his rule was 
marked by tense relations with the Algerian political establishment as well as with the 
civil society. The regime's repressive drift, with its severe crackdowns on FIS 
militants and sympathisers, also initiated the repression-counter-violence spiral that 
has characterised Algeria's daily life since then. Boudiaf was murdered after six 
months of presidency, to all appearances, for having thought he could manage 
political affairs without the assent of the Army. The political reshuffle that followed 
Boudiafs death in June 1992 brought back to power Boumedienists and notably 
Belaid Abdesselam. As prime minister, he restrained economic liberalisation and 
89 See the article of Bernard Stasi (vice-president of the CDS and of the Association France-Algerie) 
in Le Figaro, 21 Wrier 1991 and interview with Jean Audibert, June 7,1995. 
90 Interview with Roland Dumas, May 16,1995. 
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engaged into a political dialogue with political parties (excluding the outlawed FIS) 
which turned short mainly because political parties refused to back the regime's 
growing repression policy. 
The French government reacted to all these events with great embarrassment. 
It did not clearly condemn the coup because it did not wish the FIS's coming to power 
and because it would have been counter-productive in trying to influence the course of 
events in Algeria. It did not, however, welcome the coup either because it was feared 
that the marginalisation of the Islamist current would generate political instability, 
detrimental to the relations between the two countries. Reservation, more than a 
wholesale condemnation, is the accurate term to describe the French official 
discourse. Despite apparent governmental unity, the Socialist Party was split over the 
question of what France's attitude should be. However, supporters of the "preventive 
coup d'dtat" did not manage to influence foreign policy-making. Indeed, until January 
1993, the French government's Algeria policy, despite talks of "solidarity" and 
"support", was rather one of minimal support to the new Algerian rulers either 
because it doubted their abilities to get the country out of crisis or because it resented 
their anti-French nationalism. The relationship became strained. France's attempts at 
promoting a political compromise, by suggesting that a new political personality 
capable of rallying the Islamists' allegiance was needed, was a central factor in the 
deterioration of the relationship between the two countries until the French volte-face 
of January 1993. 
3.1. Political upheavals in Algeria 
3.1.1. The coup d'etat 
The results of the first ballot of the parliamentary elections suggested that the 
FIS was heading for a clear majority in the second round scheduled for January 16, 
1992. It had won 188 seats out of 231 and needed only an additional 28 seats to win 
an absolute majority. On the eve of the first ballot Chadli Benjedid had claimed that he 
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was ready to "cohabit" with the winning majority and that force would not be resorted 
to. Rumours of a meeting with Hachani seemed to confirm that the president was 
ready to reach a compromise with the FIS. The FFS and the FLN called for the 
second round to be held as planned. Other parties, such as the Rally for Culture and 
Democracy (RCD)91, the Algerian Movement for Justice and Development (MAJD)92 
and the Socialist Vanguard Party (PAGS)93, as well as a number of non-political 
associations gathered around the workers' union (UGTA) in a National Committee for 
the Safeguarding of Algeria, demanded the interruption of the electoral process. The 
Army, which all along had warned that it would defend democracy and the 
institutions, intervened. Its plan was to make Chadli resign -- which he did on 
January 11,1992 -- after making sure he had signed the decree dissolving the 
National Assembly and then to replace him by the president of the Constitutional 
Council instead of the president of the parliament who was judged as too close to the 
Islamist current. The flaw in this grand plan which, by resorting to the Constitution, 
aimed at comforting the legalist image of the Army, was that the president of the 
Constitutional Council refused to assume presidential powers, pleading a 
constitutional blank on the type of power vacuum generated by the resignation of the 
head of state. The ruling authorities were led to hold the reins of power : on January 
12, the High Security Council, originally created to provide counselling on matters of 
security and defence to the president, took power. It annulled the results of the first 
round of the parliamentary elections while cancelling the second round. Maintaining 
the Ghozali government, it then set up on January 14 a High State Council (HSC) to 
91 The RCD, created by Said Sadi in 1989, was joined by militants of the FFS and the Berber 
Cultural Movement (MCB). The RCD is a Kabylia-based party, advocating secularism, social 
democracy and cultural pluralism. The FFS, born in 1963 but recognised only in 1989, shares the 
same objectives as the RCD. But the two parties differ on the issue as to how the FIS should be dealt 
with. The MCB, now legal, was a clandestine association which sprang from the 1980 Berber Spring 
and whose prime objective is to defend the Berber cultural heritage. 
92 The MAJD was created in 1991 by Kasdi Merbah (head of the Military Security from 1962 to 
1979 and minister until 1989). Merbah supported the establishment of a pluralistic democracy, but 
put more emphasis on cleansing the Administration from corruption. Although the MAJD supported 
the cancellation of the elections, it later advocated conciliation with the FIS. 
93 The PAGS was clandestinely set up in 1966 in opposition to Boumediene's regime. It was a 
resurgence of the Algerian Communist Party banned under Ben Bella. Made legal in 1989, the PAGS 
splintered in the early 1990s. One of the new parties, Ettahaddi, headed by Cherif el-Hachemi, 
advocates secularism, pluralism and socialism. 
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assume presidential powers until the end of 1993 with the assistance of a National 
Consultative Council. The HSC consisted of : Major General Khaled Nezzar (minister 
for defence) ; Ali Haroun (minister for human rights) ; Ali Kafi (secretary-general of 
the Organisation of the Mujahidins) ; Tijani Haddam (rector of the Paris mosque) ; 
and, as president, Mohammed Boudiaf. Boudiaf had been one of the historic leaders 
of the War of Independence and was, therefore, representative of the generation of 
November. However, he had been in exile since 1964 and was, thus, untainted by the 
economic mismanagement and corruption associated with the FLN. Moreover, as he 
had criticised the authoritarian drift of the Ben Bella regime, he offered a certain 
guarantee of democratisation94. 
3.1.2. The Boudiaf leadership (January 1992 - June 1992) 
Boudiaf was not to stay long in power. He was shot on June 29,1992 by a 
second lieutenant, Lembarek Boumaarafi, who belonged to the security apparatus 
protecting the president during his speech at Annaba. The death sentence pronounced 
against Boumaarafi on June 3,199595 has not dispelled the suspicions about the 
official version according to which a zealot would have acted on his own. Rather, it is 
widely believed that the killing was ordered by "the politico-financial Mafia", afraid of 
losing its privileges in front of Boudiafs determination to punish corrupted officials -- 
a resoluteness illustrated by the arrest of General Mostefa Belloucif in May 1992. 
During his stay in power, Boudiaf was isolated. Mistrusting the political 
system to which he now belonged, he had taken as advisors his close friends who, 
like him, had been out of Algeria for the past thirty years. Within the HSC, 
disagreements appeared with this "Mister Clean" who projected to increase his 
popular legitimacy by purifying the system and creating his own support-base. Within 
the population, Boudiafs past brought him some degree of legitimacy, but it is his 
94 The account of the unfolding of the coup is drawn from A. Charef (1994), pp. 234-59 ; P. 
Ddvoluy & M. Duteil (1994), pp. 34-100 and JJ. Lavenue (1993), pp. 173-81. 
95 Le Monde, 6 juin 1995. 
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tragic end more than anything else that has now made him a national hero. As to the 
political parties, those who had initially supported the cancellation of the elections and 
the establishment of the HSC were rapidly disenchanted. 
Two aspects of Boudiafs policy particularly worried the opposition. Firstly, 
as early as February 1992, Boudiaf had announced his intention to mobilise the 
people around a Patriotic National Rally which would have played the role of a forum 
for discussion on a national programme for the establishment of a pluralistic 
democracy. As dialogue with the political parties was explicitly excluded (discussions 
were to take place within neighbourhoods and working premises), they denounced 
Boudiafs initiative as a replica of the one-party system. The establishment, in April 
1992, of the National Consultative Council which was to play the role of the 
dissolved parliament also generated much opposition because its members had been 
nominated by the state and reflected the professional civil society (journalists, 
academics, unionists, etc... ) rather than the political parties. 
The second aspect of Boudiafs policy which generated opposition concerned 
the growing repressive drift and its correlative dangers. Cracking down on the FIS, 
while coopting some dissidents96, was one of the first steps taken under Boudiaf. 
Most of the FIS leaders who were still free were arrested between January and 
February ; the control of the mosques was reinforced ; the FIS press suspended ; and, 
ultimately, the FIS was outlawed on March 4,1992 while half of its local councils 
were suspended97. The crackdown on the FIS provoked demonstrations which turned 
into violent clashes with the police forces stationed around the mosques. Numerous 
FIS militants and sympathisers were arrested. The state of emergency was imposed 
on February 9,1992 (and is still in force today). The banning of the FIS led those 
who had never believed that the political system could be reformed from within and 
who had always advocated armed rebellion as a means to take power to put their ideal 
96 Said Guechi and Sassi Lamouri were included in Ghozali's third government (February 1992). 
Guechi, who had attempted to take over the FIS in July 1991, was appointed minister for 
employment. Lamouri, who belonged to an Islamist movement close to Hamas, was appointed 
minister for religious affairs. 
97 Although it is incorrect to talk of the FIS, as opposed to the ex-FIS, when referring to the banned 
party, it has become usual to do so. In this paper I shall follow the norm. 
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into practice. Their influence over the FIS's sympathisers grew for two main reasons. 
First, the arrest of FIS leaders beheaded the party of its cadres who had until then 
checked the violent inclination of some FIS members. Second, because of the 
repressive drift, many militants and sympathisers joined the armed groups merely to 
avoid being arrested. Terrorist attacks against security forces thus became frequent, 
while Rabah Kebir did not manage from his house arrest to make himself heard. His 
calls for a peaceful solution to the political crisis even seemed to be ignored by 
Abdezzerak Redjem, a member of the FIS provisional executive bureau who went 
underground and published communiques warning the authorities that, in the absence 
of a political dialogue and of a political party channelling Islamic aspirations, the 
political struggle would be led by other means. Redjem is reported to have sponsored 
the formation of the Islamic Armed Movement (MIA) around ex-Bouyalists such as 
Abdelkhader Chebouti98. In July 1992, Mansour Meliani, also a member of the 
former Bouyali Group, created the Islamic Armed Group99. The Islamic Armed 
Group has never had a proper national structure. It has rather been an umbrella 
movement gathering several factions which, while sharing a common outlook and co- 
ordinating some of their ventures, have been independent from each other. As a 
consequence, it has been referred to as the Islamist Armed Groups (GIAs). In parallel 
with the crackdown on the FIS, gagging the media (through personnel reshuffles, 
financial pressures, temporary suspensions and judicial harassment of journalists 
criticising governmental policy) was reminiscent of the pre-1988 period. Equally 
worrisome was the dissolution of some local councils controlled by the FLN and the 
Independents. The political opposition apprehended with great concern the emerging 
repression-violence circle. The FFS, the FLN, the MDA100, the Algerian Renewal 
Party (PRA), Hamas and the Movement of the Islamic Renaissance (MNI)tot 
98 Le Point (1124), 2 avril 1994. Bouyali headed from 1982 to 1987 the first Islamist armed group 
in Algeria. 
99 P. Ddvoluy & M. Duteil (1994), p. 224. 
100 The MDA was founded by former President Ben Bella in 1984 while he was in exile. The MDA 
was legalised in 1990. It advocates pluralistic democracy, reference to a tolerant Islam and soft 
economic liberalism. 
101 The PRA (headed by Nourdine Boukrouh and created in 1989), llamas (Sheik Mahfoud Nalmah, 
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criticised the dissolution of the FIS as an unviable solution. The whole opposition -- 
including the PAGS and the RCD which had approved the banning of the FIS -- 
called for the lifting of the state of emergency, the closing down of the seven detention 
camps opened in February, the respect of human rights and civil liberties, the 
establishment of a political dialogue, and a schedule for the reconvening of the 
electoral process. 
Under Boudiaf, conflicts also characterised the economic scene. Ghozali had 
started his premiership by making the ostentatious announcement of the "selling out of 
Hassi Messaoud", the largest oil field. The anticipated sale of gas and oil, as well as 
the new possibility for foreign firms to participate to the limit of 49% in the 
exploration and exploitation of new and existing oil and gas fields, was publicised as 
potentially generating a revenue of $7 billion, which would have allowed Algeria to 
face its financial difficulties. Because of the symbolic nature of oil as the source of 
Algeria's "economic independence", opposition crystallised around the project, at the 
National Assembly. The technocrats who, under Hamrouche, had prepared the bill on 
foreign participation in the exploration and production of hydrocarbons expressed 
reservations on the politicisation of this measure. They pointed out that it could not be 
used as an alternative to economic structural reforms because it would not accrue the 
kind of money Ghozali promised and that it would produce results only in the 
medium-term102. Ghozali's policies also alienated foreign and domestic economic 
agents. He promised the IMF and the IBRD privatisation which never came. His 
refusal to impose price deregulation and currency devaluation at the recommended 
pace led to the blocking of an IMF credit in April. The Algerian employers' union 
protested against the insufficient funds and delays set by Ghozali for the financial 
stabilisation of public enterprises. The UGTA denounced the low budget devoted to 
the social net meant to compensate for price increases. The scope of the economic and 
1990) and the MNI (Sheik Abdallah Djaballah, 1990) are three Islamist parties advocating the 
establishment of an Islamic state respecting democratic pluralism. They reject violence. Apart from 
the MNI, they fully support economic liberalism. 
102 Interview with Sadek Boussena, April 19,1994. S. Boussena was : minister for energy and 
petrochemical industries (1988-89) ; minister for mines and industry (1989-91) ; head of the 
Sonatrach (1988-90) ; and president of OPEC (1990-91). 
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financial disaster was illustrated in June 1992 by Ghozali's breaking of the debt 
rescheduling taboo. He was, however, about to be dismissedio3. 
3.1.3. The Boumedienists' comeback104 
Ali Kafi was elected by the High State Council on July 1,1992 to replace 
Boudiaf as president of the HSC and Redha Malek was included within the 
presidential collegiate. Discharged, Ghozali was supplanted by BelaYd Abdesselam, 
who became prime minister as well as minister for the economy on July 8,1992. 
Seven ministers of the Ghozali government were renewed in their functions, of whom 
Khaled Nezzar (defence) and Lakhdar Brahimi (foreign affairs). The image projected 
by the new ruling team was that of Algeria's nationalist past, reflecting the regime's 
attempt to recapture the legitimacy which the Boumediene regime had benefited from. 
Kafi actively took part in the War of Liberation and, after a diplomatic carrier, became 
the general secretary of the organisation for the war veterans in 1990. Malek managed 
the governmental newspaper during the War, participated in the negotiations of the 
Evian Accords and in the drafting of Algeria's major doctrinal texts such as the Tripoli 
Charter and the 1976 National Charter. Malek had a diplomatic carrier, notably in 
Washington and London, before returning to domestic politics as the head of the 
National Consultative Council. As to Abdesselam, his return to politics marked a clear 
rupture with the Chadli era. As minister for industry and petroleum (1965-77), 
Abdesselam had, indeed, been a top figure in the Boumediene era and had virulently 
criticised Chadli's policies. 
It thus came as no surprise that Abdesselam's economic programme 
(September 1992), without wholly rejecting the principle of the market economy, 
focused on renewed state control and questioned some of the implemented reforms, 
such as the Central Bank's autonomy or trade liberalisation. It also announced a "war 
103 The major events marking Boudiafs leadership are drawn from J. Cesari (1994a), pp. 619-30 and 
A. Charef (1994), pp. 259-366. 
104 The following paragraphs concentrate on the policies of the HSC under Kali only until the 
Winter 1993, for it is then that French policy towards Algeria changed. For details on this period, see 
J. Cesari (1994a), pp. 630-51 and A. Charef (1994), pp. 366-441. 
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economy", centred upon drastically reduced imports, in order to ensure the 
reimbursement of the foreign debt. On the political front, the policy of the new team 
was characterised in the first months of power by two main orientations : an overture 
towards the opposition (FIS excluded) and an attempt to eradicate the Islamist armed 
groups, which, with time, became identified with eradicating the FIS. 
While Boudiaf had refused to open a political dialogue with the political 
parties, Kafi announced in July 1992 that he agreed to meet them in late September in 
bilateral talks as long as they abided to his conditions : condemnation of terrorism and 
a clear commitment to establish a modern state and a pluralist democracy, and to 
uphold the unity of the nation and the respect of fundamental liberties. From the 
outset, the RCD and the PAGS were hostile to a dialogue which would include 
Islamist parties such as Hamas and MNI. The other political forces were, on the other 
hand, favourable to such discussions which they saw as a means to organise the 
transition towards the resumption of the democratisation process. As to the banned 
FIS, it declared itself ready to participate in the discussion table on four conditions : 
releasing all prisoners ; ceasing the arrests ; reinstating the FIS local councils and 
organising the second round of the elections. Whatever the FIS's conditions, the HSC 
was not willing to discuss political matters with it. The political dialogue eventually 
turned short because the political parties refused to back up the HSC's authoritarian 
policies. 
The authorities' second aim was to put an end to the terrorist violence 
organised by the MIA and the GIAs. A repressive security system was gradually put 
in place throughout the Summer to emerge fully in the Autumn with the adoption of a 
harsh anti-terrorist law (October 2), the systematic deployment of anti-terrorist 
squads, and the enforcement of a curfew in seven wilayas (December 2). 
Progressively, the struggle against terrorism transformed into a struggle against the 
FIS : on November 28, Abdesselam announced that most of the remaining FIS- 
controlled local councils would be dissolved. In accordance with an August 1992 
decree allowing the authorities to dissolve any organisation labelled as a threat to 
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public order, he dissolved cultural and charitable organisations as well as Islamic 
Unions whose members had been FIS militants. 
3.2. France's mixed support (January 1992 - January 1993) 
3.2.1. The French response to the coup d'etat 
As indicated above, the French government urged a resumption of the electoral 
process when the parliamentary elections were postponed in June 1991. It was, 
therefore, in the order of things that the spokesman for the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs would welcome the event. A certain embarrassment as to the results of the first 
round was, however, discernible in his declaration as well as in Dumas's : both 
refused to comment "prematurely" on the results of the elections. Nevertheless, the 
spokesman for the Quai d'Orsay adopted a well-disposed prudence towards the future 
parliamentary majority, arguing that : 
"(... ) whatever the choice of the Algerian people, the relations that unite them to the French 
people are so deep in all domains that they should maintain themselves. France, for its own 
part, will continue to promote their strengthening. "105 
As the intervention of the Algerian Army became evident, the minister for foreign 
affairs claimed that "(... ) France does not intend at all to call on anybody to correct the 
[results of the] first round (... )"106, which, without indicating whether France would 
support a coup, at least, denoted that it was not itself acting behind the scenes for a 
cancellation of the elections. 
Weighting the pros and cons 
The coup d'etat put the French authorities in a very uncomfortable situation 
because, in practice, they could neither officially support nor condemn the event. 
They consequently chose a middle-ground. It was clear that the French government 
105 Declaration, December 30,1991 in MAE (novembre-ddcembre 1991), p. 176. 106 Press conference in Abidjan, January 8,1992 in MAE (janvier-fdvrier 1992), p. 24. 
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could not officially back the coup. Even though the Algerian Army presented its 
intervention as a means "to save democracy", it escaped nobody that it had reacted 
chiefly to safeguard its own position within Algerian politics. The cancellation of the 
elections represented a fundamental break in the democratisation process initiated by 
Chadli. Since France had been standing for this democratisation process, it could not 
suddenly retract and welcome the coup. In addition, this would have contradicted its 
official foreign policy orientation. No open support could, thus, be contemplated. But 
the coup also generated a certain apprehension. In particular, it seems that Mitterrand 
dreaded the consequences of a return of the military establishment to the forefront of 
Algerian politics. Even though the scope of armed confrontation between Islamist 
armed groups and the authorities was not projected, it was well suspected that the 
marginalisation of the Islamist current would not be done gently and that it would face 
some resistance. A new era of authoritarianism coupled with a greater state of 
instability was, thus, to be expected. 
This apprehension had to be counterbalanced by the fact that the coup allowed 
to hamper the FIS from taking power. On the whole, the FIS was perceived as a 
reactionary and regressive political force. It was not doubted in Paris that the FIS was 
undemocratic. Commenting on the Algerian events in late January 1992, Mitterrand, 
indeed, argued that "(... ) fundamentalism (... ) does not appear to me as the surest 
way to reach democracy. " 107 Yet, whatever the French politicians' personal feelings 
were, other considerations were at stake. The head of the secret services affirmed that 
he advised no support for the coup in order to preserve the future of Franco-Algerian 
relations in case the FIS later took power in less favourable conditions108. Within the 
administration of the Quai d'Orsay, the head of the Maghreb-Mashreq department, 
Pierre Lafrance, projected that a FIS government in Algiers would not dramatically 
affect France's economic and strategic interests. He also thought that, within the FIS, 
there were some moderates with whom the French authorities could find an 
107 Press conference in Oman, January 31,1992 in MAE (janvier-fevrier 1992), p. 92. 108 C. Silberzahn (1995), p. 292. 
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understandingt09. Part of this argument had found an echo at the Elysee. Indeed, the 
French president maintained that the Algerians were more dependent upon France than 
the reverse and that, consequently, the Islamists would have to tone down their anti- 
French positions, if in power110. As for Dumas, he had changed his discourse on the 
FIS prior to the coup. In a press conference held in Morocco in April 1991, he argued 
that the FIS represented "the expression of Algerian identity, of the Muslim religious 
spirit and of its political tradition" 11 It. Since the FIS had won the votes of a quarter of 
the electorate, it was thought that it might have to be included in the political game. 
This judgement was reflected in an August 1992 statement when Dumas said in 
relation to Ali Kaffs proposal for a political dialogue excluding the FIS : "Our hope 
remains to see a national dialogue taking place with the least exclusions possible. " 112 
Explaining today what he meant by that, he answers he thought that it was a mistake 
on the part of the Algerian authorities to have cancelled the electoral process and then 
to have assumed that the Islamist political force could be defeated by combat. He also 
says he then thought that, if a dialogue there was to be, it had to be established not 
with self-appointed interlocutors but with those who were at the centre of the political 
riftl13. 
Two linked factors, thus, militated in favour of a disapproval of the coup 
d'dtat : the risks entailed by the coup (authoritarianism, repression, counter-violence) 
and the view that a political compromise taking into account the Islamic aspiration of 
part of the population was possible. Yet, the French authorities could not wholly 
condemn the coup either. They would have had to take concrete measures, such as the 
non-recognition of the new authorities, a freeze of bilateral relations, etc... This was 
completely unimaginable because it would have implied that the French government 
wished the victory of the FIS, which was not the case. It simply wished the political 
situation to remain stable even if that meant that the Islamists be recognised as political 
109 Interview with Jean Audibert, June 7,1995. 
110 Ibid. 
111 In MAE (mars-avril 1991), pp. 94-5. 
112 Interview in Realites, 13 aoüt 1992. 
113 Interview with Roland Dumas, May 16,1995. 
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partners, although under a strict control. In addition, clearly condemning the coup, 
would have had the consequence of blocking the channels of communication between 
the two rims of the Mediterranean. In that case, France could have lost a potential 
means of influence over the course of the events in Algeria. 
France blows hot and cold 
In order to express reservations without a clear condemnation, the French 
authorities chose to talk with two voices. Whereas Mitterrand protested against the 
interruption of the elections, Dumas cultivated a softer stance. The first statement of 
the French president (January 14,1992) was undoubtedly critical of the Algerian 
authorities and the tone peremptory : 
"(... ) the engaged process towards elections in Algeria has been interrupted and that represents 
at the very least an abnormal act since it comes down to establish a state of exception. (... ) 
the Algerian leaders have to knot again at the earliest the threads of a democratic life that had 
begun and which will have to (... ) be carried through °114 
Dumas's judgement on the Algerian High Security Council's decision was much less 
severe : 
"It is not France's place to intervene in this affair. The Algerian leaders were faced to a 
difficult situation. They considered (... ) that it was the least inadequate solution. We now 
have to trust them for things to be restored when the time comes "115 
As to France's relations with Algeria, Dumas argued in the same declaration that 
France should maintain economic support to help stabilise the political realm : 
"(... ) France has to express its solidarity with the Algerian people. We have too many things 
in common not to take further interest in what happens in Algeria and to turn our back on 
this people and this country under the pretext that it is experiencing a difficult phase. (... ) If 
we want to cure the causes [of the Algerian malaise], we have to (... ) take measures to that 
effect, heal the disease, assist [economic] development so that this youth (... ) finds a certain 
satisfaction in living at home rather than in finding refuge in extremist stances. " 
114 Press conference in Luxembourg, January 14,1992 in MAE (janvier-fevrier 1992), p. 55. 115 Interview on Radio Shalom, January 21,1992, in MAE (janvier-fevrier 1992), p. 67. 
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Whereas Dumas had argued towards the end of January that economic aid to Algeria 
was not to be closely tied to the restoration of the democratisation process116, a week 
later, and in a context of emerging violence in Algeria, Mitterrand warned that : 
"France is profoundly attached to the carrying-on and development of [Franco-Algerian] 
relations inasmuch as the principles that it judges as essential -- and the progress towards 
democracy and the respect of human rights are part of them -- will be respected" 
117 
The deliberate discrepancy between the discourse of the president and that of 
his foreign minister aimed at showing that, even though the French government 
would not cease its relations with the new authorities in Algiers -- supposedly because 
of its solidarity with the people -- it strongly encouraged them to move beyond the 
accomplished fact. If, this time, a "telling silence" was not resorted to, it was because 
the French highest authorities were determined to put their message across. This, of 
course, generated strong reactions in Algiers. Ghozali denounced France's 
interference in Algeria's domestic affairs and -- as invariably occurs in such cases -- 
implicitly brought for consideration Mitten-and's ministerial functions in 1954 arguing 
that "There are some people in France (... ) who continue to live Algeria's problems as 
though they were theirs because they still have not accepted our 
independence( ... )"118. 
Divisions within the Socialist Party 
On the whole, the Cresson and Berdgovoy governments showed great unity 
over France's Algeria policy. Nevertheless, there were divisions within the Socialist 
Party. They did not have any particular impact on the formulation and implementation 
of France's Algeria policy which was well under Dumas's control. Yet, they are 
worth mentioning. In general, the attitude adopted was one of wait-and-see in front of 
116 Ibid. 
117 Interview in Al Hayat on January 27,1992 in MAE (janvier-fevrier 1992), p. 81. 
118 Quoted in Revue de Presse Maghreb, Proche et Moyen Orient, janvier 1992, (361), p. 11. 
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a dilemma that everybody would have preferred not to be confronted with. On each 
side of this general middle-ground, two currents of opinion can be guessed from the 
public interventions made by party or government members. Some were in line with 
the substance of governmental policy but went slightly further than the official stance 
by pronouncing the very words that had been avoided by Mitterrand. Thus, Bernard 
Kouchner, minister for health and humanitarian action, declared in late April 1992 that 
"the current [Algerian] government was born out of a coup d'&tat" and that "the 
progression of Islamism will not be stopped by force. "119 
On the opposite side, and somewhat against governmental policy, some 
supported the "preventive coup d'dtat". It was the case, for instance, of Georges 
Morin, Claude Cheysson and, it seems, Pierre Joxe (defence minister). On the basis 
of the analysis of the Algerian Army's officer corps120, they projected that the FIS's 
coming to power was bound to lead sooner or later to the Army's intervention because 
of the risks that such an eventuality entailed. They diagnosed three main risks. Firstly, 
Chadli might be too weak to resist an initiative of the FIS-dominated parliament to 
revise the Constitution. He would probably make some concessions to the FIS whose 
moderate wing would have to give in to the radicals so as to catch votes in the run for 
the presidential elections. Presidential indulgence would generate opposition among 
the population, notably in Kabylia and in the Southern Sahara. There would, thus, be 
a risk of a secession war threatening the unity of the Army and, therefore, the 
cohesion of the Algerian state. Secondly, by searing off the world community, a FIS 
regime, would isolate Algeria internationally whereas it needed foreign financial 
resources for its economy to recover. Thirdly, if the FIS attempted to "export its 
revolution" it would seek to destabilise the neighbouring regimes and this threatened 
to suck the whole region in Algeria's political turmoil. Faced with risks of civil war, 
economic collapse, and regional instability, the Algerian Army would intervene. 
Within the French Socialist Party those who supported the Algerian Army's 
119 Quoted in Le Monde, 12 janvier 1993. 
120 An account of the Algerian Army's analysis of the risks entailed by an eventual seizure of power 
by the FIS can be found in A. Charef (1994), pp. 253-4 or in H. Roberts (1993a), pp. 451-2. 
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line argued that, since the Army would intervene, it would be more efficient if it did 
so before the FIS controlled the wheels of government. They also had a four-point 
argument to rebuff those who, like Mitterrand or Kouchner, pointed their forefingers 
at the military-backed takeover more or less discretely. In the Socialist Party's 
newspaper and in Le Monde121, Morin thus argued that : (1) emphasising the military 
nature of the coup was to ignore that for the past thirty years every Algerian governing 
institution had been military-backed ; (2) democracy made no sense if it resulted in the 
access to power of a party that had vowed to destroy it ; (3) with 3 million FIS-voters 
out of 13 million registered voters, the FIS hardly had a popular mandate to head for a 
revision of the Constitution towards the implementation of the shari'a; and (4) no one 
"could take the liberty of telling the Algerians that they should have 'attempted the 
experience' at all costs. " Morin was joined in his views by Cheysson (European MP, 
chairman of the European delegation for the Maghreb) who described as sheer 
nonsense Mitterrand's and Dumas's fixation on the interruption of the electoral 
process in a country where there is not yet a democratic tradition122. Joxe seemed to 
share Cheysson's view when he argued that the French political establishment should 
be "a bit wary when it judges those countries that have acquired their Independence in 
very cruel circumstances" 123. This current of opinion, critical of the chosen course for 
France's Algeria policy, does not seem to have succeeded in influencing governmental 
policy towards a greater support to the HSC. As examined below, until January 1993, 
France's backing of the Algerian regime was more a matter of words than of deeds. 
3.2.2. A strained relationship 
After the coup and until January 1993, when Dumas went to Algiers 
specifically to repair the troubled relations, France's Algeria policy was characterised 
by inconsistency between official discourse and actual deeds. The official discourse, 
121 Le Monde, 15 janvier 1992 and reprint given to the author by Morin of his interview with Vendredi in mid-January 1992. 
122 Interview on April 22,1994. 
123 In Le Monde, 21 janvier 1992. 
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after what had been perceived in Algiers as Mitterrand's diatribes, was one of support 
for, and solidarity with, the Algerian people and the regime. Dumas reiterated this 
policy stance all along. His address of February 5,1992 to the Association of the 
Foreign Press sums up France's discourse : 
"On several occasions and since the arrival in power of a new team, France has renewed its 
willingness to continue to help Algeria. (... ) I would like to say here to the Algerian 
authorities France's willingness to help Algeria and the Algerian people at this critical 
juncture which, I do not doubt, Algeria will be able to overcome if an effort is made -- a 
significant effort to assist the economy of this country. " 124 
Yet, political relations did not illustrate France's discourse. Neither did economic co- 
operation. 
After the coup, the relationship between the Cresson and the Ghozali 
governments opened with a mini-crisis which resulted, on the one hand, from 
Mitterrand's harsh words, and on the other, from Dumas's manoeuvres. Immediately 
after the establishment of the HSC, Dumas sent Pierre Lafrance, director of the Quai 
d'Orsay's Maghreb-Mashreq department, to Algiers. Press reports described the visit 
as "a mission of information and contacts with Algeria's political forces" and, 
whereas the spokesman for the Quai d'Orsay initially indicated that these would 
include the FIS, he thereafter denied that this had been the case125. For his part, the 
French Ambassador accounted for Lafrance's trip as a mission of contact with the 
HSC126. According to the Ambassador, the object of the visit was primarily to incite 
the Ghozali government to find a political remedy to the risks of instability stemming 
from the coup d'dtat by recognising the force of political Islam. Lafrance had a ready- 
for-use solution : to find a political personality who, as head of state, could please 
every political currents and rally behind him the allegiance of the Islamists. This 
personality was Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, a politician with whom Dumas was on 
friendly terms. As a young lawyer, Dumas had defended FLN members during the 
124 In MAE (janvier-fdvrier 1992), p. 116. 
125 Le Monde, 18 and 21 janvier 1992. 
126 Interview with Jean Audibert, June 7,1995. 
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War of Independence. Taleb Ibrahimi was one of them. Taleb Ibrahimi represents the 
religious current of the FLN which, ever since Independence, has played the role of a 
lobby within the state apparatus for Arabisation and Islamisation. With the rise of the 
FIS, he has come to be seen as a "synthesis man" representing both historical and 
religious legitimacy, a "link man" between the FLN and the FIS127. Lafrance's 
message made the Algerian foreign minister blanch all the more because Lafrance, a 
close friend of the Iranian foreign minister, All Akbar Velayati, brought Iran into the 
picture. He argued that the mullahs could bring their help to a political solution by 
finding a way of cooling the FIS's ardour. Since the Rafsanjani regime was 
denounced in Algiers for meddling in Algeria's internal affairs -- Iran had condemned 
the cancellation of the elections and showed an open support for the FIS -- the 
suggestion was not only wholly unacceptable for Algiers but also dismissed as 
improper. 
The French Ambassador to Algiers, whose services had been short-circuited, 
had warned Dumas's emissary that the message would provoke "reactions". If the 
political strategy behind the proposal was not senseless (had not Ghozali brought 
Islamists into government ? ), he thought the approach ham-fisted. In addition to 
Lakhdar Brahimi's frank response to Lafrance, the Algerian government reacted by 
recalling its Ambassadors from Paris and Teheran. The Iranian Ambassador to Algiers 
was also expelled128. 
Throughout the year, all sorts of signs, including the presence of FIS activists 
in France129, were underlined in the Algerian press as evidence of a Paris-Khartoum- 
127 Taleb Ibrahimi is the son of Sheik Bachir Brahimi who had been president of the Association of 
the Reformist Ulema after the death in 1940 of its founder, Abdelhamid Ben Badis. As a member of 
the wartime FLN, Ibrahimi was arrested by the French in 1957. Under Ben Bella, he was jailed (1963- 
65) for his criticisms of the regime and notably its socialist orientation. Under Boumediene, he 
benefited from the policy of co-optation of the ulema and was appointed minister for education (1965- 
70) and minister for information and culture (1970-77). Under Benjedid, he remained in government 
although he was attributed in 1982 a less sensitive portfolio -- the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. He 
was dismissed after `Black October". Biographic information in JJ. Lavenue (1993), p. 228. 
128 Le Monde, 21 janvier 1992 and Middle East International (417), January 24,1992. Diplomatic 
relations with Iran were eventually broken off in March 1993 (Le Monde, 30 mars 1993). 
129 FIS militants of a high profile such as Kameredine Kherbane, Rabah Kebir and Anwar Haddam 
stayed in France before being expelled. In addition, the Algerian Brotherhood in France, created in 
February 1991 to support the FIS electoral campaign, continued to function and evidence of fund- 
raising operations for the benefit of the FIS emerged with the dismantling of a counterfeiting trade 
operation in October 1992 (the Lacoste affair). 
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Teheran axis conspiring against Algeria. El Watan spread rumours of contacts 
between the French secret services and the FIS (then referred to as "France, Iran, 
Sudan") in Karthoum before the cancellation of the elections130. Le Matin quoted the 
Spanish newspaper El Pais which leaked a French working document prepared for the 
account of the Elysde in which the hypothesis of a FIS takeover was duly 
analysed131. Members of the ruling elite also resorted to this conspiracy theme, 
recurrent in Algeria's politics. In August 1992 the Algerian prime minister denounced 
the work of "the foreign hand" -- i. e. France in the Algerian political wording -- in the 
bomb attack against Algiers Airport which killed nine people and wounded over a 
hundred132. At the end of the year, Ali Haroun, member of the HSC, condemned the 
French government for "having two irons in the fire" 133, which meant it had a "FIS 
joker" up its sleeve. 
The Algerian press campaign and the authorities' unfounded accusations were 
a protest against France's attitude. Quite apart from the crisis triggered by Lafrance's 
visit, the Algerian government discovered that, despite its discourse of support and 
solidarity, the French government was, in fact, unwilling to throw its weight behind 
Boudiaf or Kafi. It was so because the French government doubted Boudiafs ability 
to pull Algeria out of crisis while the security, political and economic situation was 
worsening. Thereafter, his murder in June 1992 reinforced the view that resistance to 
a from-top-to-bottom reform of the Algerian political system was strong within the 
state apparatus itself. The return to office of Boumedienists and, particularly, of 
Belaid Abdesselam, was received with great reservation in Paris because of their 
nationalist, and strongly anti-French, outlook. 
In this general context, the French government's policy was to maintain 
relations with Algiers, but to a strict minimum. Thus, the February 1992 financial 
accord amounting to FF 5 billion (about $1 billion) was lower than before and was 
only made up of commercial credits. Certainly, the French government put pressure 
130 Middle East International (417), January 24,1992. 
131 Le Malin, 14 decembre 1992. 
132 In Le Monde, 28 aoüt 1992. 
133 Haroun's interview in the French newspaper La Croix, quoted in Le Malin, 14 decembre 1992. 
64 
on American and Japanese banks to stay within the international bank syndicate 
headed by the Credit Lyonnais. An accord was eventually reached on March 4,1992, 
allowing the release of a$1.45 billion loan134. Although this helped Algeria in 
repaying part of its non-guaranteed debt, the French government's mediation 
concerned an operation in discussion since 1991. 
Throughout 1992, political relations were far from being at their best, as 
demonstrated by bilateral exchanges. Except for the visit of the Algerian minister for 
foreign affairs to Paris on March 4-5,1992135, there was no contact at high levels 
between the respective governments before July 1992, that is six months after the 
coup. Certainly, in June the French government had sent the minister for agriculture 
and his counsellor (Gorges Morin) to Algiers, as well as the deputy minister for trade, 
who headed the delegation of French enterprises at the commercial fair organised by 
Algiers136. Yet, the absence of an official high-state visit, if only of the foreign affairs 
minister, indicated the French government's unwillingness to bring too strong an 
approval to the policies of the Boudiaf regime. At Boudiafs request, Mitterrand had 
accepted to meet him in Paris on July 16,1992. The meeting did not occur since 
Boudiaf was killed before. But, significantly, the visit was to be secret137. Dumas 
eventually went to Algiers in order to attend Boudiafs funeral and promised that 
"France [would] not economise on its help to Algeria and that this [would] be visible 
in the days that follow[ed]"138. The Algerians were in fact to wait for another six 
months. In the meantime, it took an unusual four months for Sid Ahmed Ghozali, 
who had been replaced by Abdesselam and appointed in late July 1992 Ambassador to 
Paris, to be accredited (December 9,1992)139 by the Elysee. The official justification 
for this delay -- the French president's health problems and the protocol -- may have 
been true, but it is evident that the difficult relations with Ghozali that occurred during 
the Gulf War and the role he played during the coup did not favour him in Paris. In 
134 Y. Troquet (le) (1994), p. 500. 
135 El Watan, 6-7 mars 1992. 
136 y. Troquet (le) (1994), p. 500 and interview of G. Morin in Le Soir d'Algerie, 28 juin 1992. 
137 Interview with Jean Audibert, June 7,1995. 
138 Quoted in Le Matin, 14 d8cembre 1992. 
139 Y. Troquet (le) (1994), p. 499. 
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any case, Ghozali's non-accreditation was perceived in Algiers as another mark of 
ostracism. 
By the end of 1992 relations between France and Algeria were thus 
particularly strained. Neither political relations nor economic co-operation illustrated 
France's discourse of support to and solidarity with the Algerian regime. The 
coherence of France's Algeria policy was consequently seriously undermined. This 
was to change three months before the French parliamentary elections. 
4. Friendship otherwise than just with words (January - March 1993) 
Against all odds, Dumas made an official visit to Algiers only three months 
before the March 1993 French parliamentary elections, initiating a rapprochement with 
Algiers just as the socialists were about to exit from the political game. Increased 
economic aid was immediately granted. Firm political backing was provided with the 
formal invitation to Paris of Abdesselam whose nomination as prime minister had 
generated strong reservations in Paris several months prior to the invitation. There are 
not yet any truly satisfactory answers to this paradoxical attitude. Two clues can, 
nevertheless, be identified. It seems that a reassessment of the Algerian crisis and of 
the power struggle occurred to the effect that the Bdrdgovoy government thought that 
it was too late to seek a compromise and that not supporting Algiers could indirectly 
help a FIS violent takeover. The change in French Ambassadors may also have played 
a role to the extent that the new Ambassador wished to start his mandate on a friendly 
footing with Algiers. 
4.1. Dumas in Algiers - Abdesselam in Paris 
The decision to organise a visit of the French minister for foreign affairs to 
Algiers was taken during the Autumn of 1992. The new Ambassador to Algiers, 
Bernard Kessedjian, had taken his position in late September 1992 with the aim of 
improving the troubled relations. In October, he announced that Dumas would soon 
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come to Algeria to say that France wanted to maintain "a sure, friendly and trustful 
relationship" with the Algerian Republic140. Because of the non-accreditation of 
Ghozali until December, Dumas's trip was, however, postponed until January 1993. 
After his visit on January 8-9,1993, Dumas declared : 
"I think my visit was useful. More than misunderstandings, a shadow existed on the 
relations between France and Algeria (... ) During my trip to Algiers I had the opportunity to 
say (... ) that during this difficult phase France would stand by the side of Algeria and of the 
Algerians, and that this would translate into a political backing of the leaders of today's 
Algeria, as well as economic [and] financial support (... ) As regards bilateral political 
relations as well as French backing of Algeria on the international scene, things have 
become normal again "141 
In addition to Dumas's promises of a strong political and economic backing -- 
promises which were also made by Mitterrand in his message to the head of the 
HSC142 -- the French authorities moved to reassure their counterparts on the issue of 
Islamism. On January 7, the spokesman for the Quai d'Orsay expressed France's 
concerns as to "the rise of intolerance under the cover of democracy in Algeria" 143 ; 
Dumas declared that "France condemn[ed] terrorism and [had] proved (... ) that when 
it was aware of activities [on French soil] which, in one way or the other, could lead 
to terrorist acts detrimental to Algeria, it took the appropriate measures. " 144 To show 
that French reservations as to Abdesselam were over, the Algerian prime minister was 
officially invited to France by Bdrdgovoy. 
In Algiers, Dumas had affirmed that it was "normal that, in a period such as 
this, friendship be expressed otherwise than just with words" 145. Almost immediately 
after his departure, the director of the French Treasury was dispatched to Algiers to 
discuss a financial accord which was concluded on February 13,1993 by the French 
minister for economic and financial affairs, Michel Sapin. The credit package totalled 
140 In Le Monde, 21 octobre 1992. 
141 Interview on RTL, January 10,1993 in MAE (janvier-fevrier 1993), p. 27. 142 Reproduced in El Moudjahid, 10 janvier 1993. 
143 Quoted in El Moudjahid, 8-9 janvier 1993. 
144 Press conference on January 9,1993, Algiers in MAE (janvier-fevrier 1993), p. 19. Dumas was 
referring to the expulsion of a few FIS militants. 
145 Quoted in Algerie Actualite (1422), 13-19 janvier 1993. 
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FF 6.1 billion (about $ 1.1 billion) for 1993. It included :a FF 5 billion commercial 
credit guaranteed by the Coface (FF 1 billion deferred credits for the purchase of 
vehicles and spare parts, FF 800 million still available from the FF 4 billion revolving 
credit, FF 2.2 billion fresh credits for miscellaneous purchases and FF 1 billion for 
food credits) ;a state loan of FF 1 billion for balance of payments aid and the 
financing of capital equipment purchases ;a FF 100 million loan financed by the 
Caisse franpaise de developpement aimed at financing joint-venture operations. The 
release of this loan, blocked since July 1991, was allowed by the signature of a 
reciprocal accord on the protection of investments146. 
In general, the Algerian press welcomed the new aid package. However, 
Algerie Actualite pinpointed that French financial help was not more significant than in 
previous years and that the French authorities continued to reject the principle of a 
bilateral rescheduling of Algeria's debt147. As to the Algerian authorities, they seemed 
to make the best out of it since Abdesselam accepted Beregovoy's invitation and went 
to Paris on February 18-19,1993. While Abdesselam's visit sanctioned the recovery 
of the dialogue with the French socialists, its main object was to prepare Algeria's 
future. The French parliamentary elections were due in March and opinion polls 
predicted the success of the Right. Avoiding tactlessness, Abdesselam's meetings 
with the opposition parties were not limited to the Right : he also met Georges 
Marchais whose Communist Party had called since January 1992 for strong French 
support for the Algerian regime. Whether in front of the French highest authorities, 
the French political parties, the employers' union, or the emigrant community. 
Abdesselam defended his programme :a three to five-year transition period to let the 
economy recover before heading towards the resumption of the democratic process. 
Despite spectacular terrorist outrages such as the attempted killing of General Khaled 
Nezzar on the very day Sapin was in Algiers, the Algerian prime minister argued that 
the security situation was under control and that the Islamist armed groups were soon 
146 Le Monde, 16 fdvrier 1993. 
147 AlgJrie Actualite (1427), 17-23 Wrier 1993. 
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to be dismantled148. 
4.2: Unclear motives 
It is difficult to understand why the decision to bring a firmer support to 
Algiers was taken at that particular stage since the French parliamentary elections were 
scheduled for March 1993 and the socialists defeated beforehand. In Jeune Afrique, 
Paul-Marie de la Gorce argued that the idea that it was no longer possible to "sulk" the 
Algerian regime arose from two main considerations. First, in a context of growing 
political violence, it was unrealistic to believe in the possibility of a prompt return to 
democratic life. Second, France would have much to loose if the FIS, now radicalised 
by its armed struggle, came to power149. 
Dumas explained his new policy in accordance with the first consideration. On 
January 7,1993, in his declaration to the personnel of his Ministry, he said indeed : 
"(... ) the Algerians need our solidarity. The economic and social crisis that hits them directly 
has not allowed the pursuit of the democratic experience, let's regret it and go beyond our 
regrets. History commands us to keep up a dialogue in order to help them rediscover the way 
to development and democracy "150 
When asked today why the rapprochement with Algeria was decided, Dumas provides 
no additional clue. He repeats his January 1993 stance while emphasising that France 
dealt with the Abdesselam regime merely because it represented the legal government. 
France, he said, only aimed at supporting the Algerian people, not the regime'51. All 
French governments have used this sophism in order to avoid criticisms highlighting 
compromising relations with a repressive and corrupted regime. Dumas's 
clarification, thus, does not help to understand the underlying reasons for the 
rapprochement. It merely indicates a willingness to minimise its impact. 
In line with de la Gorce, it may be suggested that clearer support to Algiers as 
148 El Moudjahid, 19-20 Wrier 1993 and Le Monde, 21-22 Wrier 1993. 
149 Jeune Afrique, 4 Wrier 1993. 
150 In MAE (janvier-fevrier 1993), p. 14. 
151 Interview with Roland Dumas, May 16,1995. 
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from January 1993 derived from a reassessment of the Algerian crisis and of the 
power struggle taking place there. The idea that the FIS was unable to overthrow the 
regime by force arose only in Summer 1993. Until then, the risk of a violent takeover 
and of the establishment of a radical Islamist government was thought to be within the 
odds. Inasmuch as the Algerian authorities were unwilling to find a compromise with 
the FIS, not supporting them entailed the risk of indirectly helping a FIS takeover. 
The French government would have preferred a compromise with the Islamist 
substance in a framework where it could be controlled. In no way, however, did it 
wish to have to deal with a revolutionary Islamist regime in Algiers. Hence, it seems, 
the 1993 rapprochement. 
The change in Ambassadors to Algiers may also have played a role in the 
redefinition of French policy. Kessedjian never hid his dislike for the FIS and was on 
relatively good terms with Abdesselam. In addition, Kessedjian had been Dumas's 
cabinet152 director for several years and thus counted among Dumas's close 
acquaintances, which may explain why Kessedjian's initiative for a rapprochement 
was well relayed to the Quai d'Orsay. 
To sum up, it is worth emphasising that, whereas the French media tend to 
affirm that France's Algeria policy has been one of unconditional support to the 
Algerian regime since the January 1992 coup d'dtat, the Cresson and Bdrdgovoy 
governments, in fact, led a very cautious policy which, as indicated by the minister 
for foreign affairs, consisted in "manoeuvring on the razor's edge" 153. The French 
government did not wish to see a FIS regime in Algiers. But it also dreaded the 
consequences of a complete exclusion of the Islamist mainstream from Algeria's 
politics. In maintaining relations with the HSC, it hoped to be able to incite it to a 
compromise with the Islamists -- a compromise whose outline was not well defined 
152 The French cabinet is the team of official and unofficial advisers grouped around each minister 
and thus bears no relation to the cabinet in the British sense. 
153 Interview with Roland Dumas, May 16,1995. 
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but which could have led, under the leadership of such a personality as Taleb 
Ibrahimi, to a political solution of (controlled) integration of the Islamists in the 
political game. The Socialist Party as a whole did not support this policy line but 
governmental unity was maintained. In addition, supporters of the "preventive coup 
d'dtat" did not manage to influence Dumas's policy which, despite words of support 
and solidarity, was one of minimal contact with Algiers. In January 1993, after one 
year of tensed relations with Algiers which accused France of having a FIS joker up 
its sleeve, the French government unexpectedly decided to more clearly back the 
Algerian regime. It seems that this change in policy was taken in the light of two 
considerations. First, that it was too late for conciliation to be reached in Algeria and, 
second, that the risk of a FIS violent takeover was possible. This policy of greater 
support to Algiers was also followed, at least until a certain point, by the new right- 
wing government appointed after the Right's triumph in the late March 1993 
parliamentary elections. 
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Chapter Two 
The Balladur government (April 1993 - May 1995) 
The Balladur government had to deal with three different governments in 
Algeria and with two presidents heading different governing institutions (see table 1). 
Despite these numerous and important changes, the Algerian leaders were all 
confronted with the same problem : getting their country out of a worsening economic 
and political crisis. Except under Abdesselam, they attempted to do so more or less in 
the same way : they dealt with the debt problem by finally agreeing to reschedule, 
sought to eradicate Islamist armed groups and opened a political dialogue with the 
opposition forces, including the FIS until September 1994. It is by reference to these 
issues that the Balladur government had to define its Algeria policy. They will thus be 
explored before turning to an analysis of the Balladur government's discourse and 
policy. The section dealing with Algerian domestic politics, while accounting for 
rescheduling, puts great emphasis on the political dialogue process. The various 
positions of the parties involved are identified along the "eradicator"/"conciliator" line 
in order to demonstrate that the current power struggle cannot be read as a mere fight 
of "democratic enlightenment" against "totalitarian obscurantism". In addition, 
particular care is devoted to demonstrate that the Algerian authorities' dialogue 
initiative was designed to fail. Indeed, it really looks as though dialogue with the FIS 
was initiated with the mere aim to discredit the outlawed party by pointing at its 
inherent uncompromising behaviour whereas, in reality, the FIS's unwillingness to 
submit to the Algerian government had its root in the latter's uncompromising 
negotiation strategy. 
The inquiry into France's Algeria policy under Balladur is divided into two 
sections corresponding to a change in the French government's approach to political 
dialogue in Algeria. From April 1993 to September 1994, despite an apparently 
conciliatory stance, the main feature of the Balladur government's policy was its 
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espousal of the Algerian eradicators' arguments for refusing to negotiate a political 
settlement with the FIS. By contrast, from September 1994 to the May 1995 
presidential elections which brought down the Balladur Administration, the French 
government showed more openness towards a conciliatory solution to the Algerian 
conflict. Regarding the first period, marked by French backing of the Algerian 
eradicators, the study focuses on the ambiguities and contradictions of the official 
discourse with the aim to demonstrate that, despite a discourse emphasising the need 
for conciliation in Algeria, the Balladur government opposed a compromise with the 
FIS. In addition, the ways in which the French government brought its support to 
Algiers are examined. Other states' positions in relation to the Algerian crisis are 
briefly reviewed in the light of France's drumming up international support for 
Algiers. Insofar as the second period is concerned, the shift towards greater firmness 
vis-a-vis the eradicators is accounted for by showing the evolution of Juppd's 
discourse on the issue of political dialogue in Algeria. Particular attention is given to 
the issue of governmental disunity which characterised this period (September 1994 - 
May 1995) and which made France's policy look like a muddle. Finally, the reasons 
for Juppd's change of heart are analysed as well as its limits : it was not accompanied 
by a change in policy measures, thus reflecting the government's unwillingness to 
force a conciliation with the FIS in Algeria. 
1. Domestic politics in Algeria 
1.1. Failed attempts at political dialogue 
A detailed treatment of the various rounds of talks held from March 1993 to 
September 1994 between the Algerian Administration and the civil society (political 
parties, associations, and various personalities) would be repetitive. Indeed, most of 
the problems to be discussed and the positions of the various parties concerned have 
more or less remained the same throughout. It will suffice, therefore, to establish the 
central aim sought in the dialogue and to discuss the main issue at stake, that is the 
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inclusion or not of the banned FIS within the dialogue. 
1.1.1. The aim of the dialogue : legitimacy 
Kafi's attempt at starting talks with the opposition afresh, after the failure of 
September 1992, was driven by the prospect of the expiring mandate of the High 
State Council (December 31,1993). New ruling institutions needed to be created and 
Kafi hoped that, if a consensus could be reached through dialogue on such 
institutions, these would acquire the legitimacy which the HSC had lacked. For Kafi, 
dialogue was not a framework within which proposals for Algeria's future institutions 
could be advanced by the civil society. Rather, he saw it as a means to get a public 
approval of the HSC's own scheme which he had outlined on January 14,1993 and 
which had been advocated by Abdesselam during his visit in Paris. 
The backbone of the HSC's programme was the creation of a new governing 
body with a three-year mandate to oversee the transition to the return to the ballot 
box'. Most political parties were hostile to this proposal which they denounced as a 
means to maintain in power the HSC in another form. Yet, after discussions held with 
the civil society between March and June 1993, this was eventually the adopted 
solution in the "Draft platform on the national consensus on the transitional period"2. 
Other rounds of talks were convened under the Malek government within the 
framework of a National Dialogue Commission3. They were aimed at bringing as 
many parties into the consensus before a National Dialogue Conference was convened 
to sanction the blueprint on the transitional period. The blueprint provided for three 
ruling bodies :a state presidency, a government, and a National Transition Council 
supposed to replace the former Consultative National Council but not fundamentally 
different since its members were to be state-nominated. 
The National Dialogue Conference took place on January 25-26,19944. Most 
1 MEI (442), January 22,1993. 
2 The Financial Times, June 23,1993 and Algerie Actualite (1447), 6-12 juillet 1993. 
3 The National Dialogue Commission was created on October 13,1993. It was headed by five 
civilians and three Army Generals. Le Monde, 17-18 octobre 1993. 
4 The convening of the Conference having been postponed to January 1993, the HSC's mandate was 
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political parties boycotted it. Among them : the FLN, the FFS, and the RCD. The 
RCD did so in opposition to the authorities' attempts at negotiating with the FIS (see 
below). The FFS, the FLN and other smaller parties were unwilling to participate in a 
"great show" aimed at "enthroning at the head of the state a candidate coming from the 
seraglio"5. Their boycott was also intended to protest against the government's 
neglect of their demands in favour of a return to civil peace : lifting the state of 
emergency, releasing political prisoners and ceasing executions. Hamas, the MNI, the 
PRA and others left the Conference because, on the eve of its opening, a provision on 
the selection process for the presidency of the Republic was reintroduced into the 
platform whereas they had previously obtained its abrogation6. The amendment of the 
platform implied that the president would be nominated, as usual, by the military 
establishment. Without surprise, it was exactly what happened. General Lamine 
Zeroual, who had been appointed defence minister in July 19937, was designated 
president of the Algerian Republic on January 31,1994. The Malek government was 
reconfirmed8. The National Transition Council was installed under Sifi's Premiership 
on May 18,19949. 
Since the most significant political parties had boycotted the Conference, the 
legitimacy which the authorities had hoped for was simply not achieved. Under 
Zeroual, the objective sought in continuing to propose a political dialogue was to 
obtain a posteriori such a legitimacy. Between March and September 1994, there were 
four rounds of talks aimed at bringing the political parties that had boycotted the 
Conference to join the state-managed political game and to accept seats in the National 
prolonged for a month. 
5 H. Alt Ahmed in Le Monde 27 janvier 1994. 
6A reproduction of the amended platform can be found in Liberte, 24 janvier 1993. Initial versions 
and amendments are outlined in El Watan, 24 janvier 1993. For details on the National Dialogue 
Conference, see Libert6,24 janvier 1993 ; Le Monde, 25 and 27 janvier 1994. 
7 Zeroual replaced Major General Khaled Nezzar who kept his function within the HSC (MEI (455), 
July 23,1993). Zeroual was reconfirmed in his function as defence minister in the Malek government 
and he kept this portfolio after having been appointed president. The High Security Council, the same 
body that dismissed Chadli, chose Zeroual as president. It was then composed of Khaled Nezzar, 
Major General Mohamed Lamari (chief of staff), Salim Saadi (interior minister), Redha Malek and 
Mourad Benachenhou (economy minister). MEED, 38 (6), February 11,1994. 
8 Le Monde 30-31 janvier 1994 and 1 fevrier 1994. 
9 El Moudjahid, 19 mai 1994. 
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Transition Council. During this period, the position of the political parties vis-a-vis 
the Algerian authorities was entirely dominated by the on-going debate on the place 
the FIS should be given in the political arena. 
1.1.2. Dialogue with the FIS 
The split between "eradicators" and "conciliators" 
The issue as to whether FIS members should be invited to the negotiation table 
arose publicly during the round of talks convened between March and June 1993 
under the Abdesselam government. It has never left Algeria's political debates ever 
since, and has divided both the civil society and power circles into two well-defined 
categories : the "eradicators" and the "conciliators". 
Within the civil society, eradicators are represented by parties, such as the 
RCD and Ettahaddi ; associations grouped around the UGTA in the National 
Committee for the Safeguarding of Algeria ; most of the French-language press and 
part of the French-educated intellectual elite. Eradicators favour, as their name 
indicates, a strategy of eradication of the Islamist armed groups but also a strategy of 
complete exclusion of the Islamist movement from Algeria's political landscape. The 
Islamist political project, which they depict as archaic and totalitarian, is, in their 
view, wholly incompatible with their own, based upon the concept of a modern, 
secular and republican state. Organising several protest demonstrations 10, eradicators 
have denounced the Algerian authorities' contacts with the FIS. They have argued that 
no bargaining should be made with "people who have deliberately and officially 
chosen murder and violence as a means to reach power" it. They have also maintained 
10 E. g. the demonstration of March 22,1994 where marchers -- bolstered by Sadi's call for 
"resistance" against the Islamist armed groups' attacks -- threatened to organise themselves into self- 
defence groups (Financial Times, March 25,1994), or the march of June 29,1994 for "a republican 
rupture", aimed at "defeating fundamentalism and the regime that produced it" (see the Movement for 
the Republic's call published in El Watan, 27 juin, 1994. This Movement was created in December 
1993 and is headed by SaId Sadi). Counter-demonstrations were also organised by the "conciliators" 
such as that of May 8,1994 where demonstrators called for a "national reconciliation" through a 
dialogue with the banned party (Le Monde, 10 mai 1994). 
11 Said Sadi (RCD) interviewed in Le Monde, 27 septembre 1994. 
76 
that no discussion should be held with any of the Islamist parties, whether or not they 
officially abide by the principle of democracy, for "(... ) the Islamist movement is one 
(... ) [and] its incarnation in different parties is just an adaptation to the conditions of 
formal multiparty politics and a judicious distribution of roles and tasks. "12 
Proponents of the eradicator line have radicalised since Spring 1993 when they were 
taken into the whirl of violence : most politicians, journalists and intellectuals 
incarnating this trend have, indeed, been the target of the Islamist armed groups. 
Intolerance, which they denounce about the Islamists, has progressively become one 
of their characteristics13. 
Conciliators are represented by parties with a greater electoral import than that 
of the eradicators. They notably include the FLN and the FFS, but also the MDA, the 
MAJD, the PRA, the PT (Trotskists) and legal Islamist parties such as Hamas, the 
MNI and the Contemporary Muslim Jazair. Organisations such as the Algerian League 
for the Defence of Human Rights headed by Abdenour Ali Yahia and personalities 
such as Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi or Abdelhamid Brahimi14 are also among the 
supporters of a compromising line. Conciliators, who do not necessarily share the 
Islamists' political project, have argued that the authorities must reintegrate the 
outlawed FIS within the political process for two main reasons. Firstly, in order to 
put an end to a civil strife which, by its very nature, hampers any return to 
democratisation. Secondly, in order to bring the FIS to compromise and to satisfy 
those who have seen in this party an answer to their social demands15. It is worth 
12 Hachemi Cherif (Ettahaddi) in El Watan, 15 juin 1994. 
13 It is worth noting, for instance, the initiative of the Algerian Rally of the Democrat Women 
which staged a tribunal simulation where the chief leaders of the FIS were condemned to death and 
where the Sant'Egidio Community, which hosted meetings between opposition parties including the 
FIS, was denounced for being the "apologist of criminals" (Le Monde, 10 mars 1995). 
14 Taleb Ibrahimi and Abdelhamid Brahimi, prime minister from 1984 to 1988, created in September 
1991 a National Committee for the Support to Political Prisoners who include the paramount leaders 
of the FIS (A. Charef (1994), p. 216). They have since then militated in favour of the re-legalisation 
of the FIS and its full reintegration in Algeria's political realm. See, for instance, Brahimi's attempt 
at relaunching the Rome initiative in London (meeting of the signatories of the Rome platform 
without, however, the FLN and the FFS at the Royal Institute for International Affairs on March 22, 
1995 (The Guardian, March 23,1995)) See as well as A. Brahimi (1994). 
15 See the FLN's declaration in Algdrie Actualite (1422), 13-19 janvier 1992 and the interviews or 
declarations of Hocine All Ahmed (FFS), in Algerie Actualitd (1422), 13-19 janvier 1992 ; Le Monde 
27 janvier 1994 and 23 ffvrier 1995 ; Mahfoud Nahnah (llamas) in Algerie Actualite (1434), 6-12 
avril 1993 and in El Watan, 21 avril 1994 ; Nourredine Boukrouh (PRA) in Algdrie Actualite (1408), 
8-14 octobre 1992. 
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mentioning that, even though politicians representing this trend have also been 
murdered, their respective parties have continued to support a compromising line16. 
The split between eradicators and conciliators observed within the civil society 
also exists within power circles, whether at the civilian or military level. Within the 
military establishment much has been said about potential disagreements between 
high- and low-rank officers, but the split also exists among senior officers. This 
became patent in April 1995 : eight Generals called for reopening negotiations 
(officially suspended in late October 1994) with the Islamists17. But, let there be no 
misunderstanding : if conciliator officers favour a negotiated solution to the state of 
violence, they are in no way ready to give up power. They are merely inclined to 
accept a civilianfafade to their exercise of power. Accommodation with the Army is a 
constraint that political parties wanting to be associated to government have come to 
terms with and it is probably for this share of civilian power that eradicator and 
conciliator parties are currently struggling. 
This panorama would be incomplete if no reference were made to the 
population. To a certain extent, it is surprising to strictly dissociate the people from 
the organised civil society. For, in one way or the other, public opinion must be 
reflected in the positions of the parties and associations. It has become a custom, 
though, to ask what the majority of the people thinks and this may perhaps be justified 
in the light of the high abstention rates that have characterised the Algerian free 
elections. Since the coup, many in the West have wondered whether the terrorist 
attacks undertaken by Islamist armed groups sapped the popularity of the FIS. The 
question in itself is a clear demonstration of the success of the propaganda divulged 
by the Algerian regime. This propaganda, relayed by eradicator parties, has sought, 
by maintaining the confusion between the GlAs, the AIS and the FIS, to demonstrate 
that Islamists are all terrorists and, consequently, that negotiating with them is a risky 
16 It was reported that, from January 1992 to December 1994,200 political militants were killed, out 
of whom 50 were affiliated to the FLN (Le Monde, 24 decembre 1994). Islamist moderates of Hamas 
and the Guidance and Reform Association have also been the target of murderous attacks (Le Monde, 
20 septembre 1994 and 14 octobre 1994). Whether they were all killed by the GlAs remains in 
question. 
17 Le Monde, 8 avril 1995. 
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business. To straighten things out, it must be specified that the GlAs, which have 
been the likely perpetrators of the murders of (some) intellectuals, journalists, 
foreigners and unveiled women, have always claimed their independence from the 
FIS whose proclivity to dialogue they have denounced. The Islamic Salvation Army 
(AIS), created in July 1994, owes allegiance to the FIS. It was founded by released 
FIS cadres who attempted to unify the various armed groups with the view to 
controlling violence to the benefit of the party's political strategy. The AIS is, as it 
were, the FIS's military arm and has centred its fighting strategy on attacks against the 
security forces and public goods'8. 
In Ahmed RouadjIa's view19, the people in Algeria make a clear distinction 
between the GIAs and the FIS so that the terror organised by the GlAs is not 
perceived as inherent in the Islamist movement nor as representative of the strategy of 
the movement as a whole. With regard to the AIS, its acts may well be perceived less 
as terrorism than self-defence or resistance for two main reasons. First, the majority 
of the people, according to RouadjYa, lay the responsibility of the current state of 
morbid outburst on the regime and not the Islamists, whether or not they are pro-FIS. 
Many saw the interruption of the elections as a confirmation that those in power do no 
want to relinquish it whatever the price20. Second, whereas it is difficult for the few 
foreign journalists who have the courage to go to Algeria to understand what is going 
on there really (because they are almost systematically flanked by ninjas for their 
protection), the Algerian people do understand. They know that some of the murders 
blamed on the zealots are mere private settlements that are given a political 
signification. They know that some ordinary, not politically committed, people were 
executed in reprisal operations. They also know that the politicians, intellectuals and 
journalists who have always defended conciliation or who have, in front of the 
disaster, become reluctant to advocate eradication are the targets as much of the GIAs 
as of the Military Security21. As long as an election involving all the political currents 
18 On the various Islamist armed groups in Algeria see S. Labat (1995), pp. 87-110. 19 A. RouadjIa (1995a), p. 110. 
20 Ibid., pp. 108-110. 
21 On the issue of state terrorism in Algeria see F. Burgat (1995), pp. 168-174. 
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crossing the Algerian society is not organised, it will be difficult to assess what the 
majority thinks and wants. Those who feel they cannot accept Roudjaia's contention 
that the Algerian population secretly wishes the victory of the FIS, if only to get rid of 
the regime, will more easily accept S6verine Labat's point that the particularly 
repressive measures implemented by the regime lead the population "to estimate that 
an Islamist regime could not, after all, show itself worse than the regime in power. "22 
Fake or real negotiations with the FIS ? 
Overtures towards the FIS were initiated during Autumn 1993. The opening 
move came with the High State Council's public statement on November 23,1993 in 
which it affirmed its willingness to open "a dialogue without exclusion". As an 
outlawed party, the FIS could not participate in the dialogue. But it was specified that 
FIS members who respected the law and certain engagements could23. The option of 
a "dialogue without exclusion" was upheld by Zeroual in his speech of February 
199424 and repeated by various political leaders until September 199425. Contacts 
with the FIS leadership were established in Winter 1993/94 and multiplied towards 
the end of Summer 1994. The Algerian authorities accompanied their dialogue 
propositions with "appeasement measures". In January 1994 part of the Islamist 
prisoners held in the Saharan camps were released and house arrest sanctions against 
FIS militants who had sat in local and regional councils were lifted. In February 1994 
two high representatives of the FIS, Ali Djeddi and Abdelkader Boukhamkham, were 
released26. 
It is doubtful that the decision to accept the principle of the integration of FIS 
representatives into the dialogue represented a genuine attempt on the part of the 
regime to find a political solution to the crisis triggered by the 1992 coup d'dtat. 
22 A. Rouadjia (1995a), p. 110 and S. Labat in Le Monde, 6 aoüt 1994. 
23 Algerie Actualite (1468), 30 novembre-6 ddcembre 1993 and Le Monde, 11 ddcembre 1993. 
24 Le Monde, 9 fdvrier 1994. 
25 Notably by Prime Minister Sifi, see Le Monde, 23 juillet 1994. 
26 Le Monde, 21 janvier 1994 and 24 Wrier 1994. 
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Under Kafi there had certainly been signs of a willingness to move towards 
conciliation. Kafi had taxed political parties and associations urging "a radical rupture 
with fundamentalism" with being "pseudo-supporters of the rupture"27. The new 
president seemed to be along the conciliating side of the political divide. However, 
President Zeroual has been unable or unwilling to impose a fully conciliatory attitude, 
lest he would finish like Boudiaf or Merbah28, one might think. This was reflected in 
the negotiation strategy adopted by the authorities. As explained below, this strategy 
could in no way lead to an agreement with the FIS. 
The authorities' bargaining strategy was the following. FIS representatives 
would be allowed into the dialogue about the transitional period and its aftermath on 
two types of conditions : conditions applying to all parties and conditions that were 
specific to the FIS. Conditions required of all parties have varied from one round of 
talks with the Administration to the other. Those recurring were : respecting the 
republican character of the state ; the principles of pluralism and of political 
alternation ; observing private and civil liberties and rejecting violence. In addition to 
these general requirements, the FIS was asked to call for an end to violence. 
Abassi Madani agreed in August 1994 to respect the "constitutional 
fundamentals" required to participate in the dialogue29. He, however, refused to call 
for a ceasefire and presented counter-conditions : release of the FIS leaders ; 
possibility for the majlis ash shura to meet ; lifting of the ban on the party and of the 
state of emergency ; general amnesty ; return of the Army to its barracks ; formation of 
a neutral government to oversee the transition before new elections or a referendum on 
the "establishment of an Algerian republican state based upon Islamic principles"30. 
27 Quoted in Algerie ActualitE (1428), 23 fdvrier-1 mars 1993 and (1431), 16-22 mars 1993. 
28 Kasdi Merbah was assassinated on the very day Malek was appointed head of the government. 
Merbah had proposed to Zeroual, then defence minister, to play the role of a mediator between the 
FIS and the authorities before they enter into direct contact with the banned party. The murder has, of 
course, been blamed on (and claimed by) the GIAs but, as in the case of Boudiaf, the accusing forgers 
are all pointing at the eradicator army officers. See P. Ddvoluy & M. Duteil (1994), pp. 304-10. 
29 Confirmed by the Algerian foreign minister in Le Monde, 1 octobre 1994. 
30 Content of the letters of August 25 and August 27 to Zeroual in Le Monde, 8 septembre 1994. It 
can be noted that between December 1993 and August 1994, one of the FIS's conditions for 
participation in the dialogue was dropped : the abrogation of the laws passed since January 1992 
which implied among others the abrogation of the annulment of the results of the parliamentary 
elections. For details on the conditions put forward by the FIS, see Kebir's statement in Le Monde, 
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On September 6,1994, in anticipation of the round of talks scheduled for September 
20, the imprisoned FIS leaders also asked to include leaders of the AIS in the 
dialogue31. The authorities responded on September 13,1994 by transferring Abassi 
Madani and Ali Benhadj from prison to house arrest32. While affirming that the 
transfer was insufficient, Rabah Kebir suggested that Madani was ready to call a 
ceasefire before all his conditions were met33. However, the authorities were not 
ready to discuss any truce directly with the AIS leaders. Zeroual argued on September 
21,1994 that nothing concrete had come out of the discussions with the FIS34. The 
official decision to cut negotiations with the FIS was announced by the Algerian 
president in a press communiqud on October 29,1994 and repeated in his 
commemoration speech of November 1,1954. The simultaneous promotion to a new 
ranking grade of Major General Lamari was intended to show that eradication was the 
major item on the Administration's agenda35. 
The authorities' strategy had two (intended) flaws. They asked from the FIS 
to call for an end to armed rebellion. This demand, if satisfied, would have led to an 
additional one : that the FIS guarantee the enforcement of a ceasefire. This was, 
indeed, an implicit condition for the FIS to be accepted in dialogue. For, if the FIS 
called for civil peace without effectively enforcing a ceasefire, it would have been 
accused of taking back with one hand what it had given with the other. Was the FIS in 
a position to agree to call for an end to guerrilla action ? No. Doing so would have 
further divided its armed wing within which dissension had already appeared. As 
early as December 1993, Abdezzerak Redjem (head of the national commission of the 
FIS's provisional executive bureau and founder of the MIA) had issued a 
communiqud attacking those who were prepared to engage in a dialogue with the 
regime36. In Spring 1994, important transfers from the FIS and the MIA to the GIAs 
19-20 ddcembre 1993 and the content of Ali Benhadj's letter to Zeroual in Le Monde, 23 aoüt 1994. 
31 Le Monde, 11-12 septembre 1994. 
32 Le Monde, 15 septembre 1994. Madani and Benhadj had been sentenced to twelve years of jail on 
July 15,1992. 
33 Le Monde, 18-19 septembre 1994. 
34 Le Monde, 24 septembre 1994. 
35 Le Monde, 1 novembre 1994 and 2 novembre 1994. 
36 Le Monde, 29 ddcembre 1993. 
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occurred : Redjem would have joined the GlAs in May, as well as Mohammed Said 
who had headed the provisional executive bureau since Hachani's arrest37. Said 
Makhloufi, author of call-up instructions on civil disobedience and second in 
command of the MIA, seems to have joined the GlAs by August 199438. These 
defections suggested that calling for a ceasefire would generate additional shifts to the 
GIAs, undermining further the FIS's control over the armed rebellion. The risk for 
the FIS was, therefore, to negotiate a truce which it would have been unable to 
enforce and which would, thus, have preempted it from being accepted within the 
dialogue. 
The second flaw in the government's strategy was that it offered no guarantee 
to the FIS that if, indeed, it managed to restore order, it would be allowed to fully 
reintegrate into politics. The issue of the re-legalisation of the FIS, on the basis of the 
respect of the political conditions to which it agreed in August 1994, was addressed 
by the government as something that would need to be considered only once the 
authority of the state had been restored. Why would the FIS have run the risk of 
dissociating itself from the radicals if, in the end, it had no guarantee to be reinstated 
into legality ? 
The manoeuvres surrounding the reshuffle of the military hierarchy in May 
1994 give added weight to the view that the Algerian authorities' negotiation strategy 
had been designed to fail. Zeroual appointed his loyal men to the command of the 
ground, air, gendarmerie and police forces and of the military regions. He also 
appointed two conciliators as ministerial counsellors39. Just as the exclusion of 
Interior Minister Salim Saadi from the new Sifi government (April 1994), this military 
reshuffle was apparently intended to reassure FIS leaders that eradicators were being 
marginalised. Yet, while this was indeed the case, one particular man was not only 
maintained in his functions but his authority bolstered : Zeroual gave him the right to 
sign decrees in his name just before the reshuffle40. This man was Major General 
37 Le Monde, 24-25 juillet 1994. 
38 Le Monde, 28-29 aoßt 1994. 
39 Le Monde, 7 mai 1994 and 19 mai 1994 and MEED (38)(20), May 20,1994. 
40 Le Monde, 23 mars 1994. 
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Lamari, the incarnation par excellence of the eradicator line. As head of the ground 
forces, he was involved in the June 1991 crisis which was perceived by the FIS as a 
betrayal on the part of the regime. After having been dismissed from this function 
under Boudiaf (although kept as counsellor to the defence minister), Lamari was 
appointed commander of the anti-terrorist squads in September 1992. He was, 
thereafter, promoted to the rank of Major General and appointed chief of staff in July 
1993. The FIS and the AIS's mistrust of Zeroual's real intentions is not then a great 
surprise. Before negotiations with the FIS were officially cut, a FIS representative, 
intervening in a conference in London, specifically addressed this point : 
"At present, the FIS is asked to give guarantees that it would be able to control the armed 
groups in order to be allowed in the dialogue. (... ) In the Army there are people who believe 
in eliminating everyone else. What are the guarantees that Zeroual can provide to control 
these elements ? "41. 
Dialogue with the FIS, thus, does not seem to have been pursued to really find 
a solution to the political crisis shaking Algeria since 1992. It almost looks as though 
dialogue was led with the aim of discrediting the option of a conciliation by pointing at 
the FIS's uncompromising behaviour. To all appearances, this fake dialogue only 
allowed the government to buy time from the international community, particularly at 
a time when it was negotiating its stabilisation programme with the IMF. For, the 
international community as a whole has not been as ready as France to buttress the 
Algerian regime in its eradication strategy42. 
All roads, it is said, lead to Rome 
Eradicator opposition parties along with conciliator ones showed distrust in 
the regime's dialogue initiative with the FIS. This was not, in fact, very startling. 
Parties representing the eradicator line have always manifested their refusal of the very 
41 Paper read in Rabah Kebir's place at the conference on "The Future of the Maghrib" organised by 
the Geopolitics and International Boundaries Research Centre, 6-7 October 1994, Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, London. 
42 See section 2.13. below, "Multilateral support". 
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principle of negotiations with the FIS by boycotting all rounds and denouncing the 
risk of a "Sudanisation" of the Algerian political system43. As to the conciliator 
parties, they were for dialogue with the FIS. But, they were unwilling to back the 
regime's initiative because they were fully aware of its limits. So, they coolly 
welcomed Zeroual when he asked them to help the authorities in bringing Madani and 
Benhadj to denounce terrorism. The FFS warned of a potential "secret pact" between 
the Army and the Islamists that would exclude the democratic camp44. Whether Alt 
Ahmed truly believed in this possibility or not, the break in the negotiations with the 
FIS in September 1994 allowed the conciliator opposition to bring the FIS under its 
own wing with the view to preempting such an alliance or simply in order to face the 
authorities in a united front. 
Under the sponsorship of the Catholic community of Sant'Egidio in Rome, 
conciliator opposition parties met FIS representatives twice : on November 21-22, 
1994 and on January 8-13,1995. The second meeting was closed with the adoption 
of a common "Platform for a political and pacific solution to the Algerian crisis". It 
was signed by the FIS, the FLN, the FFS, the MDA, the PT, the MNI, the 
Contemporary Muslim Jazair, and the Algerian League for the Defence of Human 
Rights. It is worth emphasising that most of the provisions of the platform put 
forward by the National Dialogue Commission are to be found in the Rome platform. 
This underlines a certain consensus as to the way in which Algeria can be 
disentangled from the crisis. The similarities concern : the respect of the declaration of 
November 1,1954 which established Islam as an integral part of the personality of the 
Algerian people ; the respect of the 1989 Constitution ; the rejection of violence as a 
means of access to or maintenance in power ; the respect of human rights and civil 
liberties ; the establishment of political pluralism and the respect of political 
alternation. 
The Rome platform, however, contains other significant provisions. Some 
emphasise Berber heritage and religious freedom. Others are about guarantees of 
43 Said Sadi in Liberte, 19 avril 1994. 
44 Le Monde, 24 and 25 aoüt 1994. 
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democracy : separation of powers ; respect of popular legitimacy and rejection of 
dictatorship. In addition, the Rome platform puts forward a series of specific 
measures to be taken by the government and the FIS before negotiations between the 
regime and the opposition about future free elections can be kicked off. Measures 
concerning the Algerian authorities included : lifting the ban on the FIS ; releasing its 
leadership ; closing the detention camps ; lifting the state of emergency ; ending 
censorship, torture and reprisals on the population. The FIS's obligations were to 
condemn violence and call for an end to the killing of civilians and foreigners and to 
the destruction of public goods45. The advantage for the FIS of this opposition 
platform was that, provided it condemned the murder of civilians and took the 
necessary steps to enforce the cessation of the violence perpetrated by the AIS, it did 
not need to restore complete order to be accepted within the political game. 
A word on the position of the FIS on the issue of violence is necessary at this 
stage because of the confusion that surrounds the question. It is important to recall, 
first of all, that when the FIS was created in 1989 it subsumed various currents and 
included proponents of armed struggle who had been, for most, activists within 
Bouyali's Armed Islamic Movement (1982-87) or veterans of Afghanistan. Until the 
cancellation of the elections and the outlawing of the FIS, partisans of the armed path 
had been marginalised within the party by those advocating a legalist way to reach 
power. When the FIS was banned and repression against Islamist militants organised, 
armed groups were formed and joined, not only by those who had always advocated 
armed rebellion, but also by militants threatened by repression. 
The political wing of the FIS, without claiming the terrorist attacks, never 
condemned them, arguing that the first violence came from the state. Playing upon 
comparisons between the policies of the colonial state and of the current Algerian 
regime, it has presented armed rebellion as a legitimate resistance against state 
oppression46. In March 1993, the armed groups' strategy shifted from merely 
45 The Rome platform is reproduced in Le Monde Diplomatique, mars 1995. 
46 See M. Al-Ahnaf et. al. (1991), pp. 129-41. The parallel with the debate in France during the War 
of Independence over the issue of the legitimacy of the FLNs terrorist acts is obvious. At the time, 
some French intellectuals such as Jean-Paul Sartre or Francis Jeanson argued that the "the violence of 
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attacking security forces to eliminating civil servants, intellectuals and journalists. FIS 
representatives have argued the killings were justified as a response to active or 
passive collaboration with the authorities : 
"Who are these so-called intellectuals ? Among them there are members of the National 
Consultative Council which has usurped the place of the people's elected representatives, 
persons who wrote murderous editorials, and those who, as psychiatrists, advised torturers on 
how to obtain confessions. The Algerian people has chosen as targets only those individuals 
upon whom the military-security system in Algeria relies. "47 
FIS representatives have also underlined that none of these intellectuals "had lifted a 
finger" to denounce state repression against the Islamists, and that they had, therefore, 
chosen a side48. 
As regards the killings of foreigners, which started in September 1993 and 
which have been claimed in their great majority by the GlAs, the evolution of the 
position of the FIS is difficult to assess accurately because press reports did not 
systematically account for the declarations of FIS representatives. What can be said 
with a measure of certainty is that while maintaining that "It [was] not the policy of the 
FIS to kill foreigners (... )"49, FIS representatives have not clearly condemned the 
killings until February 1994, arguing that foreign regimes supporting the Algerian 
authorities had to expect a reaction. 
It is, it seems, the GIAs' intimidation campaign against the civilian population, 
clearly engaged since 1994 in order to establish Islamically ruled pockets50, that has 
brought the FIS -- then, in negotiations with the Algerian authorities -- to condemn 
"the attacks against all individuals -- Algerians and foreigners, civilians and soldiers -- 
popular resistance" could not be equated with the "violence of aggression" and that counter-violence to 
the initial violence produced by the colonial political system was legitimate. 
47 Anwar Haddam (October 1993) quoted in A. Zerouali (1994), p. 164. 
48 Abdelbaki Sahraoui on Transit, "Algdrie : comment sortir de l'impasse 7", Arte, November 1993. 
49 Rabah Kebir (October 1993) quoted in A. Zerouali (1994), p. 164. 
50 Intimidation measures include the killing of unveiled school girls (the first having occurred on 
February 28,1994), threats to public transport owners to incite them to impose sexual segregation, 
or to traders to bring them to reduce their prices (Le Monde, 22 Wrier 1994). Since August 1994, the 
GlAs have also threatened schools and universities of forced closure on the ground that current 
education programmes deviate the youth from the path of God (Le Monde, 7-8 aoüt 1994). By 
October 1994, over 600 schools had been partially destroyed and some 50 academics murdered (Le 
Monde, 8 octobre 1994). 
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who do not participate in the operations of the security forces conducted with the use 
of force"51. Since February 1994 this has been the constant line of FIS 
representatives who make a distinction between "terrorism" and the "armed struggle". 
The armed struggle is defined as targeting the security forces. Terrorism is understood 
as aimed at the persons not involved in the security forces' violent operations. During 
the Rome conference Haddam was clear on this point. He also declared that the FIS 
condemned terrorism but supported the armed struggle with the specification that : 
"The armed struggle is not an end in itself, it is a means. If its goal can be reached 
through peaceful and civilian ways, we are for [them]. "52 
Since their February 1994 declaration, FIS representatives have strongly 
condemned the killing of a monk and a nun (May 8,1994), the bomb attack in the 
Mostaganem cemetery which killed four children (November 1,1994), the hijack of 
the French Airbus (December 24,1994) and the killing of four White fathers that 
followed (December 27,1994) as well as the car bomb attack against the police station 
of Algiers which killed 38 persons and wounded over 250 (January 30,1995)53. 
While Haddam has blamed the GlAs for fulfilling the expectations of the eradicators, 
Kebir made an important move in January 1995, condemning "any act which aims at 
innocents whatever their tendencies or their religion and whoever the authors of such 
acts are. "54 The precision "whoever the authors of such acts are" is significant since it 
implies that were the AIS to commit terrorist attacks, in the sense defined by the FIS, 
the latter should no longer try to justify such acts. 
51 A. Haddam in Le Matin, 3 Wrier 1994. See also R. Kebir in Le Monde, 23 novembre 1994. 52 A. Haddam in Le Monde, 12 janvier 1995. As early as December 1993 a representative of the FIS 
had declared that the FIS's "armed resistance (was] directed only against the military dictatorship. " (Le 
Monde, 7 d6cembre 1993). But the FIS's unwillingness to clearly condemn attacks against civilians 
and foreigners somewhat undermined this claim. 
53 Respectively in Le Monde, 17 mai 1994 ;4 novembre 1994 ;5 janvier 1995 ;7 janvier 1995 and 
4 Wrier 1995. 
54 Both in Le Monde, 7 janvier 1995. 
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Algeria confronts an unsure future 
The evolution of events in Algeria since Autumn 1994 casts doubts on a return 
to civil peace which is a necessary (but not sufficient) stepping-stone to the 
resumption of democratic life. The authorities' unwillingness to agree to the 
organisation of a transitional period on terms that they would not have wholly defined 
has pitted them against the opposition which is, thus, not inclined to co-operate. In 
parallel, whereas the FIS has softened, the authorities have striven harder than ever to 
stamp out the armed groups. This attitude somewhat breeds the risk of continued 
violence as it contributes to the undermining of the control of the political wing of the 
FIS over the AIS. 
Zeroual's current political programme is to hold a presidential election in 
November 1995, followed by legislative and local elections. Elections are planned to 
go ahead without the Islamists as long as arms are not laid down. After bilateral talks 
with the Algerian government in April 1995, the signatories of the Rome platform and 
other parties have stood by their opposition to the organisation of presidential 
elections in Algeria's current insecurity situation55. They propose the organisation of 
a short transitory period during which the return to the ballot box would be jointly 
monitored. The authorities, which condemned the Rome initiative56, have remained 
deaf to the proposals of the conciliatory opposition which is, therefore, likely to 
boycott the elections. In this case, presidential elections will not constitute the first 
step in weathering the storm. 
The Algerian government's attitude towards the Islamist current also suggests 
that a return to civil peace is far from being in reach. Not so much because the Army 
and the Islamists are not prepared to share power, or because of the hatred that 
separates both camps, as argued by Rouadjia57. But because the Army has declared 
an all-out war on the armed groups precisely when the political direction of the FIS 
55 Bilateral talks took place with the FFS, the FLN, the MDA and Ettahaddi (Le Monde, 14 avril 
1995). 
56 Le Monde, 20 janvier 1995. 
57 A. Rouadjia (1995a), p. 105. 
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started to denounce the use of violence within the limits indicated above. It is today 
less clear whether the AIS maintains its allegiance to the FIS. In January 1995, the 
AIS rejected the Rome agreement judging that, by approving the condemnation of 
violence as a means to reach power, its signatories showed "unjust towards the 
mujahidins". Without formally rejecting a political solution, the AIS expressed regrets 
that the objective of the Rome meeting had been to keep the FIS away from its military 
role58. Two pieces of information, to be handled with great care considering the 
multiple manipulations taking place in Algeria, suggest that the AIS may no longer be 
prepared to follow the political wing's watchwords. One is the alleged takeover in 
March 1995 of the FIS provisional executive bureau by an armed chieftain of the AIS 
instead of the political figures in exile. The other concerns the announcement of the 
fusion between the GlAs and the AIS in April59. If this were how the AIS is drifting, 
it would not be so surprising. The AIS has no guarantee that, if it renounces armed 
warfare, its fighters will be spared. The authorities refused to implement appeasement 
measures recommended by the conciliatory opposition and even vowed they would 
settle accounts with the armed groups by August 199560. In these conditions, if the 
AIS were to cease its struggle, its fighters, having nothing to lose, would join the 
GlAs. Whether or not the FIS would reconsider its censure of violence would not 
prevent guerrilla warfare from making the headlines for some time. 
This bleak assessment can only be reinforced by the failure of the secret 
negotiations engaged by the Algerian authorities with the FIS in June-July 1995. The 
scenario was the same as that adopted a year earlier. The dismissal on July 2,1995 of 
Interior Minister Abderrahmane Meziane-Cherif, who had proved as much of an 
58 Le Monde, 24 janvier 1995. 
59 Respectively in Le Monde, 17 mars 1995 and 16 mai 1995. With regards to the reaction of the 
GlAs to the Rome initiative, after having declared itself ready to "cease the war" under particularly 
harsh conditions (recognition by the authorities of the Rome platform, release of their chief Abdelhak 
Layada, dissolution of the communist parties and application of "the law of God" against the 
Generals, in Le Monde, 17 janvier 1995), they withdrew their support and called for the establishment 
of the caliphate through armed combat (Le Monde, 24 janvier 1995). 
60 The authorities' offensive started in November 1994 and has taken the form of "wiping out" 
operations to which both the ground and air forces take part. The population has been incited to get 
involved in the anti-terrorist struggle in practising denouncement or joining the communal guards (Le 
Monde, 7 mars 1995 and 15 avril 1995). 
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eradicator as Salim Saadi, his predecessor in the Malek government, was to be a 
goodwill token. Yet, in their negotiation strategy, the authorities did not waive their 
idea both to release paramount FIS. leaders only after the latter called for an 
unequivocal ceasefire and to allow a relegalisation of the FIS (under another name) 
only once total calm had been restored61. 
1.2. Rescheduling Algeria's foreign debt 
Foreign debt has been a major troubling issue confronting the Algerian 
Administration. Although it had dominated Algeria's economic agenda since 1988, it 
became a particularly urgent case to be settled in 1993 when creditors increasingly lost 
patience in face of Algeria's refusal to deal with the Bretton Woods institutions. 
Algeria's foreign debt rose at a high pace in the 1970s, passing from 
$ 940 million in 1970 to $ 19.4 billion ten years later. This resulted from the need to 
externally finance Boumediene's ambitious industrialisation programme. Whereas 
Algeria's debt decreased in the early part of 1980s, it grew again from 1986 to 1992, 
reaching by then $ 26.8 billion. In 1993, foreign debt stood at $ 25.8 billion62. The 
growth of the mid-1980s was partly driven by the adverse effects of the oil 
countershock on Algeria's revenues. Algeria was forced to borrow money on the 
international market not only to finance investment projects (besides, drastically 
reduced) but also current imports. 
Despite a ratio of debt to gross domestic output evolving around 60% since 
199163, Algeria's major financial problem was not its total debt stock. The root of its 
liquidity crisis lay in the time structure of its debt reimbursements which were 
concentrated in the late 1980s and early 1990s, that is at a time when export revenues 
were low because of falling oil prices and the dollar low value. Since 1988, the debt 
service (principal and interests) has absorbed between 60% and 80% of Algeria's 
61 See Le Monde, 4 and 13 juillet 1995. 
62 IBRD (1992), p. 2 and (1994), p. 6. 
63 IBRD (1994), p. 6. 
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export revenues64, leaving but few resources left to finance imports and investments. 
Although the cost of debt servicing strangled the economy, the Hamrouche, 
Ghozali and Abdesselam governments refused to implement a classical rescheduling 
of the debt service through the Paris Club (group of governmental creditors) because 
it required the signature of a stabilisation programme with the IMF and, thus the 
engagement to economic restructuring. In official speeches, the refusal to sign such a 
programme as a counterpart to IMF financial help was justified by the ensuing loss of 
national sovereignty. However, and even though the image of the IMF as an 
imperialist agent remains strong in Algeria65, the successive Algerian governments 
were less opposed to the nature of the economic policies to be implemented under a 
stabilisation programme than to the pace planned by the IMF. The recommended 
measures, such as devaluation, freeing prices, reducing wages and state expenditures, 
adversely affect purchasing power. Rapid restructuring was seen as containing the 
seeds of a social explosion which the regime wanted to avoid, considering the already 
turbulent political situation. The closure of international financial markets to 
rescheduling countries was also an element explaining that refusal. 
Instead of debt rescheduling, the different Algerian governments proposed 
bilateral debt "reprofiling" operations with their major creditors. In terms of result, 
debt "reprofiling" is a debt rescheduling since it aims at delaying the debt service 
payments. But it differs from a classical rescheduling operation because, by 
negotiating directly with the creditors and not with the Paris Club, the debtor avoids 
the requirement of dealing with the Bretton Woods institutions. Algeria was unable to 
put across this proposal. Indeed, with the exception of a bilateral reprofiling operation 
with Italy and with a consortium of banks led by the Credit Lyonnais, Algeria's main 
creditors, and principally France, have blocked this initiative, considering that the 
engagement on the part of Algeria to implement an IMF/IBRD programme gave 
greater guarantees than a national programme. 
64 Ibid. 
65 See for instance Algdrie Actualite (1437), 27 avril-3 mai 1993 and M. Benhassine (1988), pp. 463-80. 
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The bleak financial situation, with a debt service forecasted to exceed export 
revenues in 1994, coupled with creditors' warnings that new funds would be 
channelled only once an agreement with the IMF was reached, drove the Malek 
government into a corner. In December 1993, it agreed to the principle of a debt 
rescheduling66. In April 1994, Algeria sent its letter of intent to the IMF, securing a 
standby loan worth $ 1.04 billion as a counterpart to a one-year stabilisation 
programme as well as the release of several credits from the World Bank and the EU. 
By June 1,1994 a framework agreement with the Paris Club was reached to 
reschedule $ 5.3 billion of official debt over 15 years with a four-year grace period67. 
As the standby agreement expired in May 1995, Algeria signed a three-year IMF 
extended fund facility of $ 1.8 billion accompanying a structural adjustment 
programme (1995-98) which provides, among others, for the privatisation of the 
public sector, currency convertibility, and complete trade liberalisation6ß. A second 
agreement with the Paris Club concerning the rescheduling of another $ 7.5 billion in 
official debt was reached in late July 199569. In parallel, after seven months of 
negotiations with the London Club (group of bank creditors), Algeria signed in May 
1995 an accord to reschedule $ 3.2 billion of private debt (financial and non- 
guaranteed) over 5 to 10 years70. 
It was expected that, by cutting the ratio of the debt service to export earnings 
by more than half in the next few years, rescheduling and foreign aid would allow the 
economy to breathe again. However, a study conducted by the consulting agency 
Nord Sud Export has shown mixed results71. Algeria's new comfortable financial 
circumstances have allowed import increases notably for current consumption and 
construction. Yet, according to this study, none of the funds granted by the IMF in 
1994 would have been allotted to new investment projects (excluding hydrocarbons). 
66 Le Monde, 16 ddccmbre 1993. 
67 Le Monde, 3 juin 1994. 
68 Le Monde, 24 mai 1995. 
69 Le Monde, 23-24 juillet 1995. 
70 Le Monde, 14-15 mai 1995. 
71 Reported in Le Monde, 4 juillet 1995. 
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This pre-empts both an easing of the catastrophic unemployment situation72 and 
economic growth prospects. 
2. The meanders of French policy under Balladur 
France's Algeria policy under Balladur is quite difficult to decipher. Two main 
factors made France's policy look like a muddle. First, France's words did not 
always match the deeds. Quite cleverly, this gave France's Algeria policy a constancy 
that it did not have in reality. Juppd always argued that the status quo was no longer 
tenable in Algeria. As a consequence, it seemed that ever since its coming to office the 
Balladur government had supported conciliation in Algeria. In fact, the Balladur 
government did so only after September 1994. But, as of then, there was no 
governmental unity as to whether the Algerian government should open negotiations 
with the FIS and as to whether the French government should encourage such 
negotiations. This brings us to the second point. During the last nine months of the 
Balladur government's term, France voiced different opinions about what its Algeria 
policy should be. Quarrels between the Elyse and Matignon and, most importantly, 
between the Quai d'Orsay and Place Beauvau gave a dim picture of France's approach 
to the Algerian conflict. 
To make sense of France's Algeria policy under Balladur, the following 
analysis focuses on the two periods characterising Balladur's shifting policy 
buttressing governmental eradicators in Algeria until September 1994 and showing 
greater firmness against these same eradicators afterwards. Eradicators, indeed, were 
praised as reasonable politicians seeking a political solution rejected by unyielding 
armed factions, then accused of blocking a political perspective in Algeria. 
72 Although somewhat outdated, the following data on joblessness in Algeria illustrate the stakes : 
according to official records, there were 1.3 million unemployed persons in December 1991 against 
435 000 in April 1985.80% of the unemployed were young people. The rates of unemployment by 
categories of age were in December 1990: 63.5% for those aged between 16 and 19; 45.5% for those 
aged between 20 and 24; and 17.3% for those aged between 25 and 29. See ILO (1993), p. 639 and 
ONS (1992), p. 9. 
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2.1. Buttressing the eradicators (April 1993 - September 1994) 
It is no longer a matter open to debate whether the Balladur government 
supported the Algerian regime or not. Its economic and military assistance to Algiers 
as well as its intelligence and police co-operation and its role as Algeria's defender on 
the international scene made it obvious that France was siding with the Algerian 
authorities, at least until Autumn 1994. The question, therefore, is whether by 
buttressing the Algerian regime the French government was supporting its conciliator 
or eradicator strands. It is the contention of the following account that, despite a 
conciliatory discourse, the Balladur government supported the eradicators. In order to 
underline the ambiguities and contradictions that point to this conclusion, the official 
discourse must be expounded first. After showing that France backed the eradicators, 
I shall focus on the policy measures which were implemented. 
2.1.1. The official discourse 
The Right in the opposition 
Prior to their victory at the parliamentary elections at the end of March 1993, 
some politicians in the opposition had clearly indicated that a right-wing government 
would support an anti-Islamist policy. After the first round of the Algerian 1991 
parliamentary elections, some public statements reinforced the Algerian Army's 
viewpoint that, were the FIS let to relish the fruits of its victory, Algeria might be 
ostracised at one stage or the other. Such signals came from Charles Pasqua 
(chairman of the RPR at the Senate) and Francois Leotard (MP, UDF). Both claimed 
that a right-wing government would revise its co-operation policy with Algeria if the 
FIS came to power. Leotard specified that a FIS-regime would not be backed if it did 
not respect the principles of democracy, pluralism and equality between the sexes. 
What the FIS would have done seemed, however, clear to him since he compared it to 
Hitler's National Socialist party73. Reference to Nazism has been the principal credo 
73 Pasqua's statement is quoted in Le Monde, 7 janvier 1992 and Dotard's in Le Point, 11 janvier 
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of the Algerian government and of the eradicators to legitimise the coup. By 
reformulating their claim, Leotard was, thus, indicating that he agreed with the thesis 
justifying the coup. By recalling the failure of the inter-war "appeasement policy", he 
also attempted to touch the right chord within public opinion. For his part, Alain 
Juppe (general secretary of the RPR) had followed a cautious line, avoiding saying 
anything that could have been interpreted as some form of "aiding and abetting". His 
hope that the FIS's electoral success would provoke a "salutary shock" to Algeria's 
"democratic opposition"74 was, nevertheless, indicative of his concerns regarding a 
FIS takeover. The cancellation of the elections was thus welcomed with relief. Valery 
Giscard d'Estaing (UDF) was the only centre-right personality who openly criticised 
the popularised view that the coup served "to save democracy"75. 
Prior to its coming to power, the Right had criticised the socialists for being 
too unsupportive of the Algerian regime. Juppe had deplored their low profile during 
his visit to Algiers in early December 1992. He then promised that inasmuch as 
"France, has an interest in Algeria being a stable and modern state", the Right, if 
elected, would intensify relations with Algeria76. 
The Right in Matignon 
"Cohabitation" between the socialist president and the right-wing government 
did not cause many problems throughout Balladur's premiership, at least in so far as 
Algeria was concerned. President Mitterrand made very few statements on France's 
Algeria policy, perhaps because of his sickness or simply because he preferred to 
remain cautious. With the exception of his proposal of February 199577, he took no 
initiative. Mitterrand reasserted that "One cannot be a democrat here, and contest to a 
people over there the right to decide for itself of its destiny. "78 But he was in line 
1992. 
74 Quoted in Le Monde, 29-30 decembre 1991. 
75 Interview on France-Inter on January 17,1992, I3IPA. 
76 See El Moudjahid, 2 d&cembre 1992. 
77 See section 2.2.1 below, "A muddle". 
78 Interview on French television, May 10,1994 in MAE (mai juin 1994), p. 68. 
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with Matignon when arguing that France must support those forces promoting the 
establishment of a "modern, tolerant and hospitable state"79, for France could not 
wish "(... ) the victory of whoever would make the mores [and] the institutions 
regress back to medieval conceptions. "80 In general, his declarations expressed a 
certain disillusionment and detachment : 
"We wish (... ) the Algerian people to put its business in order by itself in the best way, the 
best known [and] the most evident manner, and become able to pronounce itself through the 
ballot box : naturally, we are far from it "81 
France's Algeria policy was thus designed by the government rather than the 
president. As Prime Minister Balladur did not have his own policy line82, French 
policy was chiefly conceived by the Quai d'Orsay and Place Beauvau. This did not 
generate a dual discourse before Autumn 1994. 
Until Autumn 1994, the Balladur government was led to determine the 
orientation of its Algeria policy by the basic idea that, while a FIS takeover would be 
"a catastrophe", it was not "ineluctable". Upon this consideration, it was decided, in 
the words of the foreign minister, Juppd, that everything had to be done in order to 
avoid the risk of a FIS takeover83. With this objective in mind, the Balladur 
government threw its weight behind the Algerian regime. 
While backing the Algerian regime, the French authorities suggested in August 
1993 a crisis-overcoming scenario based upon Juppd's argument that "the status quo 
is not tenable". As Juppe invariably explained, moving beyond the status quo meant 
the implementation of two courses of action by the Algerian government : 
(1) completing the transition to a market economy ; and (2) opening a political 
dialogue with opposition forces provided they respect the principle of democracy and 
79 Best wishes address to the diplomatic corps in January 1994 reported by El Watan, 9 janvier 1994. 
80 Quoted in Le Monde, 2 septembre 1994. 
81 Speech to the French Ambassadors, August 31,1994, quoted in ibid. 
82 Balladur made few statements on the Algerian crisis. He intervened mostly at times of crisis to 
reiterate the principles of non-intervention in Algeria's internal affairs and of refusing that France 
become a terrorist haven. See his radio interview reproduced in Le Monde, 16 aoüt 1994. 
83 These considerations appear in various interviews and statements. A. Juppd's interview in the 
Tunisian newspaper Realitds on June 30,1994 (in MAE (mai juin 1994), p. 360) mentions them all. 
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disavow violence. The ultimate objective would be the return to the electoral process 
once the security situation was mastered84. Although the French government 
advocated this surpassing of the status quo as a means to solve Algeria's crisis, it 
always maintained that it would not intervene in Algeria's domestic affairs and that, 
consequently, it would not seek to impose this solution but merely encourage the 
Algerian authorities to follow its recommendations. 
The policy line of transcending the status quo was defined in a particular 
context. It was spelt out ten days before the dismissal of Prime Minister Abdesselam. 
Throughout Abdesselam's premiership the rumour had always been that he might 
depart soon, so unpopular at home and abroad was his economic policy and his 
political statements so at odds with the HSC's decision to open a political dialogue85. 
Whether or not the French government knew exactly when Abdesselam would be 
dismissed and by whom he would be replaced, the definition of its policy line at that 
particular moment can be understood as a signal of what it wished the new Algerian 
government to do. It was an encouragement to find an agreement with the IMF and to 
continue discussions with the opposition (then excluding the FIS) within the 
framework of the National Dialogue Commission scheduled for Autumn 1993. The 
appointment of Redha Malek as prime minister was welcomed favourably in Paris 
precisely because he satisfied these expectations86. 
Even though France's policy line was defined in this specific context, it 
remained its constant message throughout Balladur's mandate. France's discourse 
was so static because things were slowly evolving in Algeria. It took the Malek 
government almost a year to sign an agreement with IMF. The dialogue process 
unfolded over two years before reaching a virtual deadlock. Another reason for such 
84 A. Jupp6 interviewed on Europe 1, August 11,1993 in MAE (juillet-aoüt 1994), pp. 103-4. 
85 Although Kart had been critical of the eradicator parties, Abdesselam went further, taxing them 
with being "secular-assimilationists", which, by referring to the colonial question of Independence / 
assimilation, implied that they belonged to the "party of France". In addition, whereas the HSC had 
opened negotiations with political parties (September 1992 and March-June 1993), Abdesselam had 
maintained that "the parties represent only themselves and are, consequently, of no use. " See Algerie 
Actualite (1431), 16-22 mars 1993 and (1459), 28 septembre-4 octobre 1993. 
86 See Jupp6's statement (August 24,1993) on the nomination of Malek in MAE (juillet-aoüt 
1993), p. 115. 
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an unchanging discourse was that it was so general and steeped in ambiguities that it 
applied to both the pre- and post-September 1994 periods. Constancy does not 
necessarily mean consistency... 
2.1.2. Putting the discourse to the test : ambiguities and contradictions 
The French discourse on its Algeria policy was characterised by several 
ambiguities and contradictions, of which two are underlined below. They concern the 
issue of the integration of the FIS within the political process in Algeria and that of 
economic aid. 
On the inclusion of the FIS into the political process 
Despite its apparent simplicity, Juppd's discourse on the political dialogue 
contained a major ambiguity : it was never crystal clear on the issue of the inclusion of 
the FIS within the dialogue. In what follows I attempt to demonstrate that the Quai 
d'Orsay -- as much as Place Beauvau -- did not support the inclusion of the FIS 
within the political process at least until September 1994, that is until negotiations 
between the Algerian authorities and the FIS were about to break down. 
It is noticeable that Juppd apparently always refused to answer reporters' 
questions whether he included the FIS in his vision of the dialogue that had to be 
opened by the Algerian government. His response was to repeat the necessity of a 
confabulation and to say that if "Islamic forces" were ready to play by the democratic 
game, they should be included in the process. He then hastened to add that it was not 
up to him to designate which such forces were, for this would have come down to 
interfering with Algeria's domestic affairs87. This argument allowed the French 
government to avoid falling out with the eradicators and conciliators of the Algerian 
regime. Perhaps more importantly, it also left open the possibility for the Balladur 
government to change its course of policy without having to change its discourse. 
87 See e. g. his interviews on February 9,1994 and December 17,1994, respectively in MAE (janvier-ffvrier 1994) and (novembre-d&embre1994), p. 173 and 367. 
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There are, however, several elements that allow us to affirm that Juppd, along 
with Pasqua, did not wish the integration of the FIS in the political dialogue and, 
more generally, in Algeria's political landscape. These are to be found in their 
speeches which emphasised the French government's opposition to a FIS takeover as 
well as the claim that there is no such thing as an "Islamist moderate". The Balladur 
government's soft attitude vis-a-vis the Algerian authorities' negotiation strategy with 
the banned party also gives added weight to the argument that, while calling for a 
conciliation, the French government opposed a compromise with the FIS. Finally, the 
way in which crackdown operations against FIS militants and sympathisers were 
conducted in France suggest that the French government made no difference between 
the Islamist militants who advocate violence and those who do not. This undermined 
its public claim that a dialogue could be opened with Islamic forces rejecting violence. 
The French government constantly made it plain from June 1993 to September 
1994 that it was opposed to a FIS takeover. On several occasions88 Juppd argued that 
the coming into power of the FIS would be a "catastrophe". But he never specified 
whether he was thinking of a takeover through violent means (with the revolutionary 
radicalism that it would involve) or of a coming to power through a negotiated 
settlement. Logic would want that, since Juppd had consistently appealed for a 
political dialogue, he had in mind a takeover through violence. But, in explaining why 
France would side with Algeria in its struggle against "fundamentalism", Juppd 
underlined France's opposition to the political project of Islamism : 
"(... ) we will not be lenient with political movements whose values, objectives, [and] aims 
are exactly in contradiction with everything we believe in. (... ) I believe that we have 
nothing to gain in showing indulgence vis-ä-vis political Islamism (... )"ß9. 
By April 1994, Juppd no longer referred so bluntly to the "clash of civilisation". In 
substance his argument remained, nevertheless, the same. From then on, he stated 
88 See, for instance, his speech to the French parliament on April 21,1994 (in MAE (mars-avril 
1994), p. 210), his press conference in Washington on May 12,1994 and his interview in the 
Tunisian newspaper Rdalite on June 30,1994 (in MAE (mai-juin 1994), respectively p. 90 and 360). 
89 Address to the diplomatic press, September 8,1993 in MAE (septembre-octobre 1994), p. 53, 
emphasis added. 
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that, if the FIS came to power in Algiers, the confidence of similar Islamist 
movements throughout the Muslim world would be boosted and anti-Western regimes 
might thus mushroom90. Inasmuch as the French government was opposed to the 
political project of the FIS and highlighted its anti-Western outlook, whether the FIS 
seized power by force or came into office through a negotiated settlement, did not 
make much difference : in either case it would have had consequences which the 
French government wanted to avoid (these are spelt out in part two). This implied, in 
turn, that the French government saw no prospect in a middle-of-the-road solution 
involving the FIS in the government. Consequently, there was no point in trying to 
associate it to the political dialogue on the transitional period. 
The French authorities also gave an informal support to the Algerian 
eradicators when arguing that there were no moderates within the Islamist movement 
as a whole. Although the interior minister is remembered as the one having said that 
"(... ) the idea that a moderate Islamist regime might emerge is nothing but 
rubbish. "91, he was never alone in saying so. In his May 1994 press conference in 
Washington, the foreign minister argued that : 
"(... ) there may be here and there this or that representative of the FIS with whom one can 
talk, but globally and in its very essence, it is an extremist, terrorist, anti-European [and] 
anti-Western movement (... )"92. 
Moreover, it was argued in the Quai d'Orsay that the legal Islamist parties such as 
Hamas or the MNI were mere "screens" of the FIS93. This contention implicitly 
meant that their formal allegiance to the principle of democracy was not to be taken 
seriously. 
The third way in which the French government showed its hostility to an 
inclusion of the FIS within the political establishment appears in its attitude vis-ä-vis 
90 Juppd- referred to the domino effect theory for the first time in August 1993 and maintained it at 
least until June 1994. See MAE (juillet-aoüt 1993), p. 115 ; (janvier-fevrier 1994), p. 163 and 247 ; 
(mars-avril 1994), p. 210 ; (mai join 1994), p. 90,314 and 360. 
91 Quoted in Le Monde, 6 aoüt 1994. 
92 See MAE (mai-juin 1994), p. 90. 
93 Interview with Christophe Bigot (assistant to the deputy-director of the Maghreb-Mashreq 
department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs), April 21,1994. 
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the strategy of the Algerian authorities in their negotiations with the FIS. As 
pinpointed earlier, this strategy could not lead to the success of a political perspective 
because the FIS was not given sufficient guarantees that it would be allowed back into 
politics. In front of this vitiated negotiation strategy, the French government 
congratulated the Algerian authorities for their political openness while blaming the 
deadlock not only on the FIS but also on other political parties. Thus, Juppd declared 
in June 1994: 
"The willingness to talk exists on the side of the political establishment. The whole 
problem is to know with whom [hold negotiations]. It is evidently very difficult to negotiate 
with someone who puts a kalachnikov on the table pointing the barrel directly to your 
chest ! But I note that, while maintaining a security policy that is often rough, the 
government proves more and more open to discussion "94 
And he concluded in October 1994: 
"(... ) unfortunately, [the dialogue] has not progressed since the political parties such as the 
FFS or the RCD as well as the FIS still refuse to get involved in the dialogue. "95 
Juppd feigned to ignore that, in the same way as the Algerian authorities had 
imposed conditions for participation in the dialogue, opposition parties had their own 
requisites. By putting forward their own terms, opposition parties showed that they 
were not against the principle of a dialogue but that they were willing to participate in 
negotiations only if they were meaningful to them. As regards the FIS, it had 
signalled in December 1993 that it was not shut to the idea of a dialogue since it had 
submitted its conditions which were, moreover, open to bargaining. When Abassi 
Madani wrote in his letters of August 1994 that he accepted the Algerian government's 
conditions to participate in the dialogue, his flexibility was greeted with great 
scepticism by the Quai d'Orsay : it was argued that "we shall wait and see how things 
94 In MAE (mai-juin 1994), p. 314. See also the declaration of the spokesman for the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs in relation to the January 1994 "appeasement measures" (Le Monde, 22janvier 1994) 
and Juppd's felicitations in relation to the transfer from jail to house arrest of the paramount leaders of 
the FIS in September 1994 (Le Monde, 16 septembre 1994). 
95 In MAE (septembre-octobre 1994), p. 176. 
102 
evolve" and that Madani's renouncing violence had to be "verified and confirmed"96. 
If Juppd may not have been wholly wrong in expressing some scepticism towards the 
FIS, his contrasting attitude with regards to the Algerian regime's dialogue initiative 
revealed an over-enthusiasm that should not have existed if the French government 
believed that a political perspective in Algeria required the reintegration of the FIS 
within the political game. 
The last indicator of the French government's reluctance to see a compromise 
being reached with the FIS is revealed by the way in which some of the round-up 
operations against FIS militants and sympathisers were conducted in France. Under 
the Balladur government four large-scale crackdown operations took place97. Only 
one point need be made now about the French government's contradictory stance. The 
French authorities themselves recognised that the first two crackdowns -- that of 
November 1993 on the Algerian Brotherhood in France and that of August 1994 
which led to the expulsion of twenty suspected FIS militants and sympathisers to 
Burkina Faso -- did not concern persons involved in terrorist activities or in the armed 
struggle in Algeria. Indeed, the house arrest sanctions against some of the defendants 
rounded-up in November 1993 were lifted because "the reproached militancy [did] not 
relate in any way to what is usually called terrorism"98. Regarding the second 
crackdown, the board for civil liberties and legal affairs attached to the Interior 
Ministry openly declared that the majority of the persons who had been expelled was 
reproached for grievances of an ideological nature while only a small minority was 
suspected of logistical support to the FIS networks in France99. The official 
recognition that most persons had been indicted or expelled on the ground of opinion 
offence and political militancy wholly discredited the French government's public 
stance on the political dialogue in Algeria. For, indeed, whether or not the Islamists 
left "the kalachnikov in the cloakroom", they had to be fought because, for the French 
96 See Juppd's statements on September 5,1994 and September 16,1994 in MAE (septembre- 
octobre 1994), p. 35 and 104. 
97 November 1993, August 1994, September 1994 and November 1994. 
98 Le Monde, 7 mai 1994. 
99 Le Monde, 2 septembre 1994. 
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government, what was really at stake was not violence but ideology100. 
By emphasising its opposition to the FIS on ideological grounds, by arguing 
that there were no FIS moderates, and by backing the Algerian authorities' negotiation 
strategy, the Balladur government showed, merely through its discourse, that 
debating with the FIS was not considered as a vector of the political solution it was, 
otherwise, calling for. For all that, did France's discourse contribute to obstructing 
the chances of a conciliation, as suggested by Hugh Roberts10' ? The argument, 
however logical at first sight, requires careful examination. The causal relationship 
between France's discourse and the unfolding of the events in Algeria is, indeed, 
difficult to establish with certainty. By upholding compromise rather than eradication, 
the socialists probably managed to boost the conciliators' confidence. However, this 
did not translate into a breakthrough in favour of the conciliators. There is, thus, no a 
priori reasons for the French Right to have succeeded where its predecessors had 
failed. It is doubtful that the Balladur government actually hampered a conciliatory 
solution through its mere discourse. What may be most important is perhaps less what 
France says than what it does. In supporting the Algerian regime the Balladur 
government essentially acted in three ways. It refused to tie its economic aid to 
political conditions as demanded by some Algerian conciliator parties and segments of 
the French public opinion. It impeded the FIS's progress in France both as a political 
movement and as a support to guerrilla warfare in Algeria. And, it encouraged the 
international community to follow in its wake. It is in doing so, more than through its 
declarations, that the French government contributed to obstruct the reaching of a 
conciliatory solution since it allowed the regime to buy time. Yet, it is unclear whether 
conciliators in government would have appreciated another policy on the part of 
France. For, in attempting to compel the Algerian regime to negotiate a true 
conciliation, France would have forced it to negotiate in a position of weakness and 
this was (and remains) the governmental conciliators' least eager wish. 
100 This contradiction was underlined by F. Burgat in a personal conversation. Any error of 
interpretation is of course mine. 
101 H. Roberts (1994a), p. 27. 
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On economic assistance and non-intervention 
Under the Right, like under the socialists, bilateral economic assistance to 
Algeria continued to be justified as a support to the people as opposed to the 
regime102. This is less a contradiction than a mere lie. Financial support may, of 
course, have benefited (some of) the people, at least by ensuring a level of imports. 
But it has first and foremost helped the regime in three main ways. Firstly, financial 
aid symbolises no ostracism and, as such, it provides political backing. Secondly, this 
financial aid allowed the Algerian government to allot funds -- otherwise devoted to 
finance current imports, investments, or debt repayment -- towards repression 
expenditures : buying anti-guerrilla hardware, regularly and well paying the security 
forces when living-standards had been collapsing, etc. Finally, considering the 
corruption system surrounding import contracts103, France's tied commercial loans 
indirectly allowed the military establishment to distribute this income and buy its 
clientele. 
On the ground that its economic aid was meant for the people, the French 
government refused to put political conditions to such financial flows. However, it 
found itself in contradiction when it eventually tied this aid to the reaching of an 
economic agreement with the IMF. By warning that its 1994 financial aid would be 
made dependent upon rescheduling the debt and implementing structural reforms, the 
French government also contradicted its initial claim that it would not force a departure 
from the status quo. French willingness to directly intervene in the economic sphere 
partly ensued from the belief that acting on the economic lever meant serving Algeria's 
long-run political stability. 
102 See the statements of the European affairs minister (Le Monde, 10 ddcembre 1993), of Mitterrand 
(Le Monde, 12 aoüt 1994) and of Juppd in MAE (septembre-octobre 1994), p. 208. 
103 Foreign firms must pay tidy "commissions" to import directorates controlled by the Algerian 
military establishment if they want their export contract to be signed. On corruption and its foreign 
links, see A. Rouadjla (1995b). 
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2.1.3. Bilateral and multilateral support : the means 
France's support to the Algerian regime took two forms : bilateral and 
multilateral. In general, on the international scene France advocated the adoption of 
policies similar to its own, notably, economic support and constraining the activities 
of exiled FIS militants. But France also did much more than that bilaterally. 
Bilateral support 
The Balladur government expressed its bilateral support to the Algerian 
authorities through traditional diplomatic means (speeches and visits), economic and 
military aid and by clamping down on exiled Islamists. 
Until Autumn 1994, bilateral visits were relatively numerous and of a 
relatively high standing. In addition to regular meetings, they included the visits to 
Paris of Foreign Minister Malek in June 1993104 and of Prime Minister Sifi in June 
1994105. Juppd and Leotard (minister for defence) went to Algiers in early August 
1994 in order to pay homage to the three gendarmes and the two agents of the French 
Ministries for Foreign and Economic Affairs killed in Algeria106. If this visit had an 
impromptu character, it had been preceded in July by the trip of a senatorial delegation 
headed by the president of the foreign affairs and defence commission of the French 
Senate, Xavier de Villepin, who also happened to be the director of Juppd's 
cabinet 107. On the whole, during these visits, the Algerian emissaries explained the 
merits of their government's policy in the political realm. They also at first attempted 
to convince the Balladur government to "reprofile" Algeria's bilateral debt. As France 
refused, they pleaded for other forms of support. Most Algerian visits to France 
preceded an international forum pending which Algeria's financial problems or its 
political situation were to be discussed (e. g. Paris Club meeting, EU summit in 
IN El Watan, 17 juin 1993 and Le Monde, 20-21 juin 1993. 
105 El Watan, 23 juin 1994 and Le Monde, 25 juin 1994. 
106 Le Monde, 5 aoüt 1994. 
107 El Moudjahid, 10 juillet 1994. 
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Corfu, G7 summit in Naples). The French authorities assured their Algerian 
counterparts of their support and understanding : President Mitterrand transmitted 
messages of support to President Zeroual and the Balladur government positively 
responded to Algeria's lobbying. 
Regarding financial flows, after disbursing the amount of the Sapin financial 
accord without economic conditionality, the French government threatened to cut off 
the tap if Algeria did not reach an agreement with the IMF. It also warned that its 
efforts at mobilising international finance would be dependent on Algeria's signature. 
France's admonitions to the Algerian minister for economic affairs during his visit to 
Paris on March 3,199410ß were essentially aimed at putting pressure on the Algerian 
authorities which were, however, hardly in a position to further postpone the 
agreement. Once Algeria signed its letter of intent in April 1994, Paris kept its 
promises. In May 1994 a three-year financial protocol (FF 200 million) for the 
purchase of pharmaceuticals was signed109. It was followed in July by a new credit 
package worth FF 6 billion ($ 1.1 billion). The first portion of the package was a 
FF 1 025 million protocol of mixed loans from the Treasury and from the export 
credit agency which were allotted for balance of payments relief and project financing. 
The second component concerned a FF 2 billion guaranteed trade credit available for 
three years and meant for the purchase of medicines, vehicles, and consumer goods. 
The third component was a FF 1 billion credit to finance the purchase of French 
cereals. The remaining sum of about FF 2 billion comprised private project financing 
guaranteed by the Coface1t0. 
If this financial package was quite traditional in relation to both its amount and 
structure, France's support to the Algerian regime was best illustrated by military 
assistance, police and intelligence co-operation. Both are reviewed in turn. The 
military aid provided to Algeria was, in fact, very limited. It was, nevertheless, highly 
symbolic of France's agreement to assist the eradication strategy. Military cooperation 
108 Liberation, 4 mars 1994 and Le Figaro, 4 mars 1994. 
109 Liberte, 27-28 mai 1994. 
110 MEED (38)(29), July 22,1994. 
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between the two countries has never been very intense despite Algeria's willingness to 
diversify away from its Soviet military hardware. A military co-operation agreement 
was signed in 1983 but it has never been clear what it was about and whether it was 
actually given substance because of the secrecy that has surrounded it. Questioned 
about it, Cheysson vaguely answered that one aspect of the agreement concerned the 
gendarmerie". From press reports it seems that military cooperation has, indeed, 
mainly concerned the paramilitary : training by the French GIGN (elite unit of the 
French gendarmerie) of their counterparts now involved in the repression and supply 
of armoured cars and light armament112. In Autumn 1994 France also supplied 
Algeria with helicopters and night vision material for helicopters used in anti-guerrilla 
warfare113. In December 1994, it was officially announced that France had cancelled 
its anti-guerrilla material supplies, although it maintained its helicopter sales in a civil 
version114. The final use of these helicopters raises few doubts. The decision to cut 
anti-guerrilla equipment supplies seems to have been taken under the pressure of the 
Foreign Ministry. The supply of military hardware was, indeed, hardly compatible 
with Juppd's new criticisms of the Algerian government's all-repressive line. 
Although the Balladur government's crackdowns on exiled Islamists in France 
fitted within a counter-terrorist frame, the measures implemented in order to restrain 
exiled Islamists' activities were also one of the means by which the French 
government politically supported the Algerian regime. Indeed, if some individuals 
were implicated in unlawful activities, others were merely involved in (lawful) 
political militancy. Measures taken against these persons amounted to the muzzling of 
a political opposition movement. In this regard, it is noticeable that prior to the first 
large-scale round-ups, Juppd, who had pledged to "help Algeria in struggling against 
extremism and fundamentalism" during Malek's visittls, justified such assistance less 
111 Interview with Claude Cheysson, April 22,1994. 
112 Le Nouvel Observateur (1573), 29 d&cembre 1994-4 janvier 1995 and Le Monde, 10 novembre 
1994. These supplies were revealed in November 1994 but it remains unclear whether they occurred 
after January 1992 and, if so, whether they took place under the Left or the Right. 
113 Le Monde, 10 and 16 novembre 1994. 
114 Le monde, 14 decembre 1994. 
115 Juppg quoted in Le Monde, 20-21 juin 1993. 
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on anti-terrorist grounds than on ideological ones. Jupp6 certainly invoked the 
possibility of "violent activities undertaken from our soil against this friendly 
country"116. But the main argument lay in the following claim : 
"Since the month of April [1993], the new government has made it clear that it would not be 
lenient with religious extremism, simply because this extremism is a vehicle for values and 
ideas that are not ours and are against us (... )" 117. 
It was only after the first round-up of November 1993 that Juppd argued that France 
refused to become "a rear-haven for terrorism" and that it should not "show leniency 
towards those who have made terrorism and violence the essential feature of their 
programme"118. Pasqua, however, underlined that, despite a preoccupation for 
terrorism, the principal concern was subversion : 
"(... ) the Republic cannot accept that, under the cover of cultural associations, operations of 
a subversive type be put in place with the view to destabilising a neighbouring country or 
even to conduct later subversive or terrorist actions in France"119 
Tracking down Islamists seeking refuge in France has benefited the Algerian 
government as well as the two other Maghrebi regimes. In December 1993, a small 
police raid aimed at the Tunisian Islamist milieu and was concluded by the putting 
under house arrest of Saleh Karkar, a founding-member of the Tunisian al-Nahda 
movement120. Police operations also concerned the Moroccan Islamist milieu in early 
September 1994121. Needless to emphasise that cracking down on Maghrebi Islamists 
in France was conducted in close collaboration with the Maghrebi regimes. The 
December 1993 police raid on Tunisian Islamists followed the French interior 
minister's visit to Tunis on September 24,1993 and is said to have been conducted 
"(... ) under a request from the Tunisian judiciary to investigate whether the Islamists 
were plotting attacks on Tunisians. "122. Similarly, there have been rumours of 
116 Ibid. 
117 Interview on August 24,1993 in MAE (juillet-aoüt 1993). p. 115. 118 Quoted in Le Monde, 12 novembre 1993. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Le Monde, 10 decembre 1993. 
121 Le Monde, 3 septembre 1994. 
122 M. Dunn (1994), p. 143 and Le Monde, 26-27 septembre 1993. 
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Lamari's presence in Paris prior to the November 1994 crackdown123. Franco- 
Moroccan police co-operation was successfully put to the test in late August 1994 
when Hassan II asked the French authorities to communicate information on Franco- 
Algerians and Franco-Moroccans suspected to belong to Islamist networks and 
involved in violent acts in Morocco' 24. 
Forbidding or constraining the political activities of exiled Islamists in France 
was mainly achieved through the close surveillance of the activities of well-known or 
suspected militants or sympathisers. It was characterised, in particular, by an 
assiduous attendance at the mosques among which some are led by members of the 
FIS or the old Bouyali group125. Several imams (who were not Algerians) were, 
subsequently, expelled for having declared that "Allah's law comes before French 
law" or for having called to jihad' 26. Propaganda material in favour of the FIS and of 
the armed struggle in Algeria has also been banned127. To track down those who 
organised logistical support in France for the FIS, the AIS and the GlAs and who 
organised arms transfers, massive round-up operations were undertaken. With the 
exception of the November 1994 round-up, only a few persons were retained in 
custody and charged. Punctual police checks were also used to discover arms traffic 
operations128 
123 Le Monde, 11 novembre 1994. 
124 See chapter three, footnote 67. 
125 For instance, the imam of the Khaled-ibn-Walid mosque in Paris used to be Abelbaki Sahraoui. 
After having been a member of the Bouyali group in the 1980s, Sahraoui took part in the creation of 
the FIS in 1989. He was then drawn aside in the 1991 Batna congress and left for France. He was 
murdered in Paris in July 1995 (see infra). 
126 See Le Monde, 12 novembre 1993 and 24 mars 1994. 
127 On June 4,1993 the FAFs newspaper was banned and on August 9,1994 five publications were 
outlawed on the grounds of their anti-Western tonality and of their appeal to violence (respectively Le 
Matin, 17 juin 1993 and Le Monde, 11 aoüt 1994). 
128 The first case of arms transfers from France to Algeria was discovered in 1992. A French national 
converted to Islam was condemned to death in Algeria for this operation. Under the pressure of the 
French authorities, the death sanction was turned into life imprisonment (Le Monde, 5-6 juin 1994). 
It is, however, only from March 1994 that a series of police checks led to the arrest of about 20 
persons involved in arms traffics for the account of armed groups in Algeria. For a reminder of the 
various arrests from March 1994 to June 1994 see Liberation, 8 aoüt 1994. Thereafter, see Le Monde, 
29 juillet 1994 and 16 mars 1995. 
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Multilateral support 
The Balladur government played the role of Algeria's defender on the 
international scene, undertaking an active advertising campaign in favour of the 
regime and selling its product to major international actors. Under the socialists, there 
had been a bid to influence the EU in order to obtain an emergency loan for balance of 
payments relief. However, the ECU 400 million loan which was granted did not 
represent a support to the new Algerian ruling institutions since it was signed in 
September 1991. There are two main reasons explaining the "diplomatic campaign" 
launched by the Balladur government. First of all, considering Algeria as France's 
backyard, the international community waited for Paris to show the way -- even 
though, in practical terms, it has not systematically followed France's 
recommendations. As to the French government, it felt directly concerned by the 
Algerian crisis not only because of the multiple ties that link France to Algeria but also 
because of the foreseen consequences of this crisis for France itself. But it did not 
want "to go it alone", as underlined by the French minister for foreign affairs, 
primarily because the international community's financial help was necessary. In 
addition, the Algerian crisis raised fundamental issues about political change in the 
Arab Muslim world. Beyond its specificities, the Algerian crisis was thus for France a 
co-operation test between the North towards an increasingly turbulent South. 
In its endeavour to drum up international support for the Algerian regime, the 
Balladur government sought financial support from international and regional 
organisations as well as from individual states. It also advocated the adoption of its 
own restrictive behaviour towards exiled FIS militants. If, in the process, it managed 
to get clear political statements backing the Algerian regime, this was of course 
welcomed. France reached its aim concerning financial support but found it harder to 
obtain a consensus about the merits of its own policy with regards to exiled Islamists 
and the exclusion of the FIS from dialogue. These three issues are reviewed below by 
focusing on the European Union, individual European countries and the USA. 
Political dialogue is examined first and international financial support last. 
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On the whole, the EU's political statements on the Algerian political crisis 
were very close to those of France. At the fourth meeting of the EU-Algeria Co- 
operation Council (February 7,1994), for instance, the Union appealed for a "frank 
and open national political dialogue with those who renounce terrorism and support 
the return to democracy and the reconciliation of all Algerians" 129. During its visit to 
Algeria on May 30,1994, the European troika also showed satisfaction with the 
Algerian authorities' conduct of the dialogue. The Greek foreign minister noted "the 
sincerity of the Algerian government in its will to face political and economic 
challenges" and the Belgian foreign minister, Willy Claes, declared : 
"We will return to Brussels with the conviction that the Algerian government is determined 
to boost national political dialogue with all the nation's active forces. "130 
The EU formally showed a greater interest than France in voicing concern regarding 
human rights violations in Algeria131. However, no sanction was taken to protest 
against Algeria's poor human rights record. The second instalment of the 
ECU 400 million loan was suspended in March 1992. But this freeze was not 
prompted by the European foreign ministers' willingness to tie economic aid to 
Algeria to the "respect of human rights, tolerance and political pluralism", as they had 
suggested after the coup132. It was linked to Algeria's refusal to go through IMF 
structural reforms. 
Despite this apparent consensus between France and the EU, it would be 
wrong to conclude that all member states were in complete agreement with France. As 
time went by and as the option of supporting the Algerian regime did not produce 
greater stability, some expressed scepticism as to the eradication strategy. 
Schematically, states closer to the scenes of violence gradually became more 
independent from France's own position. Thus, the other three Southern European 
129 Europe Daily Bulletin (6166 n. s. ), February 9,1994. 
130 Europe Daily Bulletin (6241 n. s. ), June 1,1994. 
131 Juppd recognised that violence had led to human rights violations on all sides (MAE (mars-avril 
1994), p. 175) and Balladur affirmed that France was attached to the respect of human rights and 
tolerance in Algeria (Le Monde, 16 aoüt 1994). However, the issue of human rights was raised only 
occasionally by the French government. 
132 Le Monde, 19 Wrier 1992. 
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states -- Italy, Portugal and Spain -- became more inclined to publicly support the 
view that the Algerian regime was "illegitimate" and that a distinction had to be made 
between Islamist moderates rejecting violence -- with whom dialogue had to be 
established -- and Islamist radicals supporting terrorism133. By contrast, Northern 
European countries such as Britain or Germany, in general, supported France's 
approach. This was less because of their total agreement with it, than because of their 
concern to avoid a public quarrel with France over an issue which remains, after all, 
peripheral to their interests in Europe. But, if Britain and Germany did not attempt to 
block France's initiatives, neither did they issue political statements supporting the 
Algerian regime134. Their case must, therefore, be differentiated from Belgium whose 
foreign minister argued in June 1994 that it was "naive" to advocate a dialogue with 
Islamist moderates who, if they existed at all, were to be found "on the benches of the 
national conference" (i. e. the legal Islamist parties) and not elsewhere135. 
Within the Clinton Administration the debate between supporters and 
detractors of a political recognition of Islamism has been settled to the advantage of 
the former. Since the Algerian government's initiative to open "a dialogue without 
exclusion", the USA has constantly advocated the solution of a power-sharing 
between the regime and what Clinton has called "dissident groups not involved in 
terrorism" 136, a category within which the FIS is included. The position of the 
American Administration on Algeria derives both from a general viewpoint on political 
Islam and an assessment of the Algerian situation itself. Contending that "Today, 
Islamic political groups vary in their attitudes and ideas about how to address the 
needs of their societies" 137, the Near Eastern affairs department has firmly argued that 
existing extremist and anti-Western groups do not represent the Islamist movement as 
a whole and are not an inherent expression of the Islamists' political agenda. The 
133 On Italy see Le Monde, 6 and 13 aoüt 1994 ; on Portugal see F. Faria (1994) and on Spain see 
The Times, September 15,1994. 
134 on Germany, see V. Perthes (1994). 
135 Quoted in El Watan, 21 juin 1994. 
136 Quoted in MEED 38 (24), June 17,1994. 
137 Robert Pelletreau, assistant secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, in R. Pelletreau, D. Pipes & J. 
Esposito (1994), p. 3. 
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department has concluded that the tree should not hide the forest and that political 
accommodation should be sought with Islamist movements which agree to work 
within existing political structures to effect change. Regarding the Algerian situation, 
the American Administration, which did not at first condemn the coup, made the 
simple assessment that : "Events of the past two years demonstrate that Algeria's 
leaders cannot ease the crisis through over reliance on repressive policies. " 
Washington subsequently urged Algeria to broaden political ' participation and 
encompass "all political forces in the country, including Islamist leaders who reject 
terrorism. "138 
Apparently, the solution advocated by the USA was similar to that of France 
since the latter never explicitly argued that the FIS should be excluded from talks. But 
the difference between the two states concerned this very issue. It showed in a 
difference in discourse over two main points. Firstly, whereas the French purposely 
blurred the frontier between the GlAs and the FIS, the Americans maintained that the 
FIS was not responsible for the acts committed by the GIAs139 which has been on 
their terrorist movements list since May 1995140. Secondly, the Americans adopted a 
harsher discourse towards the Algerian regime than France did. The acting assistant 
secretary for Near Eastern affairs, Mark Parris, emphasised that the violation of 
human rights in Algeria was not unilaterall4l. Likewise, whereas the French 
government congratulated Algiers despite its vitiated political dialogue strategy, Parris 
expressed his doubts about the Algerian government's sincerity in attempting to open 
a real political dialogue. On March 22,1994, he declared before the House Foreign 
Affairs subcommittee on Africa : 
"I regret to say (... ) that despite the stated intention of all Algerian governments in the past 
two years to undertake genuine political and economic reforms, we have seen little progress 
toward these goals. The failure of the government-sponsored "national conference" in 
January, which all major opposition parties boycotted, demonstrated that the regime has yet 
138 Ibid., p. 4. 
139 MEED 38 (22), June 3,1994. 
140 Le Monde, 25 mai 1995. 
141 Le Monde, 1 avril 1994. 
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to convince opposition elements of its willingness to permit them a meaningful role in 
governing during a transition period. - 142 
France's position on the political dialogue, from which it wished to exclude 
the FIS, and on the political support that had to be provided to the Algerian regime 
was, thus, progressively contested by some European countries and the USA. 
France's efforts at bringing the international community to constrain the activities of 
exiled Islamists did not meet with a particular success either. To the great 
disappointment of the French authorities, foreign governments were careful to make a 
clear distinction between political militancy and involvement in terrorism. 
The USA, Britain and Germany which host official representatives of the FIS 
and high figures of the Tunisian Islamist movement were asked to restrict the political 
activities of FIS representatives by limiting their freedom of movement and by 
imposing on them the "duty of reserve". In early August 1994, the deputy 
spokeswoman for the French Foreign Ministry indicated that contacts with a number 
of countries had been taken so that these countries would do everything to prevent the 
FIS representatives from "engaging in political activities and renewing declarations 
that were inadmissible. "143 The failure of the USA, Britain and Germany to meet 
France's demand led Interior Minister Pasqua to depict as an "unfriendly act" the fact 
that they sheltered "persons who not only did not disavow attacks but underwrote 
them. "144 
The authorities concerned have defended a policy of abstaining from 
crackdowns on Islamists as long as there was no evidence of a shift from political 
activism to terrorist or illegal activities. The White House indicated that no special 
measures against Islamists could be undertaken as long as expatriates were on 
American soil lawfully and as long as there was no proof of their financial support to 
listed terrorist groups145. Germany, where Rabah Kebir and the suns of Madani 
142 Speech reproduced in Middle East Policy (1994), III (2), p. 190. On US policy see also P. Golub 
(1994/95) ; C. Moore (1994) and PM. Gorce (de la) (1993). 
143 Quoted in Le Monde, 7-8 aoüt 1994. 
144 Quoted in Ibid. See also Le Monde, 6 aoüt 1994. 
145 Le monde, 6 aoüt 1994. 
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obtained asylum status, declared that Kebir's role was essentially political and that, in 
these circumstances, he could not be subjected to special surveillance. He was fined in 
August 1994 for disregarding his obligation not to express publicly his views on the 
Algerian political crisis, but the German authorities did not expel him146. Britain 
answered Pasqua's allegations of laxity by maintaining that, as a matter of principle, 
political refugees benefit from freedom of expression. The Home Office, however, 
refused to grant a visa to Anwar Haddam when he was supposed to deliver a speech 
at the Royal Institute for International Affairs in September 1994147. This concession 
was made to Pasqua in order to ease relations with France. On French television, 
Britain was depicted as a country "soft on Islamists". French reporters pointed at 
several "elements of proof" of Britain's "laxity" : the Home Office's unwillingness to 
ban the Wembley and Sheffield meetings respectively organised by Hizb el Tahrir and 
the Islamic Mission of the United Kingdom on August 7 and August 28,1994 ; the 
granting of asylum rights to Rashid Ghannoushi (leader of the Tunisian al-Nahda), to 
FIS sympathisers and militants such as Mohammed Dnidi, ex-director of the FIS 
newspaper ; and the Royal Institute for International Affairs' organisation and hosting 
of meetings where FIS representatives were present in June, September and October 
1994. 
In supporting their viewpoints the three states concerned were in line with the 
EU. In October 1993 a communique of the European Parliament had urged member 
states not to allow FIS representatives living in their borders to condone acts of 
violence148. But the Council had specified that "political action must not be confused 
with terrorism" 149. France's efforts at bringing the states where Islamist militants had 
found refuge to put a break on their political militancy were thus thwarted. 
The only area where France's multilateral diplomacy in favour of the Algerian 
regime produced tangible results was the financial one. While refusing "bilateral debt 
reprofiling", France declared itself ready to lobby in favour of Algeria in order to 
146 Le Monde, 13 aoüt 1994. 
147 Le Monde, 2 septembre 1994. 
148 Europe Daily Bulletin (6097 n. s. ), October 30,1993. 
149 Europe Daily Bulletin (6065 n. s. ), September 16,1993. 
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obtain flexible and advantageous conditions from the IMF and the Paris Club as well 
as fresh financial loans from regional institutions and individual countries once 
Algeria had rescheduled. Parallelling Algeria's financial diplomacyt50, France first 
exhorted Japan and Italy to accept the principle of a rescheduling of Algeria's debt and 
then attempted to gather international support for fresh credits to be channelled to 
Algeria. In Spring 1994, Juppe multiplied his foreign visits, calling for economic 
support notably in Tokyo (April 1), Luxembourg (April 18) and Washington (May 
12)151. Emphasising the risks of bandwagoning in the Mediterranean, Jupp6 criticised 
the view that the West should prepare itself for, instead of opposing, a FIS takeover 
and argued that the economic card was one way of ensuring stability in Algeria. 
All the governments contacted by Algeria and France agreed to support 
Algeria's case within international organisations (IMF, IBRD, EU, Paris Club) under 
the condition that Algeria signed a stabilisation programme with the IMF and filed its 
rescheduling dossier with the Paris Club. However, with the exception of France and 
Belgium152, none immediately granted new bilateral financing. This may be because 
they preferred to wait for their bilateral rescheduling agreement to be finalised after the 
signature of the framework agreement with the Paris Club. This may also be because, 
while recognising the necessity for rescheduling and international financial support, 
they were unwilling to give too much moral and material support to the Algerian 
regime. Such was the USA's stand153. 
After its rescheduling operation, Algeria, thus, received new financing mostly 
from international institutions. In addition to the IMF standby loan, Algeria benefited 
from a series of loans from the IBRD. In July 1994, the blocked $ 175 million second 
tranche of the World Bank's structural adjustment loan was released, triggering the 
150 Visits in May 1994 of the Algerian finance minister to Brussels and London, of the industry and 
energy minister to Madrid and of the trade minister to Bonn (El Moudjahid, 12 mai 1994 and El 
Watan, 23 mai 1994) ; visits in June 1994 of the Algerian prime minister to Brussels, Paris and 
Rome and of the foreign affairs minister to Washington (El Watan, 21 and 29 juin 1994). 
151 See MAE (mars-avril 1994), p. 119 and 189 and (mai-juin 1994), p. 90. 
152 Following the Algeria-Belgium joint-commission meeting in April 1994, Belgium is to provide development assistance worth $ 8.3 million per year until 1997 in addition to balance of payments 
support and project financing (MEED 38 (16), April 22,1994). 
153 MEED 38 (22), June 3,1994. 
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disbursement of the remaining $ 150 million instalment of a programme approved in 
1991 and co-financed by the Import-Export Bank of Japan. The IBRD also planned 
the granting of new loans for the development of the agrarian, housing and 
construction sectors154. In May 1994, the EU agreed to release the frozen second 
tranche (ECU 150 million, $ 180 million) of the 1991 balance of payments loan155. 
In Summer 1994, it also paid into a locked account of the Algerian Central Bank an 
ECU 70 million ($ 84 million) structural adjustment grant to finance work in the 
housing sector156. Lastly, in December 1994, the EU signed with Algeria a new 
credit of ECU 200 million ($ 240 million) for balance of payments relief. Its first 
instalment of ECU 100 million was granted in May 1995157. 
2.2. Greater firmness towards the eradicators (September 1994 " May 
1995) 
During the last nine months of the Balladur government France's Algeria 
policy was the most confusing. A dual discourse appeared within the government. 
Whereas Juppe (as well as Dotard) made an overture towards the conciliators, 
Pasqua maintained the previous policy line of support to the eradicators. Yet, Pasqua 
also engaged in a secretive diplomacy, initiating contacts with the FIS. This 
contradicted both France's official policy and Pasqua's apparent alignment with the 
eradicators. A rift also occurred between the Elysee and Matignon over the issue of 
organising an EU conference on Algeria in order to unlock the crisis. It was, 
nevertheless, short-lived. Jupp6 soon recognised that Mitterrand's February 1995 
proposal was not completely unsound. These quarrels and contradictory attitudes 
stemmed in part from the electoral context. However, it would be a mistake to believe 
that the prospect of the French presidential elections of April-May 1995 had a 
significant impact on policy-making. The main consequence of the battle for the 
154 MEED 38 (32), August 12,1994. 
155 Le Monde, 18 mai 1994. 
156 MEED 38 (32), August 12,1994. 
157 Le Monde, 17 mai 1995. 
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elections was to allow governmental disunity to appear to the public eye. 
The Juppd/Pasqua split and its consequences regarding the coherence of 
French policy are expounded below. Then, the causes and the limits of Juppd's 
shifting vision will be analysed. 
2.2.1. The Juppe/Pasqua split 
August, September or December 1994 ? 
It has been argued that the Jupp&/Pasqua split was discernible as early as 
August 1994 and that it came out in open light after the hijack of an Air France Airbus 
by a GIA commando in December 1994158. Because Jupp6 did not change his views 
from one day to the other, choosing a date is necessarily somewhat arbitrary. 
Nevertheless, September 1994 may represent the best compromise. Jupp6 had, 
indeed, fully developed his new stance before the hijack occurred. Hence, the hijack 
cannot have played the role of a "catalyst" in the adjusting of his policy. The crisis of 
confidence that crystallised during this event between the Quai d'Orsay and the 
Algerian authorities merely reinforced Jupp6 in his newly formed views. Regarding 
the other side of the time-scale, the starting-point of Juppd's personal doubts as to the 
merits of supporting the eradicators may well have arisen in August 1994. However, 
he did not share them publicly before his speech to the Senate on September 15, 
1994. There he warned that political dialogue between the Algerian government and 
the Islamists may not succeed because on both sides some wished to torpedo it159. 
Intra-governmental disagreements occurred notably between Place Beauvau 
and the Quai d'Orsay in August 1994. This explains why many observers have taken 
this date as the starting-point of Juppe's changed perceptions. It is not, however, 
absolutely certain because Juppd did not publicly indicate a policy change prior to 
mid-September 1994. Consequently, there is a risk of interpreting the quarrel between 
Juppd and Pasqua as stemming from disagreements of substance over France's 
158 J. Cesari (1994/95), pp. 189-90. 
159 In MAE (septembre-octobre 1994), p. 100. 
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Algeria policy whereas it may have derived from mere disagreements of form. The 
tension may also have been the sole result of infra-governmental competition. For 
instance, Pasqua's tough call on "allied countries" to crackdown on exiled Islamists 
irritated the diplomatic corps. But, as was mentioned earlier, the Quai d'Orsay issued 
a communique confirming that steps to that effect had been taken. Disagreement was, 
thus, less driven by a fundamental difference in viewpoints than by Pasqua's large 
interpretation of the powers allocated to him through his interior portfolio and by his 
undiplomatic manners. Similarly, the war logic into which Pasqua entered after the 
AIS and the GIAs had issued threats to protest against the internment of twenty-six 
Islamists in Folembray may have been perceived by the Quai d'Orsay as over- 
dramatic160 and dangerous for the security of French nationals in Algeria. But Juppd 
had also always maintained that France would not let Islamist networks operate in 
France. 
In the midst of this confusion ensuing from bureaucratic politics, it is thus 
safer to choose the date of the official text clearly instituting the difference in 
viewpoint as the starting-point of the Jupp6/Pasqua split. 
Overtures towards the conciliators : the Juppe line 
Between September and December 1994 Juppd changed his views by feeling 
his way along as events unfolded in Algeria. Because of this gradual process of 
change, his speeches on Algeria and on France's policy incorporated both old and 
new elements. On the one hand, Juppd reiterated that France would not be lenient with 
terrorism on its own soil ; that it would struggle against ideologies that combat what 
France represents ; that it would continue to promote political dialogue in Algeria and 
that it would pursue its policy of financial help as long as the Algerian authorities 
160 Anti-riot police forces were deployed in Paris and major provincial cities. In Paris, over a period 
of twelve days, they proceeded to about 27 000 identity checks and 10 000 car searches. About 500 
persons were said to be liable for prosecution but none were arrested during these identity checks for 
their potential links with Islamist networks. Apart from drinking and driving offences or the like, the 
bulk of the arrested persons were illegal immigrants (Le Monde, 18 aoüt 1994). 
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maintained their economic liberalisation policy161. On the other hand, Jupp6 adopted a 
more conciliatory attitude towards the FIS and a harsher one towards the eradicators, 
thereby moving towards a more balanced policy stance. 
Juppe's perceptions on the FIS partially evolved. By early September 1994, 
he recognised that the Islamist movement was divided162 -- a point that the French 
authorities had hitherto been unwilling to publicly uphold. Jupp6 still expressed a 
certain scepticism regarding Madani's written acceptance of the authorities' conditions 
to participate in the discussion table. He also refused to pronounce the expression 
"Islamist moderates"163. Yet, he tried to play down Pasqua's declaration (and his 
own) according to which there is not such a thing as an Islamist moderate. He argued 
that the interior minister's statement aimed solely at the terrorist movements with 
which no dialogue was to be considered164. Claiming that the solution to Algeria's 
crisis was to be found in "the reconciliation of the different trends of the Algerian 
society" 165, Juppd seemed convinced as from early September 1994 that the most 
representative Islamist party would have to be integrated within the political process. 
If he did not exclude the principle of a coalition government166, he nevertheless 
consistently maintained that the arms would have to be laid down first and that strong 
guarantees from the FIS that it would respect the principle of democracy, and notably 
political alternation, were needed167. This was essential to prevent any dominance or 
"hijack" of the government by the FIS once it was accepted within its fold. 
If Juppd's perceptions on the FIS partially evolved with the recognition that it 
should be associated to a political solution, a change also occurred vis-a-vis the 
Algerian government. Between September and December 1994, Jupp6 became more 
critical of the eradicators. In his speech to the Senate, five days before the last round 
161 See notably Juppe's speech to the National Assembly, October 11,1994, in MAE (septembre- 
octobre 1994), pp. 205-6 ; on economic aid linked to continued economic liberalisation see Le 
Monde, 8 Wrier 1995. 
162 Interview, September 5,1994, in MAE (septembre-octobre 1994), p. 35. 163 Interview, September 16,1994, in MAE (septembre-octobre 1994), p. 104. 164 Interview, September 14,1994, in MAE (septembre-octobre 1994), p. 87. 165 Interview, September 5,1994, in MAE (septembre-octobre 1994), p. 35. 166 Hearing at the National Assembly, October 5,1994, in MAE (septembre-octobre 1994), p. 179. 167 See his statements on September 1,1994 and October 11,1994 in MAE (septembre-octobre 
1994), p. 25 and 208 and on December 8,1994 in MEA (novembre-decembre 1994), pp. 237-8. 
121 
of talks (September 20) between the Algerian regime and opposition parties, Juppd 
depicted as kith and kin diehards in the Algerian government and the Islamist armed 
groups, and notably the GIAs. He suspected both of doing their best to block a 
political perspective in Algeria. On the very day the first Rome conference was held 
(November 21,1994), he further declared that "our party in Algeria is the party of 
democracy" 168 and specified in early December that this was addressed to all "hawks" 
whether on the side of the Algerian authorities or of the "extremist opposition"169. 
This new firmness towards the eradicator trend was also reflected in the defence 
minister's discourse. In September, Leotard claimed that "the best solution for Algeria 
would have been to accept the poll of December 1991"170. This U-turn provoked the 
summoning of Kessedjian by the Algerian authorities. More skilful in the art of 
diplomacy, Juppd made a clever declaration which, while apparently intended to the 
Islamists, could also concern the Algerian authorities : 
"(... ) when one wants to participate in a democratic process, the rules of democracy must be 
respected. The basic rule of democracy is alternation, that is, when one wins elections, it is 
fine ; but when one loses, one goes. (... ) A certain constitutional framework, the respect of 
the fundamental rights of the human person (... ) must be accepted. If there are some Islamic 
forces ready to play by the game (... ) they must be allowed into this [political] process. "171 
More than criticising past decisions, which would have amounted to questioning the 
soundness of France's past policy, Juppd focused on the near future. In particular, he 
issued warnings with regards to the planned Algerian presidential elections. While 
arguing that the FIS had to recognise democracy to participate in them, he was 
addressing the Algerian government when he stated that the elections should represent 
a "true democratic consultation" and that they could not occur in "such a climate that 
their legitimacy could be contested" 172. 
The hijack of the Air France Airbus by a GIA commando did not generate a 
168 Interview in MAE (novembre-decembre 1994), p. 114. 
169 interview, December 8,1994, in MAE (novembre-decembre 1994), p. 237. 
170 Interview in Echarq Al Awsat reported in El Watan, 5 Wrier 1995. 
171 Interview, December 27,1994, in MEA (novembre-ddcembre 1994), p. 377. 
172 Interview, December 8,1994, in MEA (novembre-decembre 1994), p. 238. Emphasis added. 
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return to a one-way tough stand on the "religious fanatics of the FIS". Rather, it drove 
Juppd to be even more explicit in his criticism of the eradicators. He now designated 
them as those who "satisfy themselves with repression and an all-security line" 173. 
While consistent with his new more balanced position, this qualification expressed his 
degree of irritation towards the Algerian authorities. Their attitude during the tragic 
event and, notably, their misinformation as to their intentions on how to manage the 
crisis had antagonised Juppd who feared both the execution of hostages by the 
hijackers and an intervention by the Algerian special forces which could have turned 
into a blood bath. He felt that the Algerian government was unjustly playing with the' 
hostages' lives by refusing to accept the commando's demand to let the plane take off. 
Algiers' attitude seemed only intended to demonstrate the government held the 
situation under control -- a fact that Juppd obviously doubted174. 
The fact that as from September 1994 Juppd was no longer opposed, as a 
matter of principle, to an integration of the FIS within the political process is reflected 
in the French government's attitude towards the second Rome conference. The Quai 
d'Orsay brought its support to the Rome initiative only through hints : on January 16, 
1995 the spokesman for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs called all the political forces 
in Algeria to engage in a dialogue175. But Leotard was clearer in saying that the Rome 
initiative was "rich in hope to get Algeria out of the bloody face-to-face that tears it" 
and that the Rome platform represented "a groundwork from which Algeria ha[d] to 
initiate the process towards the return to a democratic order"176. There was, indeed, 
nothing more explicit than this statement to indicate to the Algerian authorities that 
France now tilted towards conciliation. Let us note that the change in France's 
discourse was reflected in the EU's statements. On September 23,1994 the EU 
asserted that all parties had to be included in the political process in order to reach 
political conciliation and the return to stability177. In January 1995 the European 
173 Interview, December 27,1994, in MEA (novembre-Mcembre 1994), pp. 376-7. 174 Le Monde, 27 and 28 ddcembre 1994 ; Le Nouvel Observateur (1573), 29 decembre 1994-4 
janvier 1995. 
175 Quoted in Le Monde, 18 janvier 1995. 
176 Respectively quoted in El Watan, 5 fevrier 1995 and Liberte, 5 Wrier 1995. 
177 In MAE (septembre-octobre 1994), p. 127. 
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Commissioner for relations with the Mediterranean countries openly said that the 
moderate wing of the FIS should be allowed to share power178, while the European 
Parliament recognised the Rome platform as a working basis179. 
After the second Rome conference and the problems surrounding the 
organisation of the presidential elections in Algeria, the Balladur government issued 
very few statements on its policy. When interviewed, Juppd maintained that France 
supported dialogue between the conflicting parties and that "all initiatives allowing to 
engage dialogue dynamics ha[d] to be taken in consideration. " 180 However, his 
statements became stripped from their harsh words towards governmental eradicators. 
Maintaining support to the eradicators : the Pasqua line 
Whereas the Ministries for Foreign Affairs and Defence partly revised their 
positions on France's Algeria policy, the Ministry for the Interior maintained the 
previous course, grounded in the view that even though the Algerian regime was not 
"a model of democratic government", "the choice [was] between the capacity of the 
(... ) regime to control the situation or the coming to power of the fundamentalists. " 181 
The Pasqua/Juppd split became patent over two main issues : the recognition of the 
existence of Islamist moderates and the Rome initiative. While Juppd had realised that 
the Islamist movement was divided and had played down the "no Islamist moderates" 
line, Pasqua reiterated in October 1994 that : 
"(... ) there are some moderate Muslims, but, in this case, they are not Islamists (... ). Is 
anyone capable of telling me, in relation to the Islamist movement, where the FIS stops, 
where the AIS and the GIA begin, knowing that, anyway, in Islamist circles, double 
language is considered an integral part of politics, that the right hand should not be knowing 
what the left hand does ? "182 
In contrast with Juppd and Leotard, Pasqua did not regard the Rome conference as a 
178 Le Monde, 6 janvier 1995. 
1791bid. 
180 Quoted in Le Monde, 30 mars 1995. 
181 Pasqua quoted in Le Monde, 6 aoüt 1994. 
182 Interview in Le Monde, 15 octobre 1994. 
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positive step in the resolution process of Algeria's crisis. He stood, in fact, with the 
Algerian authorities, questioning the popular representativeness of the opposition 
parties having signed the platform, taxing of "angelism" the attitude consisting in 
believing that "FIS people would become democrats" and arguing that : 
"To believe for two minutes that these people will abandon the idea of an Islamic Republic 
appears to me unreal. What is at stake is the return to the application of the shari'a (... ) that 
is [to] the Muslim society of the seventh century. "183 
Although in his official statements Pasqua made it clear that, to him, Islamists 
were all backward fanatics prone to terrorism, he initiated behind-the-scenes contacts 
with the FIS through his special mission man, Jean-Claude Marchiani. Press reports 
indicated a meeting with Kebir in April 1994 where a French mediation between the 
FIS and the Algerian government would have been proposed as well as talks with the 
two paramount FIS leaders and a meeting with AIS representatives in October 
1994184. There were also rumours of contacts initiated by the French government 
with Khartoum to incite the Sudanese regime to work towards a rapprochement 
between the FIS and the Algerian regime. Whereas the occurrence of contacts with 
Hassan al-Turabi were officially denied185, Marchiani's manoeuvres were not. 
The rationale behind Pasqua's secretive diplomacy is difficult to establish. 
Meetings with the FIS contradicted France's official policy of not being in touch with 
the banned party. They were initiated by the person in government who was 
apparently the least inclined to arrangements with the FIS. In trying to find an 
explanation, it may be suggested that these contacts came within the framework of 
Pasqua's security policy. In November 1993, following the kidnapping of three 
consulate agents in Algeria, Pasqua had already approached a founding-member of the 
FIS (the expatriated imam of the Khaled-ibn-Walid mosque, Abdelbaki Sahraoui) in 
order to get his help for the release of the French hostages186. Meetings with the FIS 
183 Pasqua in L'Heure de verite, France 2, January 29,1995. 
184 Le Monde, 26 octobre 1994 and 13 decembre 1994. 
185 See Le Monde, 3 and 7 septembre 1994. 
186 Le Monde, 5 novembre 1993 
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can also be seen as part of an attempted mediation to bring the outlawed party to a 
give-and-take policy. Asserting that negotiations are out of the question and 
conducting secret talks on the side is standard practice in conflict settlements. The 
discrepancy between Pasqua's discourse and his acts is consequently not that 
baffling. What is most troubling is that, if these contacts are to be seen as a mediation 
attempt, this raises questions about Pasqua's apparent alignment with the eradicators. 
Unfortunately, as long as it remains unknown whether we are dealing with mere 
confabulations or with hard bargaining -- in which case the very terms of Marchiani's 
negotiations are important -- it will be impossible to ascertain whether these contacts 
invalidate the thesis according to which Pasqua sided with the eradicators all the way. 
A muddle 
To add to the confusion created by intra-governmental disunity and Pasqua's 
parallel diplomacy, a dispute occurred between the Elysde and Matignon. It arose on 
February 3,1995 when Mitterrand launched the idea of organising a conference on 
Algeria within the framework of the EU with the aim of enhancing the chances of a 
national reconciliation on the basis of the Rome platform187. The government which 
had not been informed of Mitterrand's idea protested. Juppd reacted by saying that 
there was no plan to take any new initiative on the Algerian issue188. The Quai 
d'Orsay deplored Mitterrand's lack of subtlety. Calling so bluntly for the organisation 
of a dialogue upon the basis of a platform that the Algerian government had rejected 
could only be met by a refusal in Algiers. All the more since the conference would be 
organised by a foreign forum. In the eyes of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the 
proposal was not only useless but could also prove counter-productive because of the 
nationalist sensitivity of the Algerians189. Actually, the Algerian regime reacted 
strongly to the proposal. It denounced it as an intervention in Algeria's internal affairs 
and recalled the Algerian Ambassador from Paris. The newly appointed French 
187 Le Monde, 5-6 f6vrier 1995. 
188 Le Monde, 8 f6vrier 1995. 
189 Le Monde, 7 ffvrier 1995. 
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Ambassador, Michel Ldveque, was also summoned to receive Algiers' 
protestations 190. 
Despite the Quai d'Orsay's initial disapproval, by the end of February, Juppd 
was apparently no longer opposed to the principle of an EU mediation. Indeed, he 
argued that if France had no right to tell the Algerian authorities what they should do 
and with whom they should talk, other powers could, precisely because they were not 
France and had not the same past with Algeria19t. 
Parallel diplomacy, reversals of discourse and dissension within the state 
apparatus generated perplexity among observers. Discord between the Elysde and 
Matignon was to be expected in those days of "cohabitation". Intra-governmental 
disunity and, even more so, its being allowed on the public space, produced 
puzzlement. As minister for the interior, Pasqua was in charge of immigration, 
security and religious affairs. He was at the crossroads of problems raised by the 
Algerian crisis and, thus, naturally led to make statements relating to Algeria. 
However, he meddled with Juppe's business when making statements that did not 
relate to the domestic consequences of the Algerian conflict. It was all the more 
shocking as Pasqua, whose statements did not comply with official policy, was never 
called to order by the prime minister. This phenomenon stemmed, in part, from the 
electoral context in France which burst the principle of governmental unity. The great 
peculiarity of France's presidential elections of April - May 1995 was that two 
candidates belonging to the same party ran for the presidency : Prime Minister 
Edouard Balladur and MP Jacques Chirac. This double RPR candidacy had the effect 
of splintering loyalties within the government : whereas some, as Pasqua or Leotard, 
supported Balladur, others, as Juppd, backed Chirac. Instead of maintaining 
governmental unity, Balladur gave his two lieutenants a free run to express their 
views. Whereas Ldotard's statements stayed in line with the position of the Quai 
d'Orsay, Pasqua's did not. By having two contradictory living electoral campaigns, 
Balladur could not then be reproached by anybody for adopting a particular stance on 
190 Ibid. 
191 Jupp-A in La France en direct, France 2, February 27,1995. 
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the Algerian conflict. 
2.2.2. Causes and limits of Juppe's shift towards conciliation 
Causes 
Juppd's and Lkotard's shift towards accepting the principle of a political 
dialogue encompassing the FIS primarily flowed from their analyses of the Algerian 
situation and from France's growing international isolation. As demonstrated below, 
electoral calculations did not play a significant role (if any) in the shift towards 
conciliation. For, very few criticisms had been voiced in the civil society against the 
government's support to the Algerian regime. Three main factors explain why Juppd 
and Leotard gradually came to favour conciliation. First, their progressive awareness 
that eradication had failed in its objectives and that it did not constitute a viable long- 
run strategy. Second, their view that the FIS was bound to negotiate with the regime 
since it could not overthrow it192. Third, their sense that in opposing conciliation 
France was increasingly alone and that this may later prove a hindrance in its relations 
with Algeria. These explanatory factors are reviewed below before turning to the issue 
of electoral calculations. 
The Foreign and Defence Ministries' shift in favour of conciliation in Algeria 
thus started with the assessment that eradication had not produced the expected 
results. Despite the Algerian authorities' constant assurances that terrorist groups 
would be neutralised soon, the guerrilla war has continued unabated. As from 1994, 
the duel between the Army and the armed groups also changed in nature. As indicated 
by a confidential report, dated March 23,1995 and drafted by the French Defence 
Ministry, both state and terrorist violence now aimed at the civilians : 
"Throughout 1994, one has progressively passed, from one side or the other, from a war 
logic (... ) to a terror logic aimed at isolating the adversary from the population, at weakening 
192 These elements of analysis draw upon an interview by the author with a high civil servant who 
expressed the wish to remain anonymous. As this civil servant is not named in the list of persons 
who brought a contribution to this work, I would like to thank this person now for the valuable 
insights I was provided with in the interview. 
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it and at causing it to splinter. Ever since then, on both sides, the target of the acts of 
violence is the population and the method, terror : massive repression on villagers by official 
troops, or collective assassination of bus passengers by the Islamists, what difference does it 
make ? The counter-guerrilla strategy used by the armed forces is quite a simple technique of 
terrorisation of the population (... ). In the same way, the violence dynamics created by the 
GIA prevails more and more over selective violence 11 193 
The equally despicable behaviour of the Army and the armed groups probably 
contributed to Juppd's and Leotard's tougher stance on the eradicators. But this new 
stand derived principally from the view that state repression had added fuel rather than 
water to the flames. If this were to continue, there was a risk of a turning a fratricidal 
war into an all-out civil war or, as the Defence Ministry's report indicated, a risk of 
"Somalisation". While the security advantages of eradication were thus undermined, it 
was also realised that, even if the armed groups were eliminated, there would be a 
political and social survival of the Islamist current. Some Islamist parties were still 
allowed to function in the Algerian political system. FIS cadres were still alive, even 
though imprisoned. There also was a functioning Islamist associational fabric. 
Accordingly, it was illusory to believe that, by neutralising the armed groups, the 
problem of the political force of Islamism would be solved. 
The view that the FIS would have to negotiate its share of power, since it was 
not in a position to overthrow the regime, was also important. It implied that the FIS 
would have to work from within the political system to effect change and that a modus 
vivendi would have to be struck with the authorities. Revolutionary fury would thus 
be avoided. Coupled with Juppd's more sceptical view on eradication and with the 
risk of the Algerian crisis bogging down, this argued in favour of a compromise. 
Lastly, as the USA and some European countries voiced their support for a 
negotiated solution to the Algerian conflict, France felt more and more isolated. At the 
same time, since it was recognised -- however reluctantly -- that a lasting solution to 
Algeria's protracted conflict required a compromise with the FIS, stubbornly backing 
the eradicators could only prove detrimental to France's future relations with Algeria ; 
193 Leaked to Le Canard enchaFni, 5 avri11995. 
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it could eventually cause a new governmental team in Algiers to broaden its horizons 
somewhat away from the ex-colonial power towards those states that had shown more 
understanding during the crisis. As dealt with in part two, the Algerian government -- 
whatever its ideological outlook -- could not wholly question the relationship with 
France. It could, however, question some of its aspects to the benefit of other 
countries, undermining, thereby, France's multi-dimensional influence in Algeria. 
The change in Juppd's discourse derived from these considerations rather than 
from electoral calculations. In general, the view expressed, notably in the press, that 
the presidential elections had played a role in the formulation of France's Algeria 
policy related not to the shift in Juppd's stance but to the policy of support to Algiers. 
It was suggested that the French government had backed the Algerian regime in order 
to avoid political change in Algeria prior to the French elections. The risk of an 
immigration flood which threatened to boost the constituency of the extreme right 
would have been the prime motive behind France's categorical refusal to see the FIS 
associated to a political perspective. This argument became difficult to uphold with the 
September 1994 change in discourse which preceded the French elections by eight 
months. The French government probably preferred the status quo to be maintained 
until the French elections in order to avoid a panic effect in France. Yet, the prospect 
of the elections did not hamper a change in policy stance and, in that respect, did not 
have an inhibiting role in policy-making. 
If the prospect of the French elections did not play an inhibiting role in policy- 
making, did it, by, contrast, trigger Juppd's change ? In other words, is Juppd's shift 
towards conciliation in Algeria to be explained, at least in part, by a pressure coming 
from the French civil society ? The answer is quite certainly negative. Neither political 
parties, public opinion, the media nor the intellectuals voiced strong criticisms about 
France's support to Algiers before August 1994. It was the reprisal threats issued by 
the AIS and the GlAs in August and the Airbus hijack in December that provoked the 
general recognition that by backing so strongly the Algerian regime France had created 
enmities among people who may become its interlocutors in the future. Because this 
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general recognition was almost concomitant with the change in Juppd's discourse, it is 
unlikely that the criticisms to which it gave rise were at the root of his policy change. 
French opposition political parties have been surprisingly silent over the 
Balladur government's policy. Parliamentary questions to ministers have essentially 
been about the domestic dimension of the Algerian conflict : security of French 
citizens in Algeria and the FIS's influence on the Muslim community in France. 
Reservations were expressed only when the Algerian conflict clearly crossed the 
Mediterranean as in August and December 1994. Such reservations came from the 
centre-right but only from specific persons who were either particularly interested in 
international affairs or directly concerned by Algeria. Jean-Francois Deniau called for 
a "double distance" from the Algerian government and the FIS194. Bernard Stasi, 
I 
head of the Association France-Algerie, claimed that France "should not give the 
feeling it unconditionally supports the Algerian government, an incompetent, 
corrupted and illegitimate government. " In his view, the Algerian government was to 
be helped only "provided that it clearly manifest[ed] its will to establish a dialogue 
with those among the Islamists who condemn violence. " 195 The Socialist Party also 
expressed some criticisms against France's support to the Algerian regime. In August, 
Dumas opposed his "balanced policy" to Juppd'S196. In December, Henri 
Emmanuelli, the Socialist Party's general secretary, urged the Balladur government to 
reconsider its Algeria policy, arguing that French support to Algiers' repressive policy 
had shown its limits197. However, the socialists remained split over the Algerian 
issue. This transpired in Cheysson's reaction to the criticisms against Pasqua's 
August 1994 crackdown on Algerian Islamists. Cheysson then declared that : "The 
fundamentalists are declaring war on us ; we must fight them. Even though I am a 
socialist, I consider that the current government is showing more enlightened on this 
issue than the previous one (... ). It is out of the question to pursue a policy of 
194 Quoted in Le Monde, 11 aoüt 1994. 
195 Ibid. 
196 Reported in Le Monde, 11 aoüt 1994. 
197 Quoted in Le Monde, 26 decembre 1994. 
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dialogue under these conditions. "198 The same internal disagreements seem to have 
occurred within the Communist Party. Whereas its leader, Robert Hue, argued in 
August that the French government should stop giving a blind support to the Algerian 
authorities199, Paul Euziere questioned the political reality of moderate Islamism in the 
Communist Party's periodical of September 1994200. In general, the PCF preferred to 
criticise the Balladur government for having driven Algiers to accept "the diktat of the 
IMF" and for refusing to cancel Algeria's debt201 rather than for its support to the 
Algerian regime. This may be explained by the Communist Party's embarrassment 
towards Algerian communists who, in general, sided along with the eradicators. 
Those political parties or politicians who criticised France's unconditional 
backing of the Algerian regime did so during the very period Juppd changed his own 
discourse. That these criticisms may have played a role in the change in the official 
discourse cannot be wholly excluded. But, their timing may essentially reflect a 
general acknowledgement that supporting a regime opposed to a political perspective 
was no longer tenable. For, in their electoral run, political parties did not attempt to 
entice voters with their proposals on Algeria. Out of the nine competing candidates 
only three (Independent Jacques Cheminade, Communist Robert Hue and Socialist 
Lionel Jospin) mentioned their future policy regarding Algeria in the electoral 
brochures mailed to voters. Only Cheminade, who, as a black horse, had nothing to 
lose, wrote in black and white that he supported the Rome platform. 
Even less than political parties can public opinion be seen at the source of 
Juppe's change. The average French person has formed her/his understanding of the 
Algerian conflict through the images projected by the media. On the whole, the French 
media have consistently given a simplistic vision of this conflict as a war between 
enlightenment and obscurantism, where the good secular democrats were being 
beheaded one by one by the bad and unscrupulous zealots. Television news, by far 
198 Quoted in Le Monde, 12 aoüt 1994. 
199 Ibid. 
200 P. Euzitre (1994), p. 73. 
201 See the PCFs call for a demonstration in "solidarity with the Algerian people", October 13, 
1994 in Les Cahiers du communisme, 70 (11), 1994, p. 180. 
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the most popular means of quick information, have been the privileged channel for 
this message. Television programmes on Algeria have reproduced this flaw as they 
were invariably about the struggle of the French-speaking Algerian "democrats"202. 
In the press, until August 1994, few journalists argued that the FIS should be 
included in the political process. Few criticised France's support for eradication. If 
they did203, the impact of their statements was annihilated by the numerous articles 
focusing merely on the barbarity of the conflict and particularly on "Islamic 
barbarity". Although Le Monde, for instance, began talking of state violence in 
October 1993204, it rarely emphasised this aspect of the conflict until December 1994. 
The French media's bias in favour of Algerian French-speaking "democrats" 
upholding no dialogue with the religious "regressive forces" was reflected in the 
almost total monopoly of expression they benefited from on French television and in 
the newspapers. The numerous interviews conducted with Algerian supporters of 
eradication rather than with representatives of secular or Islamist conciliator parties 
have resulted in the generalisation of a truncated vision of Algerian society, which is 
perceived by the French layman as wholly opposed to the Islamist political project. As 
seen at the beginning of this chapter, the situation is more complex. 
In general, the French intellectual community has also failed in providing a 
balanced criticism of governmental policy towards Algeria. While some openly 
supported the 1992 coup d'dtat, arguing that "between two ills, the lesser must be 
chosen, that is secular authoritarianism that saves us from fundamentalist 
totalitarism"205, many intellectuals were torn by their antipathy for the Islamists and 
their recognition that "the lesser evil" still proved to be one. As a consequence of their 
embarrassment, French intellectuals chose not to meddle with Algerian politics, 
202 Up to the time of writing, only one television broadcast partly avoided this flaw by having a 
relatively more diversified panel of intervening parties, including, however, no Islamists : "Femmes 
courage", Envoye Special, France 2, June 29,1995. 
203 For instance, Jacques de Baffin in Le Monde, 29 octobre 1993. 
204 Le Monde, 17-18 octobre 1993 and 21 octobre 1993. 
205 Jean Daniel, quoted by I. Ramonet in Le Monde diplomatique (decembre 1993). Ramonet was 
one of the first to ask in this paper : "Do the abominable killings committed by the religious 
extremists justify the excesses of the Algerian regime ? Or the accomplice silence of the European 
democracies ?" 
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claiming it was not their business to recommend or condemn a specific solution to the 
Algerian crisis206. They preferred to devote their energies in existing or new 
associations to provide moral comfort and material support to Algerian intellectuals, 
academics and artists threatened by the Islamists207. Accordingly, their criticism of 
France's Algeria policy was confined to its immigration aspect only. Intellectuals 
joined associations for the defence of human rights or for foreigners' rights and 
participated in demonstrations against the government's restrictive attitude in granting 
tourist visas and asylum status to their Algerian peers seeking refuge in France. They 
put forward "the duty to host" and the crime of "non-assistance to endangered 
persons"208. It was not before the 1994/95 Winter that the French intellectuals 
suggested what they thought France's policy towards the Algerian conflict should be. 
They then signed the Algerie urgence communiqud accompanying the demonstration 
of December 3,1994 in which French trade unions, associations and political parties 
as well Algerian parties participated. They then all argued for a "double distance" from 
"murderous fundamentalism" and the "authoritarian, violent, corrupted and 
discredited regime"209. By then, Juppd had already made his harsher declarations on 
the eradicators and advocated a conciliation which had, nevertheless, some limits as 
underlined below. 
Limits 
Despite the adoption of a new policy stance over the way to resolve Algeria's 
political crisis, no concrete measures were implemented under Balladur to illustrate an 
eventual determination to actively promote conciliation in Algeria. The only sign of 
innovation compared to past behaviour was the content of a leak to the press made 
206 See P. Bourdieu and J. Leca in Le Monde, 7 octobre 1994. 
207 Among newly created associations the most well-known is the CISIA (International Committee 
of Support to Algerian Intellectuals) created in June 1993 and headed by Bourdieu and Leca. 
208 Three demonstrations were organised, out of which two specifically targeted the Balladur 
government's immigration and asylum policy. That of October 11,1994 for which a "Common 
platform for the hosting in France of Algerian asylum seekers and exiles" was elaborated and signed 
by many associations. And that of March 25,1995. See Le Monde, 16-17 octobre 1994 and 28 mars 
1995. 
209 Le Monde, 6 decembre 1994. 
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between the two rounds of the French presidential elections -- a period that also 
followed the failure of bilateral talks between the Algerian authorities and the FFS, the 
FLN and the MDA. It was then intimated that France's 1995 financial assistance to 
Algeria may be reduced by FF 1 billion (about $ 200 million)210. Press reports 
suggested that this could represent the first gesture of active involvement in promoting 
a meaningful political dialogue. The decision now lies with the Chirac Administration. 
It remains to be seen whether this decrease will eventually occur and, if it does, 
whether it will explicitly be given a political significance. 
Beyond discourse, there has been no policy output under Balladur for at least 
two distinct reasons which, more than appearing from the government's discourse, 
can be inferred. First, Juppd never envisaged intervening, otherwise than through 
diplomatic means, in order to break the Algerian political deadlock. Second, direct 
interference entailed risks of retaliation from the eradicators. 
In January 1995, Juppd clearly indicated that foreign interposition was out of 
the question : 
"It is up to it [Algeria] to create for itself a real society project which will not be imposed 
by anyone, neither from the interior nor the exterior, for it can only be the fruit of a dialogue 
between the different political and social components of the Algerian people. "211 
He seemed convinced that foreign intervention in order to dragoon the Algerian 
regime into conciliation was not the best strategy for Algeria's long-term stability. In 
thinking so, he was probably right. It is, indeed, difficult to imagine how an 
externally forced compromise with the FIS could be sustained in the long-term. 
Without a consensus between governmental eradicators and conciliators over the issue 
of striking a deal with the outlawed party, there are few chances of a return to calm. If 
governmental conciliators were to find a give-and-take deal with the FIS under 
duress, they would have to oust eradicators from the spheres of decision-making. 
Conspiracies to overthrow the new rulers could not to be excluded. If a coup d'dtat 
210 Le Monde, 29 avril 1995. 
211 Speech to the Centre d'analyses et de previsions, January 30,1995, quoted in Le Monde, 1 fevrier 
1995. 
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orchestrated by dismissed eradicators were successful, nothing would be solved 
while a new problem would arise : how to restore the authority of the previous 
government ? By sending troops ?A scenario ä la Haiti is hardly applicable to 
Algeria, if only because of the psychological impact that sending troops to Algiers 
would have in both countries. By cutting aid ?A sound evaluation as to how exactly 
minus $1 billion per year would have on policy-making in Algiers would be required 
before actually closing the tap. Reactions from Algiers would also need to be 
considered. Would not France be in danger of becoming a target for state-sponsored 
terrorism ? 
This question, apparently so far-fetched, brings us to the second point 
explaining Juppd's reluctance to bring pressure to bear upon the Algerian regime. 
Direct intervention entailed risks of reprisals. The change in France's discourse 
generated protests on the part of the Algerian authorities. They showed their irritation 
by resorting to codified diplomatic behaviour (recalling their Ambassador, convoking 
the French one) and by denouncing the existence of a pro-Islamist lobby within the 
French establishment by interposed media. The Algerian regime, or some of its 
elements, also used less classical methods. It is quite seriously suspected that some 
foreigners supposedly killed by the GlAs in Algeria were, in fact, killed by the 
Algerian Army. Suspicion hangs over the murder of a French nun and a French monk 
in May 1994 and of four White Fathers (out of whom three were French) immediately 
after the December 1994 Airbus hijack212. In addition, a survivor's account of a May 
1995 attack in which five foreign technicians were killed by an Islamist commando 
underlines that the Algerian Army is not always there to protect foreigners against 
reprisal operations triggered by its habit of displaying the bodies of killed Islamists in 
the street for half a day213. Knowing that the Algerian Army prides itself on acting as 
it would when playing poo1214, one wonders whether, in this particular case, the 
Army aimed at a specific ball (the killing of Islamists) merely to move another one 
212 Le Canard enchafne, 2 aoüt 1995. 
213 See Le Monde, 10 mai 1995. 
214 Remark of a former Commander reported in P. Ddvoluy & M. Duteil (1994), p. 41. 
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(the killing of foreigners). The Army's underlying motive for killing foreigners, while 
blaming the murders on the GlAs (which are widely believed to be infiltrated by the 
Military Security), would be both to generate further antipathy against the Islamists 
and to dissuade foreign governments from actively supporting conciliation. The 
French government was probably aware of the risks entailed by its turnabout 
inasmuch as it had had a compromising hand in the shady business of the Algerian 
Military Security in relation to the Mdcili affair (1987) and perhaps as well in the 
kidnapping of the three French consulate agents (September 1993). There have been 
lots of unanswered questions about the circumstances and unfolding of this 
kidnapping and some have argued that it was a fake abduction215. True or not, it is 
worth mentioning that this happy-end kidnapping absolved the Algerian regime of its 
repressive excesses. It also justified the crackdown on the FIS's relays in France -- a 
crackdown that had more in common with a frame-up than with a terrorist-hunt, as 
the Kraouche affair was to demonstrate216. Being tempted by the devil does not 
shield from becoming its victim, however. This probably explains quite well why the 
Balladur government undertook nothing to promote conciliation and why Juppd, after 
having lost his temper with the eradicators, stripped from his discourse his severe 
remarks. 
To conclude this chapter, it may be underlined that although the principles of 
France's Algeria policy -- summed up in Juppe's "untenable status quo" -- were 
constantly advocated under the Right, the Balladur government did not always 
support a true conciliation involving the FIS. In fact, until September 1994, it was 
215 F. Burgat (1994), p. 205. 
216 Kraouche was in custody after the November "Chrysanthemum operation", because he was 
allegedly found in possession of copies of documents emanating from the GlAs and, notably, of 
copies claiming the murder of the two first Frenchmen killed in Algeria and advising foreigners to 
leave Algeria. In January 1994, however, a policeman, having serious doubts as to the origin of the 
documents found in the flat of Kraouche, leaked to the press. A police enquiry into the matter 
concluded that it was, indeed, possible that documents, thought to be in Kraouche's possession, had 
been introduced in his flat by the police at the time of the search (See Le Monde, 8,10,12 and 26 
janvier 1994). 
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clear as a bell that the Balladur government as a whole rejected the principle of a 
compromise with the FIS even though it called for conciliation in Algeria. I showed 
that there were four main factors allowing us to make this claim : (1) the Balladur 
government opposed the FIS because of the nature of its political project ; (2) it also 
considered that there was not such a thing as an "Islamist moderate" ; (3) the Balladur 
government showed soft on the Algerian eradicators' fake negotiations with the FIS, 
thus indicating that a political compromise with the FIS was not seen as a prerequisite 
in the weathering of the storm ; and (4) the way in which the Balladur government 
conducted its crackdown operations on FIS militants and sympathisers exiled in 
France undermined its public stance on the political dialogue in Algeria since political 
militancy was almost equated with terrorism. The Balladur government thus backed 
the Algerian regime's eradicator trend. This support was accompanied with a bilateral 
and multilateral backing. France granted economic aid to Algeria although it tied it to 
economic restructuring. Following Algeria's agreement to reschedule its debt in April 
1994, France successfully drummed up international support for fresh credits to be 
transferred to Algeria and for the IMF to be lenient in its lending conditions. While 
selling some military hardware to Algiers, France also hampered the progress of the 
FIS and of the GlAs on its own soil by cracking down on exiled Islamists, which, in 
some cases, came down to muzzle political opponents not involved in violence. 
France, however, failed to convince European countries or the USA to follow in its 
wake as these countries made a clear distinction between political militancy and 
terrorism. 
As the security situation deteriorated in Algeria, Paris became increasingly 
isolated in supporting the Algerian eradicators. This growing isolation, allied with the 
view that the eradication strategy, led the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and for Defence 
to revise their positions regarding eradication/conciliation. Juppd and Leotard became 
more critical of the eradicators, now accused of blocking a political perspective in 
Algeria. Apparently, however, there was no governmental unity over that matter since 
Pasqua continued to argue that conciliation could not be envisaged with "fanatics". If 
138 
the May 1995 French presidential elections played a role in France's Algeria policy, it 
was merely by allowing governmental unity to appear to the public eye, since virtually 
no segment of French society criticised the Balladur government's support to 
eradication up to December 1994. The Quai d'Orsay's September 1994 shift did not, 
however, translate into effective policy measures seeking, if not to force, at least to 
influence the reaching of a political settlement encompassing the FIS. Such a lack of 
concrete initiative, while driven by the view that foreign intervention might not bring 
the lasting solution required and by fears of reprisal operations by the Algerian 
eradicators, also highlights that France's change of heart was made reluctantly. Why 
was it that the Balladur government (and to some extent the B&rdgovoy government) 
was so attached to refusing a compromise with the FIS in Algeria ? This is the 
question that part two will attempt to answer. 
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Part Two 
Motives 
Part one was concerned with confronting the discourse to the deeds so as to 
understand what the successive French governments did as opposed to what they said 
they were doing. The purpose of part two is to identify the French political 
establishment's underlying reasons or motives for opposing both a violent FIS 
takeover and the inclusion of the FIS into the political process in Algeria. Much of this 
study concerns the Balladur government's motives since it was under the Right that 
opposition to the FIS was most patent. This inquiry into the motives for opposing the 
FIS, however, also applies to the socialists. Under the Cresson government, 
governmental policy was not pro-Islamist but aimed at encouraging a compromise 
with the Islamist substance by propelling to the forefront of Algerian politics a 
personality who could carry out the junction between the FLN and the Islamists and 
who would, therefore, ensure a smooth continuation of Franco-Algerian relations. 
This plan failed and, after relations with the new Algerian rulers strongly deteriorated, 
the socialists eventually shifted from sulking to backing the Algerian regime. In 
addition, under the socialists, some government or party members did not wholly 
agree with the course chosen for France's Algeria policy which they saw as too 
unsupportive of the Algerian regime. The (publicly silent) backbenchers' motives for 
opposing the FIS and, thus, for supporting the Algerian regime as well as the 
Bdrdgovoy government's motives for shifting policy were in all points similar to those 
of the Balladur government. 
It must be strongly emphasised that the motives underlying the Balladur 
government's opposition to the FIS did not hamper it from finally calling for 
conciliation in Algeria, even though conciliation would not necessarily have solved the 
foreseen risks implied by a FIS takeover or by its re-integration into politics. In this 
sense, however strong concerns about a FIS victory were, they did not constitute a 
stumbling block to a rethinking of the Algerian quandary. 
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Chapter Three 
Perceived risks, ideological and psychological bearings 
Until September 1994, Juppd always argued that the FIS's coming to power 
would be a "catastrophe". As underlined earlier, he was never precise, when saying 
so, whether he was thinking of a takeover through violent means or through a 
negotiated settlement. Christophe Bigot, assistant-deputy to the head of the Maghreb- 
Mashreq department of the Quai d'Orsay, made the point that, in assessing the 
consequences of a possible FIS takeover, the issue as to how it came to power had to 
be taken into account. If the FIS seized power violently, revolutionary ardour had to 
be expected. The Franco-Algerian relationship might be questioned by the new 
regime, at least in the short- to medium-run. On the other hand, if the FIS was part of 
a coalition government, its radicalism might be tempered and conciliation lay perhaps 
ahead. Yet, Bigot also mentioned that, even if a negotiated settlement occurred, not all 
problems would be solvedl. Obviously, this was also Juppd's viewpoint. For, when 
he argued that an Islamist regime in Algiers would be a catastrophe, it was already 
thought since Summer 1993 that the FIS was unable to take power through warfare. 
What were then the envisaged consequences of a FIS takeover or of an 
inclusion of the FIS within the political process ? Juppd never greatly expanded on the 
issue as to how precisely Islamists in government would prove to be a catastrophe. 
Nevertheless, from his own speeches and interviews with members of the political 
establishment, it appears that there were two types of concern : the domino effect that 
a FIS victory might have throughout the Mediterranean and the consequences that 
such a victory might have for future Franco-Algerian relations as well as for France 
itself through the issues it raised in the fields of immigration, national security and 
economic relations. In addition to these issues, which corresponded to the perceived 
risks foreseen by the French political establishment, opposition to the FIS was 
I Interview with Christophe Bigot, April 21,1994. 
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justified on ideological grounds :a FIS victory needed to be resisted because it was 
inevitably perceived as bringing Algeria back to "seventh century Medina". 
Regarding perceived risks, the French government' overriding concern seems 
to have been the domino effect that a FIS takeover or inclusion in government might 
have throughout North Africa. Bandwagoning was thought to potentially have two 
major consequences. First, it might generate instability in the region with risks of 
intra-regional conflicts. Second, and perhaps most importantly, with falling 
dominoes, the (negative) consequences of a FIS victory on Franco-Algerian relations 
would be multiplied on a larger scale, thus rendering the situation "unmanageable". 
The FIS's coming to power was thought to have several negative effects on 
France. I sorted out such effects under three headings : immigration, national security 
and economic relations. Immigration issues raised by a FIS takeover or an inclusion 
of the FIS within the political process dealt with the risk of a massive influx of 
refugees from Algeria and with the risk of re-Islamisation within the Muslim 
community living in France. Such issues played a crucial role in the French 
government's hostility to the FIS, first, because it was forecasted that they would be 
raised even if the FIS was included in government through negotiations and, second, 
because they entailed profound tensions in France's sociopolitical system. National 
security issues (revolving around terrorism) as well as economic considerations did 
have a role to play in the French government's opposition to the FIS but essentially as 
contributing factors. Indeed, issues of state-sponsored terrorism were most likely to 
occur if the FIS came to power by toppling the regime. As it was rapidly understood 
that the FIS was not able to do so, the problem was not of the highest salience. 
Nevertheless, the FIS's ambiguous attitude towards violence, notably against France, 
contributed to the view in Paris that France would be better off without Islamists in 
government in Algiers. In the economic domain, the reasoning was similar. It was 
assumed that a FIS regime would not question Algeria's economic relationship with 
France. If it did, it was assessed that, while incurring a cost, this would not constitute 
a major blow to France's economy. However, if avoiding a change of regime allowed 
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the maintenance of the economic relationship intact, it was all the better. 
In addition to these perceived risks, the prospect of the FIS coming to power 
(by violence or not) stirred concern because its political project, based upon the 
restoration of a supposed divine will, was understood as profoundly regressive and 
intolerant. French opposition to the FIS on ideological grounds, although similar to 
most Western states' wincing at a new form of nationalism involving the ideological 
and cultural sphere, was primarily motivated by the fact that the challenge to Western 
political culture came specifically from Algeria. Algeria has always remained a part of 
France in the French collective imaginary. In addition, contacts between the French 
and Algerian elites have also nourished a truncated vision of Algerian society which, 
to French eyes, has been a somewhat mirror image of France. The FIS vote was lived 
as a "psychological trauma" because it implied that part of the Algerian people did not 
recognise itself in France. This very fact was not accepted. In addition, the French 
political establishment was led to oppose the FIS in its defence of the Algerian 
gallicised elite with whom bonds of understanding and friendship were woven 
throughout the years. 
Deconstructing French policy-makers' perceptions as to the risks involved by 
a FIS takeover leads us somewhat into the realm of political fiction. Political fiction 
does, however, have real implications for policy-making. Indeed, at least until 
September 1994, a series of hypotheses as to the consequences of a FIS's coming to 
office led the French government to decide on its Algeria policy. In addition, on the 
basis of these hypotheses, the government also took practical steps to limit the effects 
of a potential change in regime. This was particularly perceptible in the field of 
immigration. To a certain extent, this was also true in its promotion of the EU 
"partnership policy" in the Mediterranean and its involvement in various initiatives 
dealing with "comprehensive security" in the Mediterranean. I shall thus comment on 
these specific policies when dealing with the issues they were responding to. When 
dealing with the ideological and psychological aspects of French opposition to the 
FIS, I shall also be brought to briefly review the existing academic literature on the 
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rise of Islamism in Algeria in order to confront it to the French political 
establishment's views on that question. 
1. Bandwagoning in the Mediterranean 
When trying to drum up international support for Algiers, the major argument 
put forward by the Balladur government was the falling domino risk. Even well after 
it was thought in Paris that the FIS was unable to topple the Algerian regime, it was 
argued that the FIS should be contained because its coming into power might have 
spillover effects throughout the Muslim world and notably, from the viewpoint of 
France's immediate concerns, in neighbouring countries prey to Islamist agitation : 
Morocco and Tunisia. Libya, Egypt and the Occupied Territories were, however, also 
identified as potentially falling dominoes2. French policy-makers never made a 
(public) detailed treatment of the risks entailed by Islamist bandwagoning throughout 
the southern rim of the Mediterranean3. The reconstruction of their projections, 
however, points to two major connected concerns. First, the region could become 
highly unstable with risks of intra-regional tensions. Second, anti-Western Islamist 
regimes could eventually emerge on Europe's doorstep, multiplying the problems 
generated by the presence of a FIS regime in Algiers. The view that a FIS victory 
might generate turmoil elsewhere and, especially, in Morocco and Tunisia led the 
French government to support the Algerian regime's eradication strategy. At the same 
time, together with Southern European countries, the French government supported 
initiatives for an inter-shore political dialogue as well as the EU's "Euro- 
Mediterranean economic area" policy with a view to promoting economic development 
and political stability in the Mediterranean. 
2 See Juppd's press conference in Washington, May 12,1994 in MAE (mai juin 1994), p. 90. The 
domino theory was also mentioned by Jean Audibert (interview, June 7,1995) and Christophe Bigot 
(interview, April 21,1994). 
3 Juppd's declarations dealing with falling dominoes were, indeed, of the following type : "(... ) 
[Algeria] 'matters to us'. I think there is no need to explain why : history, geographic proximity and 
the importance for France to have in Algeria a stable partner because instability in Algeria, the 
destabilisation of the Maghreb, I shall not follow on, we can see the consequences. " (in MAE 
(janvier-fevrier 1994), p. 247). 
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1.1. Falling dominoes and their foreseen consequences 
As mentioned above, the risk of falling dominoes in North Africa generated 
two major concerns. One was that the region become highly unstable with risks of 
infra-regional tensions. This hypothesis drew attention to the fact that North Africa 
could become a theatre for violence. Their morale boosted by a FIS victory, muzzled 
Islamist movements would conclude that violence could pay, if not in overthrowing 
regimes, at least in forcing an overture of the political game. If, switching from 
having been the "leader of the Third World" to being "the light of Islam", Algiers 
attempted to export its revolution by supporting like-minded movements, inter-state 
conflicts might emerge. Increased intra-regional tension -- already illustrated by 
Algeria's closure of its border with Morocco from August to September 19944 -- 
could be accompanied by destabilising arms races in a context where the proliferation 
of non-conventional weapons is becoming an acute issue on the world stage. In this 
respect, Algeria's interests in chemical technology and its development of nuclear 
power, purportedly for civilian use, could become a more worrisome concern than it 
has been until today5. This dramatic scenario was never brought to its possible 
conclusion, namely the direct involvement of foreign powers in regional conflicts with 
a view to containing Islamist expansion. Certainly, Juppe maintained that "Naturally, 
France will not economise on its help to preserve the security and stability of 
4 In late August 1994, Algeria closed its land, air, and maritime borders with Morocco as a protest 
against Morocco's decision to reintroduce entry visas for Algerians. Such a measure followed the 
murder of two Spanish tourists in a Marrakech hotel and the arrest of several persons having, in most 
of the cases, the dual French and Algerian nationality (See Le Monde, 31 aoüt 1994 and 24 septembre 
1994). Drug and arms traffics between the borders (in June 1994, six Moroccans and two Algerians 
were charged by the Moroccan military court for arms traffics to the benefit of Algerian Islamist 
armed groups, see Le Monde, 17 juin 1994), have increased the tension between the two states which 
periodically accuse each other of intended destabilisation. 
5 Although the Asmidal chemical plant in Annaba is reported to have stopped its research activities 
in Summer 1992 under American pressure (A. Charef (1994), p. 71), it is estimated that Algeria has 
the industrial infrastructure and basic technology to acquire a chemical offensive capacity (R Aliboni 
(1993), p. 49). Algeria also bought two small nuclear reactors. The Nour reactor (low power of 1 
megawatt) was built in co-operation with Argentina. In operation since 1989, it is regularly visited 
by the IAEA. The Es Salam reactor (15 megawatts), constructed with the help of China, was 
inaugurated on December 21,1993 at Birine. An IAEA visit occurred in 1991 after American satellite 
images revealed the construction of this nuclear plant. Western experts estimate that the Algerian Es 
Salam reactor could produce plutonium for military use (Le Monde , 23 decembre 1993). Up to the 
present day, the French authorities have considered nuclear developments in Algeria as an issue of 
secondary importance compared to the more urgent problems of underdevelopment and political 
instability (Interviews with Jean Audibert, June 7,1995 and Christophe Bigot, April 21,1994). 
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[Morocco and Tunisia]"6. But French policy-makers were advised to keep current 
state to state arrangements in case of changes in regimes across the Mediterranean, 
precisely to avoid feelings of ostracism and risks of confrontations7. 
In addition to intra-regional instability, the other major concern generated by 
bandwagoning was its "multiplier effect" : whereas the foreseen negative 
consequences in France of a coming into power of the FIS could be faced, a 
generalisation of these problems to the entire North African region would become 
"unmanageable" for France and perhaps for other European countries8. 
In order to countercheck potential bandwagoning particularly in the Western 
Mediterranean, France paralleled its support to the Algerian authorities with bilateral 
aid to Morocco and Tunisia. Most importantly, however, it encouraged regional 
initiatives aimed at fostering economic development in the Maghreb in order to favour 
political stability and to undercut radical Islamism. 
1.2. Promoting regional initiatives for stability 
Concerns about stability in the Western Mediterranean did not simply grow 
out of the Algerian crisis. In the late 1980s, despite a slackening of tensions resulting 
from the end of the Cold War and the creation of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)9, 
France as well as Southern European countries were worried about the destabilising 
effects both for Europe and the Western Mediterranean of the widening 
socioeconomic development gulf between the Northern and Southern shores of the 
Mediterranean. In the early 1990s, two initiatives were sponsored by the Southern 
European countries in order to deal with socioeconomic development problems and 
their implications for political stability and security in the Mediterranean. The 
6 Interview in Realites, June 30 1994 in MAE (mai juin 1994), p. 360. 
7 See Commissariat general du Plan (1993), pp. 90-1. 
8 Christophe Bigot, interview, April 21,1994. 
9 The AMU (Union du Maghreb arabe) was founded on February 17,1989 between Algeria, Libya, 
Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. Its formal aim was political and economic integration. Since its 
creation, however, the AMU has made few progress towards these goals. For details, see G. Joffe 
(1993c), pp. 203-12 and C. Spencer (1993), pp. 46-8. See as well J. Damis (1993) for details on the 
AMU and the resolution of regional disputes in North Africa. 
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Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), which 
applied to North Africa and the Middle East, was meant to reproduce the success of 
the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in contributing to the 
end of the Cold War. The ambitious CSCM initiative, however, got bogged down 
from the very start. Because of its field of application extended to the Middle East, it 
generated hostility, notably, from the USA. For their part, the French preferred their 
"5+5" dialogue initiative which specifically focused on the Western Mediterranean by 
gathering the four Latin European states (France, Italy, Portugal and Spain), Malta 
and the five members of the AMU. After two meetings in 1990 and 1991, where 
proposals for socioeconomic co-operation and for the promotion of mutual trust were 
brought forward, the 5+5 framework collapsed as a result of the 1992 coup d'dtat in 
Algiers and mounting tensions between Europe and Tripoli following Libya's 
suspected involvement in the Lockerbie and UTA affairs10. 
Since the Algerian parliamentary elections, however, the link between 
socioeconomic problems, the rise of radical Islamism and instability has been 
considered all the more relevant as demonstrated by the conclusion of the Lisbon 
European Council's meeting in June 1992: "Demographic growth, repeated social 
crisis, large scale emigration and the rise of religious fundamentalism are all problems 
which threaten the stability [of the Maghreb]" 11. The idea that the Western 
Mediterranean should be "anchored" to Europe in a stable and long-run relationship 
has thus continued to inspire Euro-Mediterranean initiatives. Today, there are two 
main types of framework which attempt to answer the problems caused by political 
developments in the Mediterranean. One is the Mediterranean Forum. It gathers the 
foreign ministers of eleven Mediterranean countries with a view to providing a 
framework for informal discussions on economic, political and cultural issues 
concerning the region12. The other is the EU's "Euro-Mediterranean economic area" 
10 For details see e. g. T. Niblock (1993), pp. 251-5 ; M. Ortega (1993), pp. 75-6 and M. Bonnefous 
(1992), pp. 79-85 
11 In MAE (mai juin 1992), p. 194. 
12 Two meetings have occurred so far. The first was held in Alexandria, on July 3-4,1994 (Europe 
Daily Bulletin (6266), July 4-5,1994). The other took place in Sainte-Maxime (France) on April 8- 
9,1995 (Le Monde, 11 avril 1995). The following states participated in the Mediterranean Forum : 
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proposal which aims at transforming the "co-operation agreements" signed with 
Mediterranean countries back in the late 1960s or 1970s into "partnership accords" 13, 
Since 1992, exploration negotiations for the conclusion of such accords have been 
conducted, notably with Morocco and Tunisia. Tunisia eventually signed a 
partnership accord with the EU in April 199514. Discussions with Morocco have been 
in a deadlock since February 1994 as a result of major disagreements over the 
transitional terms to be found in order to smooth out the effects of opening the 
Moroccan economy to European industrial goods and over quotas in agriculture. In 
addition, since a disagreement occurred in April 1995 regarding the renewal of a 
fisheries accord between the EU and Morocco, Rabat has linked the conclusion of a 
partnership accord to a satisfactory one over fishing's. As to Algeria, informal 
exploratory talks began in June 199416. 
In addition to traditional issues of financial, technical, social and cultural co- 
operation, partnership accords revolve around the creation of bilateral free-trade zones 
and the institutionalisation of a political dialogue. The latter is seen by the EU as a 
means to discuss issues pertaining to regional security (e. g. proliferation of weapons 
of mass-destruction) and to domestic politics. Indeed, political dialogue is geared 
towards the establishment of democratic systems of government, based upon the rule 
of law and the respect of human rights'7. As noted by George Joffe, there is a 
tendency in Europe to conceive democratic systems of government in strict European 
terms and to encourage the simple reproduction in North Africa of the European 
Algeria, Egypt, France, Italy, Greece, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, and Turkey. 
13 "Association agreements", dealing with trade (preferential access for certain products in the EEC 
market), were signed in 1969 with Morocco and Tunisia. Within the framework of the 1972 European 
"Global Mediterranean policy", these accords were transformed into "Co-operation agreements" in 
1976. In addition to trade issues, these agreements dealt with economic, technical, and financial co- 
operation. Algeria, as other Mediterranean states (Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, 
Syria, Turkey and Yugoslavia) signed such agreements with the EEC. The "Global Mediterranean 
policy" was transformed into the "Redirected Mediterranean policy" whose financial protocol covers 
the period 1992-96 (for details see B. Khader (1992), pp. 13-29). In April 1992, the Commission 
made a proposal for the adoption of a "policy of partnership" with the Maghreb and, in October 1994, 
it put forward the proposal for a "Euro-Mediterranean economic area" which basically seeks to extend 
the partnership policy to the other associated Mediterranean countries. This proposal should be 
discussed during the EU-Mediterranean conference planned for November 1995 in Barcelona. 
14 Le Monde, 14 avril 1995. 
15 See B. Callies de Salies (1994), pp. 135-7 and Le Monde, 30 aoüt 1995. 
16 Europe Daily Bulletin (6257), June 23,1994. 
17 D. Engelis (1994). 
148 
political model18. Until today, however, talks between the EU and its Maghrebi 
partners have essentially focused on the establishment of free-market areas. The 
contentious issue of political dialogue has, for the time being, been reduced to 
"defining the areas of mutual interests that could be included in the dialogue" 19. If the 
EU has been willing to relegate political dialogue in the background, it is because its 
priority is to integrate the Maghreb and the Mediterranean as quickly as possible into 
the European context partly as a means to struggle against the rise of radical Islamism. 
In addition to the Mediterranean Fora and the EU Mediterranean policy as 
regional instruments to undermine the development of radical Islamism, it is worth 
mentioning the January 1995 meeting of the interior ministers of the four Latin 
European states and of Algeria and Tunisia who set forth to co-ordinate actions to 
struggle against "terrorism, fundamentalism, extremism and fanaticism" and who 
intend to meet every year20. 
France's involvement in this series of regional frameworks which are more or 
less directly meant to contain the rise of radical Islamism (the borderline as to when 
Islamism becomes "radical" being still relatively obscure in official discourse) has 
partly stemmed from its concerns as to bandwagoning and the subsequent 
multiplication of the problems that could arise from a FIS victory. The foreseen 
impacts on France of a FIS coming to power are reviewed in the three following 
sections dealing with immigration, national security and economic relations. 
18 G. Joffe (1994b). 
19 D. Engelis (1994). 
20 Morocco did not participate in this Tunis meeting arguing that its subject was of no interest to Morocco (Le Monde, 24 janvier 1995). 
149 
2. Immigration issues 
One central explanatory factor for France's opposition to a FIS takeover and, 
then, to an inclusion of the FIS in the political process in Algeria, relates to the 
immigration issues raised by such prospects. There were two major kinds of concern. 
One was linked to the potential immigration to France of Algeria's Western-oriented 
elite as a consequence of a coming to power of the FIS. It was feared that an 
immigration wave from Algeria would exacerbate social and political tensions in 
France. At the same time, an inflow of refugees could possibly hinder relations with a 
new regime encompassing the FIS, since it would represent a pool of potential 
political opponents to Algiers. The other main concern raised by the potential coming 
of the FIS into office dealt with the Algerian community and, more generally, the 
Muslim community living in France. In relation to this issue, there were two major 
worries. First, that the pro- or anti-FIS attitude of the Algerian (and Muslim) 
community be a constraint on French foreign policy and, second, that the FIS attempt 
to control the Muslim community at large by encouraging a process of re-Islamisation. 
All these concerns were reinforced by the prospect of potential bandwagoning 
notably in Morocco and Tunisia. They explain, in part, why the French supported the 
Algerian regime so resolutely until September 1994. It must be noted, however, that 
the French government and, particularly, the Balladur one took measures to limit the 
impact of a potential FIS arrival in power, notably by restricting immigration from 
Algeria and by showing tough on the issue of re-Islamisation. 
2.1. Politically-driven immigration from Algeria : concerns and 
restriction 
French opposition to the FIS was partly motivated by the fear that its coming 
to power would spark off an immigration wave of Algeria's Westernised elite. A 
massive influx of refugees from Algeria and, eventually, from the Maghreb (through 
the domino effect) was problematic for the French government for two main reasons. 
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First, although these Europeanised, middle/upper class, new immigrants would have 
a different profile from that of traditional Maghrebi immigrants (blue-collar workers 
joined by their families), it was feared that an immigration wave would exacerbate 
existing anti-Arab/Muslim feelings in France and, thus, favour social and political 
tensions. Second, these new immigrants could represent a potential political 
opposition to the new regime in Algiers. Their presence in France could, thus, prove a 
hindrance in the political relations with the new regime -- relations which the French 
government would like as little strained as possible, whatever it may think of the 
ideologico-political orientation of the new regime. 
Partly to avert an immigration wave from Algeria, the Bdrdgovoy and Balladur 
governments chose to support the Algerian regime. At the same time, especially under 
Balladur, a policy restricting immigration inflows stemming from political violence in 
Algeria was adopted. By keeping entries from Algeria within tight bounds, the 
government sought to hamper permanent settlement in France, should the FIS be 
accepted back into the political game. 
2.1.1. An immigration wave : governmental hypotheses and concerns 
Governmental hypotheses 
In the Quai d'Orsay's view, a sudden immigration wave from Algeria could 
have resulted from a FIS takeover as well as a political settlement between the 
Algerian government and the FIS. In September 1994, Juppd, indeed, argued that a 
political compromise would lead to an Islamisation process that not all Algerians 
would accept21. Logically, this meant that, despite a lull, some would still be 
candidates for emigration. However, it was not very clear whether the French 
government had a sound estimate of the proportion such a movement could take on. 
Government members gave significantly different projections. In April 1994, whereas 
21 Press communique of Juppe's address to the Senate, September 15,1994 in MAE (septembre- 
octobre 1994), p. 102. The point that a political settlement with the FIS would not solve the 
problem of potential immigration was also raised by Christophe Bigot, interview on April 21,1994. 
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Juppe advanced a high hypothesis of hundreds of thousands of people, Pasqua "bet" 
on tens of thousands22. In addition, the Quai d'Orsay made an about-face in October 
1994 : Juppd, who had hitherto argued that there was a real risk of seeing an 
immigration wave to France23, then minimised the risk, claiming that to expect a 
massive exodus was part of a "psychosis" and "catastrophism" which he did not 
share24. 
Whether or not the Balladur government had a precise idea as to how many 
Algerians might effectively have been candidates for immigration if a political 
compromise was struck with the FIS25, it was vocal in claiming that France would 
not adopt a lax policy. Pasqua, indeed, stated : 
"We would not be able to host several tens of thousands of persons. (... ). We would 
evidently accept those who have the French nationality. Bi-nationals will have to justify of 
their quality [as bi-nationals]. For the rest, we have absolutely no obligation (... ). Besides, 
this issue, if it were to be raised, should be examined not within the framework of our own 
country, but within that of the Mediterranean countries, at the level of the European Union. 
(... ). We cannot be the natural receptacle of all the oppressed, all the persecuted, all those 
who are in opposition. "26 
What were the French government's concerns explaining its refusal to open at large its 
border ? 
Governmental concerns 
The French political establishment put forward three main reasons explaining 
why it considered a mass influx of Algerian refugees as a major trouble. First, there 
22 See the interviews of Jupp6 and Pasqua, respectively in Le Point (1126), 16 avril 1994 and Le 
Figaro, 18 avril 1994. 
23 See his interview in Le Point (1126), 16 avril 1994 and in Jeune Afrique in MAE (mai-juin 
1994), pp. 314-5. 
24 See his speeches to parliament in MAE (septembre-octobre 1994), p. 207 and (novembre-ddcembre 
1994), p. 16 
25 By arguing that a precise evaluation of the Algerian migratory risk was still needed, high civil 
servants suggested that the French government did not know exactly what to expect (see Notes de la 
fondation Saint-Simon (1995), p. 25). 
26 Interview with Le Figaro, 18 avril 1994. Juppd said the same thing in his interview with Le Point 
(1126), 16 avril 1994. The number of persons having dual citizenship and living in Algeria is 
evaluated between 25 000 and 50 000 (Le Monde, 5 aoüt 1994). 
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were practical problems to cope with welcoming a significant number of Algerians, if 
only in terms of lodging, schooling for children, employment and diploma 
recognition27. Second, especially when it was criticised for its restrictive Algeria 
immigration policy, the French political establishment emphasised that "Algerian 
democrats" needed to stay in their country if they wanted their political ideas to 
triumph there. Pasqua went somewhat out of his way when recalling that he did not 
"clear off' when the Nazis invaded France28. But a civil servant expressed the 
government's concern by asking : "Is it in our interest to empty Algeria of its 
modernist substance ?A million and half Iranians left after the Revolution ; the sole 
result was to reinforce the power of the ayatollahs. "29 Third, it was argued that an 
immigration wave would cause "domestic politics complications" and would upset the 
"social equilibrium"30. 
Without denying that the first two problems were important, it seems that the 
government's overriding concern related to these "domestic politics complications" 
and, notably, to the fear that anti-Arab/Muslim sentiment may be boosted by a sudden 
immigration wave. I shall, thus, focus on this concern rather than on the others. I 
shall also put forward the argument that French policy-makers were preoccupied by 
the impact that sheltering Algerian would-be political opponents might have on 
France's future relations with a government encompassing the FIS. Although never 
publicly mentioned, this concern about the future of Franco-Algerian relations was 
most certainly in the policy-makers' minds. 
Answering the expectations of French public opinion 
The protest actions undertaken by the French intellectual community in order 
27 Interview with Christophe Bigot, April 21,1994. In Autumn 1994, ME1 reported that senior 
government representatives (prefets) had been asked to draw up a list of sites in which refugees could 
be installed and that the Red Cross contemplated using the Albertville Winter Olympic facilities 
(MEI (485), October 7,1994). 
28 In L'Heure de Write, France 2,29 janvier 1995. 
29 Quoted in Liberation, 29 juin 1994. 
30 Respectively, Christophe Bigot (interview, April 21,1994) and Alain Jupp6 (in Le Point (1126), 
16 avril 1994). 
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to denounce the government's policy of "non-assistance to endangered persons" did 
not have much influence on French public opinion which has expressed a certain 
anxiety about a massive inflow of new "boat-people" -- a suggestive mediatic idiom. 
According to a September 1994 opinion poll, only 11% of the French people thought 
that political refugee status should easily be granted to Algerians if the FIS came to 
power. 34% argued that entry should be limited to those who have family in France 
and no less than 29% thought that the frontier should be sealed31. Besides the specific 
Algerian issue, since the 1980s, public opinion has increasingly expressed its anti- 
foreigner feeling which, it must be stressed, is directed against alien citizens but also 
French citizens of foreign -- usually non-European -- origin. North Africans and their 
children are in the line of fire because they constitute the most important non- 
European community in France. Maghrebis and their French-born children amount to 
about 3 million persons. According to the 1990 census, the number of Maghrebi 
nationals amounted to approximately 1.5 million (620 000 Algerians, 585 000 
Moroccans and 208 000 Tunisians). Accounting for 17.2% of the total foreign 
population in France, Algerians were the second largest community after the 
Portuguese (17.9%). Moroccans (16.2%) were the third largest foreign 
community32. Children of Maghrebi nationals account for an estimated 1.5 million 
people33. Labelled as "second or third generation" or as Beurs, they are often entitled 
to receive the French nationality34. 
31 Le Monde, 13 octobre 1994. 
32 A. Lebon (1992), p. 92 and my calculations. 
33 C. Jelen (1991), p. 9. The Algerian community is the most important and counts about 1.5 
million people. It is made of three main groups of about half a million each : 1) Algerian nationals, 
2) the Harkis and their children (the Harkis are Algerians who fought on the French side during the 
War of Liberation and who expatriated to France at Independence) and 3) the generation of Beurs (see 
infra) (A. Hargreaves, 1994). 
34 Until January 1994, many Algerian beurs (as opposed to the Moroccan or Tunisian ones) were 
entitled to become French citizens automatically. Article 23 of the Nationality Code provided, indeed, 
that children born in France of parents who were born in Algeria when it was a French department 
were entitled to the French citizenship at birth. On the other hand, children born in France of foreign 
parents (e. g. Tunisian or Moroccan) were entitled to the French nationality at 18 if they had been 
permanently living in France since they were 13 (article 44). The Nationality Code was amended by 
parliament in June 1993. One of the major effect of this reform was to suppress the automatic 
acquisition of French nationality. Article 23 was changed to the effect that children of Algerian 
parents who were born in Algeria before Independence benefit from the so-called double jus soli only 
if their parents have been living in France for five years before the birth of their children. Article 44 
now reads that children born in France of foreign parents must willingly ask for the French 
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Following the French government's mid-1970s decision to cease importing 
foreign labour, Maghrebi immigrants settled in France and were joined by their 
families, whereas they used to go to France in order to work mostly as blue-collar 
workers and then to return to their homelands. This settlement process occurred in a 
context of deepening economic crisis and of social upheavals, which favoured racist 
sentiment. The Maghrebi community has thus increasingly come to be seen as either 
competing for jobs or as draining the Social Security benefits. With the increase in 
violent protest movements in the suburbs, recurrent since the mid-1980s, the Beurs 
have been perceived as disrupting law and order35. In the eyes of many, they are the 
"new dangerous class"36. Settlement has also generated a focus on cultural and 
behavioural differences. The view that Islam is, in itself, a stumbling block to 
integration to French society gained currency throughout the 1980s. The Gulf War 
raised fears of a lack of allegiance of the Beurs to their own state, i. e. France. Similar 
national security concerns are being raised by Islamic revival in the Maghreb37. In 
short, Maghrebi immigrants and their French children are perceived as a threat. 
Whether they should be so perceived is right or wrong -- and there is ample 
literature showing that this threat feeling partakes of a collective fantasy38 -- people 
behave according to their perceptions. Radicalisation about immigration and 
"foreignness" has been reflected in the growing success of Jean-Marie le Pen's 
extreme-right party39 whose electoral platform has revolved around the discriminatory 
nationality between the ages of 16 and 21. Criminal records are taken into account. For details, see Le 
Monde, 1 janvier 1994. 
35 Because of cheap housing in the suburbs, immigrants and their children are mainly located there. 
Throughout the 1980s and increasingly in the latter part of the decade and the 1990s, the "suburb 
issue" has become a major social problem in France as riots, often sparked by bad relations with the 
police and, eventually, by the death of a young beur, became more and more frequent. Stone-throwing 
against police forces was readily identified as a new form of intifada in the French suburbs. For details 
on the "suburb issue" see e. g. A. Jazouli (1992). 
36 J. Cesari (1994b), p. 159. 
37 See section 2.2. below. 
38 See e. g. C. Withol de Wenden (1992a) and (1992b) on the problem of collective images on 
Maghrebi immigrants and their French-born children and (1991) on the issue of the Beurs and the 
Gulf War. See also C. Jelen (1991) on the issue of the economic threat and, more generally, on the 
assimilation of Beurs. For references on the issue of religion, see infra. 
39 In the first round of the 1995 presidential elections, the FN secured 15% of the vote (Le Monde, 
28 avril 1995), which was in line with previous scores varying between 10% and 15%. In the 1995 
local elections, however, the FN was in the run for the second round in over 150 towns. FN mayors 
now administer the towns of Marignane (37.3% of the vote), Orange (36%) and Toulon (37%). The 
FN realised this score in many other towns (Le Monde, 20 juin 1995). 
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concept of "national preference" and the idea that the survival of "Frenchness" 
is 
threatened by the presence in France of Arab Muslims. Rising anti-Arab/Muslim 
feelings40 and the subsequent success of the extreme-right has led all political parties 
to advocate tougher immigration policies throughout the 1980s and 1990s in order to 
minimise social tensions and to thwart the drawing power of the National Front. The 
French government's concern about an immigration wave from Algeria and, 
eventually, from Morocco and Tunisia must, therefore, be read within this general 
context of rising "populist anti-Muslimism"41. That an immigration wave might have 
occurred before the French presidential elections was certainly an additional source of 
concern because of its possible direct impact on the Le Pen vote. Actually, one may 
be tempted to explain Juppd's baffling change of heart about the reality of a mass 
exodus (see supra) merely as a means to reassure anxious voters. Fundamentally, 
however, the French government's concern was motivated by the view that, in the 
long-run, a massive influx of Algerian refugees might provoke intense sociopolitical 
tensions in France. 
Thinking ahead 
An immigration wave sparked off by the FIS coming to power would result in 
France sheltering likely political opponents to the new regime in Algiers. There are 
few doubts that, once in France, some refugees would seek to structure a political 
opposition. Such political activism might prove a hindrance to France's relations with 
the new regime in two ways. First, depending on how good relations between the 
two states would be, Algiers could quite easily accuse Paris of seeking to destabilise 
the new Algerian regime by hosting opposition movements. Second, the political 
40 Anti-Arab/Muslim sentiment is reflected in the results of an opinion poll led by the National 
Consultative Commission on Human Rights (1994 Report) : 65% of those polled admitted to be 
harbouring some element of racist prejudice ; 62% judged there were too many Arabs in France and 
59% too many Muslims (Le Monde, 22 mars 1995). 
41 Fred Halliday uses the concept of "anti-Muslimism" to depict Western hostility to the Islamic 
component of Muslims' identity. He makes a distinction between : 1) "strategic anti-Muslimism" 
which is articulated around strategic issues (nuclear power, oil, terrorism, etc. ) and directed against 
states and 2) "populist anti-Muslimism" which is directed against Muslim immigrants in the West 
and which is one component of xenophobia and racism. Fred Halliday (1993). 
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activism of some opponents to the new regime in Algiers could turn into a threat to 
territory security in France and, thus, generate tensions between France and Algeria. 
In exactly the same way as the FLN regime or Iran eliminated major political 
opponents abroad, so could a regime comprising the FIS. In the current situation 
where both Islamist and secular Algerians have found refuge in France to escape 
political violence in Algeria42, there have been a few signs indicating that France 
could become an arena of confrontation between Algerian political movements. It was 
reported that complaints to the French police had been filed by some Algerians in self- 
exile in France who had received threatening telephone calls and visits presumably by 
self-exiled Islamists reproducing in France the GIAs' methods43. The murder of 
Sheik Abdelbaki Sahraoui in July 1995 in his Paris-based mosque also shows that, 
whoever committed the murder, France may be turned into a hunting field to political 
opponents44. The killing of political opponents, while in itself affecting national 
security, can lead to further complications. For instance, in 1980, the attempted 
murder of Shahpur Baktiar (last prime minister of the Shah regime) in Paris led to the 
imprisonment of the head of the commando, Anis Naccache. The release of Naccache 
became one of the claim of pro-Iranian terrorist groups which took French hostages in 
the Middle East and carried out bomb attacks in France45. 
42 See section 2.1.2. below. 
43 Liberation, 30 juin 1994. 
44 Sahraoui was shot point-blank on July 11,1995 (Le Monde, 13 juillet 1995). Up to the time of 
writing, the French police has not solved the Sahraoui case. Sahraoui was a FIS founding-member. 
As a salafiyyist, he was marginalised after the FIS Batna Congress in July 1991 and left for France 
where he obtained the position of imam of the Khaled-ibn-Walid mosque thanks to the World Islamic 
League (Saudi obedience). Sahraoui was an interlocutor of the French authorities : he called for the 
liberation of the three French consulate agents held hostages in Algeria in late September 1993 as 
well as for an end to the killing of foreigners in Algeria (Le Monde, 5 novembre 1993). In August 
1994, following the internment of suspected Islamist activists in Folembray which triggered the 
AIS's retaliation threat against France, Sahraoui claimed that the AIS "is only opposed to the puppet 
regime in Algiers and (... ) hits only the forces of repression in Algeria", suggesting that the French 
territory was not a target for terrorist attacks as it was then feared (see Le Monde, 11 aoüt 1994). In 
addition, Sahraoui was opposed to the undertaking of illegal activities by Algerian Islamists on 
French soil which, in his view, had to be kept as a safe haven for fleeing Islamists (see II. Terrel 
(1994), p. 362). Because Sahraoui was the living proof that dialogue could be engaged with FIS 
members and that conciliation could be found, he could have been killed as much by the GlAs as by 
the Algerian Military Security. 
45 Baktiar was eventually eliminated in 1991 in Paris. According to some police reports, one of the 
aim of the November 1993 police raid against the Algerian Brotherhood in France (which led to the 
Kraouche affair) was to prevent terrorist attacks linked to the trial of the presumed killers of Baktiar. ' 
In the mid-1980s, pro-Iranian terrorist groups had "sub-contracted" terrorist attacks which were 
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The purpose of the hypotheses sketched above is not to dramatise the 
situation, but to show that, if relations between Paris and Algiers were difficult 
for a 
variety of reasons, the very fact that France would be hosting potential political 
opponents to the new regime in Algiers may prove a hindrance to a normalisation of 
political relations between the two states. It is very unlikely that this scenario did not 
strike French policy-makers when they assessed the various consequences of a mass 
influx of Algerian refugees. 
In view of the potential unsettling effects that an immigration wave could have 
in terms of France's "social equilibrium" and in terms of its future relations with a 
new Algerian regime including the FIS, the B&regovoy and Balladur governments 
backed the High State Council and then the Zeroual regime, hoping to avoid being 
faced with an exodus from Algeria. In addition, the French government and, in 
particular, the Balladur government adopted a restrictive immigration policy towards 
Algeria. By making it harder for Algerians to enter France and to stay there, the 
French government sought to limit inflows and to hamper the permanent settlement of 
those who already left Algeria, in case the FIS came to power. 
2.1.2. Restricting entries 
Immigration to France generated by political violence has already begun. It is, 
nevertheless, difficult to assess the number of people involved. The latest official data 
on immigration inflows from Algeria concern 1993 and are, thus, not recent enough 
to show the full impact of violence on expatriation. In addition, these data do not take 
into account the (renewable) temporary residence permits delivered for a three-month 
period, whereas most Algerians having sought protection in France have been granted 
that particular status. According to press records, 10 000 Algerians would have 
performed by Maghrebi radical Islamists. The French authorities would thus have feared the same kind 
of sub-contracting (See P. Ddvoluy & M. Duteil (1994), p. 333). To be accurate, it can be pointed 
out that the trial of Baktiar's presumed killers did not actually open in November 1993 but in 
November 1994 (International Herald Tribune. November 2,1994). What happened in November 
1993 was that the judicial inquiry into the Baktiar Affair was closed because enough evidence against 
the presumed killers had been gathered for them to be brought to court (Le Monde, 4 novembre 
1993). 
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benefited from this "territorial asylum" status between 1992 and 199446. Even though 
the Interior Ministry's data are underestimates because of the exclusion of that type of 
visa47, they show a trend of immigration from Algeria for political reasons. The 
number of asylum-seekers has, indeed, increased since 1992 even if the numbers 
involved remain low : 144 in 1990,191 in 1991,618 in 1992,1098 in 199348 and 
2 385 in 199449. 
In the main, Algerians seeking protection abroad belong to the Westernised 
intelligentsia. Many were threatened with death by the Islamist armed groups. Some 
may also have been threatened by the regime for their conciliatory views. Among the 
Algerians who left Algeria for France, there are also some Islamists. However, they 
are far less numerous50. 
In order to prevent (in case a compromise was reached with the FIS in 
Algiers) the long-term settlement in France of those who already left Algeria, the 
Balladur government took three main measures which, besides, have not been 
reversed under the new Juppd government. To begin with, the Balladur government 
adopted a restrictive interpretation of the Geneva Convention on political asylum, 
arguing that asylum status could be granted exclusively to people persecuted by their 
own government. This implied that persons claiming to be victimised by Islamist 
armed groups could not benefit from this status51. This stance on political asylum 
explains why very few applications were approved : 15 in 1992,14 in 1993, and 18 
in 199452. The French government's refusal to consider as political refugees 
46 Le Monde, 24 ddcembre 1994. 
47 Between 1991 and 1992, Algerian immigration was stable (16 860 persons in 1991). Between 
1992 and 1993, the number of immigrants rose by a mere 8.7%, passing from 16 714 to 18 175. A. 
Lebon (1992), pp. 83-5 ; (1993), pp. 85-8 and (1994), pp. 87-90. 
48 A. Lebon (1994), p. 26. 
49 Le Monde, 23-24 avril 1995. 
50 Only 1% of the Algerian asylum-seekers are Islamists (Le Monde, 6 ddcembre 1994). This does 
not imply, however, that only 1% of the persons who came to France as a result of the slaying in 
Algeria are Islamists. 
51 In July 1994, the French Appeal Commission for Refugees granted asylum status to a young 
Algerian woman because the Algerian local authorities did not fulfil their duty of protecting her while 
they knew of the persecutions she had been subjected to by Islamist activists. The Commission 
stressed that the approval was based on these sole circumstances and underlined that this decision did 
not imply that Algerian women were considered as a persecuted group. See Le Monde, 23 and 24-25 
1 uillet 1994. 
2 Le Monde, 6 ddcembre 1994 and 30 mars 1995. 
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individuals persecuted by Islamists was a gesture of political support to the Algerian 
regime : it implied that the regime was capable of protecting its citizens and that it was 
in control of the security situation. But the French government's refusal was 
fundamentally motivated by its unwillingness to create a precedent and to ease the 
long-run settlement of these new immigrants. By merely providing momentary shelter 
through a renewable three-months "territorial asylum", the French government 
attempted to punctually answer protection needs while at the same time avoiding 
permanent settlement. 
The government also made it harder for Algerians to come to France. A policy 
of tourist visa restriction was adopted under the socialists as early as 1990. However, 
between 1993 and 1994, issued visas dropped from 300 000 to 100 000 (less than 
20% of the demand)53. It is highly likely that if Algeria was now living in peace, 
issued visas would be maintained at their early 1990s level, that is about 400 000 per 
year. In December 1994, an immigration agreement was signed with the Algerian 
authorities. It abolished the preferential treatment hitherto granted to Algerians in 
matters of visa issuance. This accord has had two effects. First of all, it has 
toughened entry conditions : Algerian tourists must hold a letter confirming that they 
will be hosted in France. This letter must be signed by the host and the French mayor 
of the host's town. In the second place, since March 1995, this accord has contributed 
to restricting the possibility of changing status once in France : Algerians can no 
longer go to France with a tourist visa and then ask for either a lengthening of stay or 
a change in status. The authorities maintain that "endangered persons" may be granted 
a derogation to the rule, but such a derogation is not regulated by law54. This 
December 1994 agreement was in negotiation for about two years and brought Algeria 
in line with Tunisia and Morocco which signed similar accords with France 
respectively in 1992 and 1993. Nevertheless, the fact that the French government 
pushed for its conclusion in the particular context of violence in Algeria showed a 
deliberate will to restrict inflows from Algeria as much as possible. 
53 Le Monde, 3 Wrier 1995. 
54 Le Monde, 24 ddcembre 1994. 
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Lastly, in Summer 1994, the Balladur government reached a secret agreement 
with the Algerian authorities over the expulsion of clandestine immigrants. This 
agreement provided that the Algerian authorities had to accept back all the persons 
who are held to be Algerian citizens by the French government and who are to be 
deported. Before this agreement was reached, the Algerian authorities had to 
recognise the persons concerned as their citizens before they could be expelled to 
Algeria55. This agreement obviously seeks to countercheck the clandestine migrants' 
tactic of destroying their identity papers, and thus to guard against a wave of 
immigrants. 
2.2. The FIS and the Muslim community in France 
Such events as the Rushdie affair or the Gulf War raised the issue of the 
impact that conflicts within the Arab/Muslim world and conflicts between the West 
and the Arab/Muslim world may have on the Arab/Muslim communities established in 
Europe. The attitudes of Arab/Muslim communities towards such conflicts are deemed 
essential because they may prove a constraint on foreign policy. In the case of the 
Algerian conflict and of a possible FIS victory, the French government was (and 
continues to be) concerned about this issue. If the Algerian (and Muslim) community 
in France proved anti-FIS, its attitude and eventual mobilisation could be problematic 
if the French government sought to maintain good relations with the new regime. On 
the other hand, if this community proved to be pro-FIS and if relations between Paris 
and Algiers turned out to be sour, its attitude could also impinge on foreign policy. In 
fact, such questions, while not completely irrelevant today, have lost most of their 
significance : in the main, the Algerian community and the Muslim community at large 
have shown no interest in getting actively involved in the Algerian political game. In 
addition, while there have been particular anxieties about a possible FIS support, 
these communities have expressed no special attraction for the FIS. 
55 Le Monde, 22 octobre 1994. However, Algeria is reported not to respect this secret agreement (Le 
Monde, 24 aoüt 1995). 
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The French political establishment has actually shown more anxiety about re- 
Islamisation, understood as a focus on the Muslim dimension of identity. It has been 
dreaded that, once in power by force or compromise, the FIS may encourage the 
process of re-Islamisation which appeared in France in the early 1990s, particularly 
among young French Muslims. The FIS's primary objective may not be re- 
Islamisation for its own sake but for political control of the Algerian (and Muslim) 
community living in France. However, by encouraging re-Islamisation to that end, it 
may contribute to transform what are, for the time being, only re-Islamisation signs 
into a trend. Re-Islamisation has been a source of concern for the French government 
primarily because it has been seen as threatening national cohesion and as 
undermining allegiance to the French state. Opposition to a FIS takeover partook of 
the French government's willingness to limit the effects of re-Islamisation, even 
though keeping the FIS from power would not ensure that re-Islamisation could not 
progress in France. The French government found its own responses to the foreseen 
threats engendered by re-Islamisation through the 1993 reform of the Citizenship 
Code and the government's 1994 tough decision on the wearing of headveils in public 
schools. 
2.2. I. Attitudes towards the FIS 
The Algerian conflict has generated concerns about its possible impact on the 
Algerian community and, more generally, on the Muslim population (about 4 million 
people56) living in France. It was feared that these communities might become 
involved in the conflict and mobilise against the French government's own policy. 
There were particular anxieties about a support for the FIS. In three years' time, 
however, these concerns have rapidly been undermined because there have been no 
sign of massive militant involvement in the Algerian conflict in the immigrant milieu, 
56 As a result of the 1978 Information and Freedom Law which prohibits the listing of religious 
denomination, there are no official data on the number of Muslims in France. Estimates vary between 
3 and 4 million people. Maghrebis and their children, by far the most numerous, account for about 3 
million. Others come primarily from Black Africa. Islam is France's second religion after 
Catholicism. See J. Cesari (1994b), pp. 21-22 and Haut conseil ä l'integration (1992), p. 40. 
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despite Algerian political parties' attempts to mobilise the Algerian community. In 
addition, attitudes towards the FIS have proved to be rather negative, thus lessening 
fears about FIS support. 
When Algeria got on the path of democratisation, the Algerian community in 
France became an electoral stake for Algerian political parties which attempted to 
arouse interest in their political ideas. The Algerian Brotherhood in France (FAF), 
while not having any organic link with the FIS, was created in February 1991 in 
France with the specific aim of inciting Algerian immigrants to vote for the FIS in the 
parliamentary elections. Similarly, all Algerian political parties or movements created 
an immigration branch in France and tried to mobilise their voters. On January 5, 
1992, responding to Alt Ahmed's call, 2 500 -3 000 FFS supporters in France 
demonstrated in Paris in echo of the January 2,1992 "demonstration for democracy" 
in Algiers which was meant to incite people to vote in the second round and, thus, to 
limit the FIS's success57. In some Parisian newsagents, Said Sadi's electoral 
platform, which had been prepared for the second round of the parliamentary 
elections, was on sale even well after the elections were cancelled58. 
After the coup, all Algerian political parties have continued to seek the support 
of the Algerian community in France. Associations having direct links with Algerian 
political movements were created in France. The association The Friends of Alger 
Republicain in France is, as its name indicates, a relay of Alger Republicain -- a 
communist, eradicator newspaper. This association publishes an information bulletin 
which accounts for the "victims of terrorism" in Algeria and denounces dialogue with 
the Islamists59. In May 1994, the association Algeria in our Hearts (L'Algerie au 
cceur) was created in the Parisian northern outskirts of Saint-Denis. It shows all the 
signs of being a direct expression of the MRP. One of its meetings (organised with 
other associations in Saint-Denis) actually took place the very day the MRP was 
demonstrating in Algiers : June 29,1994. In its first publication, L'Algerie au cceur 
57 Le Monde, 7 janvier 1992. 
58 As late as Winter 1992/93, I found by chance a copy of Sadi's Plate forme pour I'Algeirie 
re publicaine. Re inventer novembre (dated December 11,1992) displayed with daylies. 
59 Les Amis d'Alger Republicain en France, Bulletin n2. 
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legitimised the 1992 coup, recognised the Algerian Army as an institution acquired to 
democracy, denounced dialogue with the Islamists and enjoined the Algerian 
community to mobilise in solidarity with the Algerians who struggle for "a republican, 
modern, democratic and progressive Algeria"60. The FAF which has directed its 
militancy towards the Muslim community at large organised support for the outlawed 
party and its cause, essentially through propaganda. It set up information meetings 
across France and distributed a news bulletin at the entrance of mosques in major 
French cities. This -- by now outlawed -- bulletin brought news of the "jihad in 
Algeria", denounced the Algerian regime and foreign support to the "junta"61. 
This militant activism which is aimed at mobilising the Algerian (and Muslim) 
community in France and which has several objectives (housing networks for self- 
exiled Algerians, financial support, "informing" French public opinion, etc. ) does not 
seem to have had much success62. There have been some "information meetings" 
organised by associations supporting democracy and denouncing the risks involved in 
Islamism. Mention can be made, for instance, of the meeting set up by the Young 
Arabs of Lyon and its Suburb (Jeunes arabes de Lyon et sa banlieue, JALB) in April 
1994. This association, which has no direct connection with Algeria, directly 
concerns the Beurs. It has played a militant role for the integration of Beurs to French 
society along a secular path. JALB's advertising statement for its meeting read : "We 
have the duty and the responsibility to understand and to manifest an active and 
concrete solidarity for peace and democracy in Algeria. "63 However, there has been 
no massive participation in public demonstrations. In April 1994, the Federation of 
Algerian Associations (Collectif des associations algeriennes) called for 
demonstrations throughout Europe in order to "denounce violence in Algeria"64. But 
60 L'Algdrie au cceur (1994). 
61 On the FAF, see N. Beau (1995), pp. 280-7 and G. Kepel (1994b), pp. 291-7. The FAFs twin in 
Britain is the Algerian Community in Britain (ACB) which controls two other organisations, the 
Algerian Brothers in Britain and the Algerian Community Association. Their activities revolve 
around propaganda. Leaflets distributed, for instance, by the Algerian Brothers in Britain at the lecture 
of Dr. M. Bedayoun (a FIS-member, visiting lecturer in Leeds University) on "The Revival of Islam 
in Algeria" (November 4,1993, SOAS, London) are similar to those of the FAF. 
62 My conclusion is akin to L. Belaid's (1995, pp. 191-200). 
63 Advertising statement reproduced in Algerie Actualite (1487), 12-18 avril 1994. 
64 Algerie Actualite (1485), 1-7 avril 1994. 
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Le Monde did not report any demonstration on April 9,1994, suggesting that it was 
either cancelled or that it did not attract much crowd. The December 
1994 
demonstration of "solidarity with the people and the democrats of Algeria" was 
organised by French political parties, trade unions and associations, even though the 
immigration branches of Algerian political parties participated. It brought together 
only 10 000 people in Paris65. In Nantes (where the visa service for Algeria has been 
transferred since the August 1994 attack on French consulate agents in Algeria), the 
March 1995 demonstration which was intended to protest against France's restrictive 
immigration policy towards Algerians gathered only 3 000 people66. 
As regards the FAF, it has had to curb down its militant activities as it has 
been under police surveillance since the November 1993 police raid. Its president, 
Djaffar el Houari, was actually expelled to Burkino Faso in August 1994 and its 
spokesman, Moussa Kraouche, has been under judicial surveillance since November 
1993. The discovery of FIS and GIAs networks in France organising a concrete 
support for the armed struggle in Algeria, the involvement in such networks of 
Muslims who have been living in France for a long time and especially of young 
beurs67 has contributed to the view that the FAF and, more generally, Algerian 
Islamists have woven an influence network within the Muslim community in France. 
In fact, cases of direct involvement in the armed struggle can be counted on the 
fingers of few hands and, most importantly, the FAF and other Islamist networks 
65 Le Monde, 6 decembre 1994. 
66 Le Monde, 28 mars 1995. 
67 Three young French beurs of a Maghrebi origin were involved in a gun attack killing two Spanish 
tourists in a Marrakech hotel in late August 1994. Two were condemned to death by the Moroccan 
judiciary. A fourth beur was condemned to life imprisonment for having fired at the Moroccan police 
in a car pursuit (Le Monde, 29-30 janvier 1995). The police operation that followed in France against 
Algerians and Moroccans related to the beurs concerned led to evidences of a link with Islamist 
networks supporting armed struggle (See Le Monde, 3,6 and 7 septembre 1994). Another beur was 
arrested in November 1994 for participating in a network, which under the cover of the Educative 
Association of the Muslims of France, transferred arms to Algeria. This association was headed by 
two brothers benefiting from the dual French and Algerian citizenship (Le Monde, 10 novembre 
1994). In addition, two cases of French nationals of an Algerian origin involved in supporting the 
armed struggle in Algeria were reported in the press. One was arrested for illegal possession of arms 
and fake Algerian IDs to be provided to the Algerian armed groups and another was arrested with his 
Algerian father for illegal possession of arms and ammunitions (see arrest recapitulation in 
Liberation, 8 aoüt 1994). At the time of writing, no other case was signalled. A greater number of 
persons may be involved inasmuch as the press does not systematically report nationality. However, 
the involvement of beurs or of Algerian nationals having lived in France for a long time remains a 
minority phenomenon. 
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have not managed to convey a positive image of the FIS within the Muslim 
community in France. Indeed, a September 1994 poll showed that there was no major 
support for the FIS among Muslims living in France, although many (on average 
22%) showed a certain prudence by declining to express their views on the various 
questions about the FIS. The results of this survey indicated that only 9% of the 
Muslims living in France had a "very good or a quite good opinion of the FIS", 
whereas 69% had a "rather bad or very bad opinion of the FIS" (with 50% opting for 
the "very bad"). Among the youngest (16 to 24 years of age), 72% had a "rather bad 
or very bad opinion of the FIS". 70% in the whole Muslim population said they 
disagreed with the proposition that "the FIS represents the values of Islam as I see 
them" (8% agreed) ; 62% agreed with the idea that "the FIS threatens democracy" 
(15% disagreed) and 57% agreed with the proposition that "the FIS signifies 
regression" (21% disagreed). Lastly, whereas 9% in the whole Muslim population 
said to "personally wish the coming to power of the FIS in Algeria", 68% said they 
did not wish so. However, 48% thought that negotiations with the FIS were required 
while 28% disagreed with the principle of negotiations68. These results were similar 
to those of a December 1993 survey which polled beurs aged 18 to 30.63% showed a 
negative attitude towards "Islamic fundamentalism" (integrisme musulman) ; 20% an 
indifferent attitude and 14% a positive attitude69. 
Generally speaking, there is thus a hard core of about 10 to 15% Muslims in 
France supporting the religio-political ideas advocated by the FIS. Whether they all 
bring an effective support to the FIS is questionable. What can be said with some 
certainty is that this relatively low support for the FIS cannot translate into a powerful 
constraint for French foreign policy. The French political establishment has, 
nevertheless, remained concerned by the fact that, once in power, the FIS could seek 
to extend its influence among the Muslim community in France and encourage, to that 
68 Size of the sample : 535. See Le Monde, 13 octobre 1994. 
69 The exact result of this survey (500 persons polled) were : "I take part in Islamic 
fundamentalism" : 5% ; "I approve ... " : 9% ; "I am indifferent to ... " : 20% ; "I am worried about 
... 
" : 37% ; "I am hostile to ... 
" : 26% and "I have no opinion" : 3%. See Le Nouvel Observateur 
(1517), 2-8 d6cembre 1993. 
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effect, a re-Islamisation process. 
2.2.2. The FIS and re-Islamisation 
Before turning to the issue of the concerns generated by re-Islamisation, a 
word must be said on re-Islamisation itself and on the objectives that the FIS may be 
seeking in encouraging re-Islamisation. 
Re-Islamisarion 
Numerous surveys on the Muslim community in France conducted in the mid- 
1980s and early 1990s showed that, for the majority of young French so-called 
"sociological" Muslims, Islam does not play a significant role in their process of 
identity construction. The majority does not endorse nor does it reject Islam, which is 
seen primarily as a cultural and family heritage and, eventually, as an ethical code of 
behaviour70. Nevertheless, since the early 1990s, there are emerging signs of an 
identity assertion along an Islamic line -- re-Islamisation -- among the 16 to 24 years 
of age, even though re-Islamised young French Muslims remain a minority within 
their own age-class. Re-Islamisation is reflected in a more assiduous religious practice 
compared to their elders7t. Re-Islamisation also appears through a greater will to have 
Islam allotted a wider place in the public space : according to a 1994 survey, 34% of 
young Muslims in the 16-24 age-class were favourable to the call to the prayer by 
means of a loud-speaker, as opposed to 23% for the 25-34 age-class and 28% for the 
national average (Muslim population). Similarly, whereas 56% of young Muslims in 
the 16-24 age-class stood for minarets as visible as bell towers, percentages were 
70 For details on the role of Islam for primary-migrants and their children see J. Cesari (1994b) ; P. 
Balta (1991) ; A. Hargreaves & T. Stenhouse (1991) ; G. Kepel (1991) ; A. Krieger-Krynicki (1988) 
and R. Leveau (1988). 
71 In the main, religious practice by Muslims in France is low and declining. Only 27% declare 
themselves "practising Muslims" against 37% in 1989. Daily prayer is performed by 31% (41% in 
1989) and only 16% follow the Friday prayer. The Ramadan is respected by a majority (60%). 
Alcohol consumption (39%) is relatively high. The pilgrimage to Mecca was done only by 4% but 
55% (and 65% among the youngest) intend to go to Mecca at one stage or the other. See Le Monde, 
13 octobre 1994. 
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lower for the 25-34 age-class (37%) and the national average (45%). In addition, 
although the demand for a distinct Muslim status regulating civil life remained low 
among the youngest (21%), it was higher than among the 25-34 years of age (12%) 
and higher than the national average (17%)72. Re-Islamisation has also transpired 
through the headveil-at-school issue which has periodically turned up at the forefront 
of France's social debates since 1989. 
Re-Islamisation is a phenomenon that has its root in the conjunction of several 
factors : reaction to "anti-Muslimism" ; socioeconomic marginalisation ;a decline in 
the popularity of secular, anti-racist and "assimilationist" associations such as SOS- 
Racisme and France-Plus which have failed to deliver the goods for the many and 
which have subsequently been supplanted, notably, by Islamic associations. The 
Islamic associational fabric has developed in France since the 1980s as a result of both 
the settlement process of primary-migrants and a looser legislation on foreigners' 
associations. Through their social work structured around the neighbourhood 
mosque/prayer room, local Islamic associations have mainly been concerned with 
rebuilding communitarian bonds defined in religious terms73. 
Re-islamisation : the FIS's objectives 
It is doubtful that, once in power, the FIS would seek, as an end in itself, the 
re-Islamisation of the Algerian community or, indeed, of the Muslim community 
settled in France. Its primary goal is to build an Islamic state in Algeria, not 
elsewhere. However, re-Islamisation may be a by-product of other aims. Charles 
Pellegrini has thus argued that the enrolment of beurs by FIS networks in France 
would correspond to the long-run objective of creating pressure groups with the 
ultimate aim of constraining the French government's international and domestic 
policy. With a population under its influence, it is argued, the FIS in Algiers could 
remotely control the suburbs of French major cities from a state of social peace to one 
72 See Le Monde, 13 octobre 1994. 
73 J. Cesari (1994/95), pp. 184-6 and G. Kepel (1994b), pp. 210-1. 
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of unrest and try to influence the course of France's policy through this means74. 
Perhaps more realistically, in attempting to control the Algerian (and Muslim) 
community in France by encouraging the process towards "Islamic assertion", the FIS 
could just be reproducing the FLN regime's past strategy75. In order to protect the 
Algerian community in France from unwanted political influences, the FLN regime, 
indeed, sought to "officer" this community through secular networks (Amicale des 
algeriens en Europe) and religious ones (Paris Mosque76). Particularly if FIS 
opponents were to find refuge in France, it is likely that a FIS regime would strive to 
prevent competing political formations from holding sway over the Algerian and 
Muslim community. In order to curb their influence, the FIS may encourage re- 
Islamisation and bring its support to Islamic associations operating in immigrant 
circles in France. 
Re-Islamisation : French concerns 
The prospect of re-Islamisation has been a source of concerns for the French 
government essentially because it has been perceived as a threat to national cohesion 
and to allegiance to the French state. These concerns have been articulated around two 
issues : the foreign influence that may be exercised on "born again Muslims" and the 
demand for a minority status possibly deriving from re-Islamisation. 
Regarding the first issue, it has been feared that once brought back on the path 
of God, young French Muslims may be permeable to Islamism whereas the latter 
asserts itself against Western political culture. That some French citizens may not 
74 C. Pellegrini (1992), pp. 105-6. 
75 This was a concern expressed by Georges Morin, interview, June 29,1994. 
76 The Paris Mosque was founded in 1926 under the sponsorship of the French Third Republic. 
Stemming from an Algerian association, the Paris Mosque has always had an unclear status. In 1982, 
the effective control of the Mosque shifted from Paris to Algiers. The Paris Mosque has since then 
become an "ancillary embassy" to channel official religious policy to Algerian immigrants. This 
became overt with the appointment of the Mosque's rector, Tijani Haddam, to the IISC in 1992. 
Haddam was eventually forced to resign. Since the early the 1980s, the Paris Mosque has sought to 
be recognised by the Algerian immigrants and the Harkis as their natural religious representative in 
France. Since the mid-1980s, it has also attempted to impose its authority over various federations of 
Islamic associations in order to be recognised as the sole representative of the Muslim community in 
France. Since the Right came into office, the French authorities have lent their support to the Paris 
Mosque's federating initiatives. On the Paris Mosque see e. g. A. Boyer (1992). 
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abide by the ideologico-political substratum of French society is viewed as threatening 
national cohesion as well as national security : "born again Muslims" may feel they 
primarily belong to the Islamic community rather than to the French one. Such a sense 
of belonging could raise questions about their allegiance to the French state. In this 
regard, the 1993 reform of the Nationality Code restricting the automatic acquisition 
of the French nationality for foreigners born in France is not innocent. By requiring 
foreigners who were born in France-and who have been living there all their lives to 
explicitly request French citizenship, the state is implicitly asking an oath of loyalty 
and allegiance. 
Second, it has been feared that re-Islamisation may be accompanied by 
demands for the recognition of Muslims in France as a minority which should be 
granted specific rights77. As opposed to Britain where immigration has been 
structured in terms of community-based relations, the French "republican model" of 
immigrant absorption (inspired by the very process through which the French Nation 
was built after the Revolution) has traditionally been based on the negation of 
minorities. Instead, it has promoted individual citizenship as a means of integration to 
French society78. The assertion of a collective identity, eventually leading to claims 
for the recognition of a minority status, thus challenges the very system through 
which national integration has always been performed. It naturally partakes of the 
debate on the "crisis of national identity" and on the "crisis of the republican model" 
which has taken place in France in the last few years79. Public confidence in the 
capacity of the republican model to culturally integrate foreigners and their children 
and, thus, to maintain social cohesion is declining. As a result, many French people 
(84%) think that "cohabitation" between the French of "old stock" and foreigners (and 
their French children) will be tensed in the future80 -- which is another reason for the 
government to be wary of re-Islamisation. 
77 G. Kepel (1994b, p. 272) thus maintains that the ultimate goal of the federating Union of Islamic 
Organisations of France is to obtain a minority status for Muslims in France. 
78 On the French and British models of integration see P. Weil & J. Crowley (1994). 
79 For details, see J. Cesari (1994b), pp. 257-65 and D. Schnapper (1994), pp. 132-5. 80 1994 Report of the Consultative Commission for Human Rights, reported in Le Monde, 22 mars 1995. 
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The view that re-Islamisation is a threat to national cohesion both because it 
may engender obedience to a foreign ideology and question the national integration 
model was particularly apparent in the hijeb affair. The wearing of headveils at school 
by some Muslim girls81 was understood as an assault on the secular character of the 
French state, organised by foreign Islamists waging an "insidious jihad"82 against 
France. Philosopher Andre Glucksmann thus depicted the headscarf as a "terrorist 
sign by itself"83. As concerns about the establishment of FIS networks in France 
grew, Francois Bayrou, Balladur's education minister, made an about-face. In 
October 1993, Bayrou supported the 1989 ruling of the Constitutional Council which, 
in the wake of the first hijeb affair, had allowed the wearing of headveils in public 
schools on the ground that the wearing of religious signs by individuals was not in 
contradiction with state secularism. A year later, Bayrou recommended the exclusion 
of veiled pupils from public schools on two main grounds. First, because the headveil 
was an "ostentatious religious sign", implying that, in Bayrou's view, there is 
something wrong in publicly showing that one is a Muslim. This stand can be 
understood only if the assertion of one's "Muslimness" is equated with support to a 
religio-political ideology. And, indeed, Bayrou maintained that "One has to be blind 
not to see the fundamentalist movements behind the young girls who wear [the 
headveil]"84. Second, Bayrou justified banning headveils in schools on the ground 
that "the choice of the Republic is not to let France evolve into separate 
communities"85. He thus cut short the debate on whether the republican model, by 
denying the social reality of minorities, proved obsolete86. 
As a concluding note, it may be worth recalling that the eventuality of a FIS 
takeover (by force or compromise) in Algeria was perceived as generating significant 
problems for France. In particular, it was thought that a FIS regime would encourage 
81 According to the Education Ministry, 2 000 girls were concerned at the beginning of the 1994 
school year (Le Monde, 26 novembre 1994). 
82 Some MPs portrayed the wearing of headscarves in these terms, in Le Monde, 28 octobre 1993. 83 In Le Point (1163), 30 d&cembre 1994. 
84 Quoted in Le Monde, 22 novembre 1994. 
85 Quoted in Le Monde, 11-12 septembre 1994. 
86 See Bayrou's October 1993 circular (in Le Monde, 28 octobre 1993) and September 1994 circular 
(in Le Monde, 21 septembre 1994). 
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re-Islamisation within the Muslim community living in France whereas re-Islamisation 
raised issues about existing societal arrangements. That the re-Islamisation process 
might be encouraged from outside the national realm was also thought to be wholly 
unacceptable because of the allegiance issue to which it gave rise. The prospect of a 
massive influx of Algerian refugees sparked off by a FIS takeover was deemed to 
endanger France's "social and political equilibrium" while at the same time possibly 
undermining political relations with the new regime in Algiers. In addition, the 
presence in France of political opponents to a FIS regime raised concerns about 
national security. In the following section, I shall focus on such concerns although 
from a different angle. 
3. National security : the terrorist issue 
One of the issues raised by the Algerian conflict and the potential arrival to 
power of the FIS dealt with terrorism. As suggested in section 2.1.1. above, although 
the French political establishment expressed no overt concern about it, it seems quite 
plausible that it was worried about the potential hunt for political opponents that a FIS 
regime might undertake on French soil. Such state-terrorism would be a blow to 
French national security inasmuch as the French state is supposed to ensure physical 
protection to the persons residing within its borders. In this section, I shall deal with 
another type of threat to national security : the undertaking of terrorist acts against the 
French state. 
It is not wholly certain that, in opposing a FIS takeover and then a 
compromise with the FIS, the Balladur government was primarily motivated by the 
fear that, once in power, the FIS may resort to terrorism against France. To seriously 
advance such a claim, one would need to know what kind of policies the French 
government thought it would implement if the FIS came to power. Indeed, it is very 
unlikely that a FIS regime would undertake terrorist actions against the French state 
without any ground for retaliation. Nevertheless, it can quite logically be argued that 
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the ambiguous attitude of FIS leaders in exile, notably as regards the killings of 
French nationals in Algeria, and the AIS's threats against France (in addition to the 
GIAs'), reinforced the negative perceptions that the French political establishment had 
about the FIS. In a context where the government feared terrorist attacks in France by 
Algerian Islamist armed groups, the fact that the FIS was understood to back violence 
against France logically led to the view that France would be better off without 
Islamists in government in Algiers. 
3.1. Threats against France 
The support lent by the Balladur government to the Algerian regime quite 
rapidly backfired partly because the strategy of the Algerian Islamist armed groups 
(particularly of the GIAs) had shifted in Spring 1993 from aiming at the security 
forces to also aiming at civilians who were suspected of active or passive 
collaboration with the Algerian authorities. French nationals (and, more generally, 
foreigners) thus became the target of murderous attacks in Algeria as of September 
1993 on the ground that they were "Christian crusaders" or that they brought a 
support to the regime by working for state companies87. France's rounding-up of 
Islamist activists in France, as well as the killing of the four hijackers of the Air 
France Airbus -- the hijack being itself a terrorist act -- by the French gendarmerie elite 
unit triggered threats of retaliation on the part of the GIAs, but also of the AIS, the 
FIS's armed-wing. Thus, after the August 1994 round-up of twenty-six Islamist 
militants in France who were held in Folembray and expelled to Burkina Faso or put 
under house arrest, the AIS and the GIAs issued menacing communiques. Demanding 
freedom for the "internees of Folembray", the AIS declared that "The French 
government must renounce its aggressive policy or it will endorse the responsibility of 
what the mujahidins of the Islamic Salvation Army will inflict on it. "88 The national 
87 From September 1993 to (early) September 1995,93 foreigners (out of whom 32 were French) 
were killed in Algeria (Le Monde, 5 septembre 1995). 
88 Quoted in Le Monde, 9 aoüt 1994. 
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structure of the GlAs also threatened to "violently hit French interests in Algeria"89. 
After the December 1994 hijack, the AIS stated that "war against France [was] legal" 
and that it would "return a hit for a hit" in order to "revenge the Faithful"90. As to the 
national structure of the GlAs, it was reported to have sent ultimatums to the French, 
German, British and American governments enjoining them to evacuate their nationals 
and to break off diplomatic relations with Algiers9l. 
None of these communiques clearly mentioned the extension of terrorist 
actions against France to its own territory or, when they did, they were later denied. 
Indeed, after the AIS's threat of retaliation about the Folembray affair, Abdelbaki 
Sahraoui maintained that terrorist attacks on French soil were not part of the AIS's 
objectives92. Similarly, after the hijack, while a group claiming to belong to the AIS 
warned that "The AIS's mujahidins [were] able to hit France in its own house"93, the 
AIS as well as the FIS denied that jihad was to be extended to the French territory and 
denounced this communique as counter-propaganda94. The Balladur government 
was, nevertheless, extremely worried about the very possibility that violent acts might 
be carried out on French soil. 
3.2. From fearing terrorist attacks in France ... 
The Balladur government's fear that the French territory might become a target 
for terrorism was perceptible when it crackdowned on the Islamist nebula in France. 
In chapter two, I argued that such crackdowns were part and parcel of the Balladur 
government's political support to Algiers95. They allowed the government to curb the 
FAF's political militancy as well as to break up networks which organised concrete 
support for the AIS and the GIAs in Algeria. But they also aimed at minimising the 
risk of terrorist attacks in France : once a network has been built, its original aim can, 
89 Quoted in Le Monde, 13 aoüt 1994. 
90 Quoted in Le Monde, 1-2 janvier 1995. 
91 See Le Monde, 5 and 6janvier 1995. 
92 See footnote 44. 
93 Quoted in France-Soir, 31 decembre 1994. 
94 Le Monde, 4 and 7 janvier 1995. 
95 See chapter two, section 2.1.3. 
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in principle, always been altered. Pasqua was perfectly clear on this point when he 
said . 
"I do not believe that there is a risk of a wave of attacks in France, but one can never exclude 
it. " "One day or the other, terrorism can perfectly be carried out in our country. What do I 
have to do : to wait for bombs to blow up in our country and for people to be assassinated 
here, or to intervene before in order to dismantle networks ? That [the second option] is what 
I am doing. +96 
In practice, none of the police raids supervised by Pasqua brought evidence of 
planned terrorist actions in France (or they were not revealed to the public). From 
press reports, the results of the round-ups and the various arrests tended to 
demonstrate two things. First, that the FAF has never really been involved in anything 
else than political militancy. Its propaganda has certainly revealed itself strongly anti- 
French, but, to all appearances, it has not been implicated in concretely supporting the 
armed struggle in Algeria. Following Sahraoui's stance, Kraouche condemned the 
undertaking of illegal actions in France and claimed that the FAF was "against the 
killing of innocents and foreigners in Algeria. "97 That the FAF has not been a support 
network for guerrilla action in Algeria seems to be confirmed by the fact that, in the 
wake of Sahraoui's murder, Kraouche was offered police protection by the French 
authorities98. Second, the various police operations showed that, as Algerian Islamist 
activists fled their country for France, they built support networks to help guerrilla 
action in Algeria. The activities of such support networks have revolved around legal 
or illegal fund-raising, arms, explosives and equipment transfers to Algeria, provision 
of fake ID papers to the guerrillas, and infiltration/exfiltration of "mujahidins". Some 
of these networks operate under the cover of Islamic associations or of firms99. They 
may co-ordinate action. However, there does not appear to be a centralising unit 
96 Respectively quoted in Le Monde, 13 aoüt 1993 and 2 septembre 1994. 
97 Interview in Le Figaro, 12 avril 1994. 
98 Le Monde, 13-14 aoüt 1995. 
99 All these activities can be judged from press reports on the round-up of November 8,1994 which 
led to the imprisonment of 77 Islamists. See Le Monde, 9,10 and 15 novembre 1994. The other 
sweeps of Islamist activists led under Balladur occurred on November 9,1993 ; August 6-18,1994 
and September 1,1994. 
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controlling the activities of these various networks. 
Even though none of the police raids indicated that the objective of such 
networks had shifted from organising support to the armed struggle in Algeria to 
carrying out terrorist attacks in France in order to bring Paris to revise its co-operation 
policy with Algiers, the Balladur government was worried about this possibility. In 
fact, under the Chirac Administration, terrorist attacks occurred. I shall return to this 
issue in the conclusion to this thesis. Let us just say that these Summer 1995 attacks 
seem to have an Algerian link but that, at this stage, it is still dubious whether they 
were performed by "sleeper" terrorist networks operating for the account of extremist 
Islamists or by the Algerian Military Security or, indeed, by both. 
3.3. ... to opposing the FIS 
As underlined in the introduction to this section, it is not sure that in opposing 
a FIS takeover the French government was motivated by the vision that, once in 
power, the FIS might resort to state-sponsored terrorism against France, thus turning 
Algeria into a threatening "terrorist state". Actually, despite a strong concern about 
"Islamic terrorism", the idea that a FIS regime may turn to terrorism as a means to 
bring pressure to bear on its external environment never transpired in public 
interviews nor in my discussions with members of the political establishment or of the 
Administration. Of course, this silence does not mean that such a possibility never 
crossed policy-makers' minds. It rather shows that the hypothesis, while perhaps in 
the background, was not given prime importance. This may be explained by the fact 
that, as of the Summer of 1993, Paris believed that if the FIS came into office this 
would be by compromise, not by toppling the regime. 
Nevertheless, the opposition of the Balladur government to a FIS takeover and 
to a compromise with the FIS can be explained by the fact that the FIS's ambiguous 
relationship with violence added to the French political establishment's negative 
perceptions of this religio-political party. As mentioned in chapter two100, FIS leaders 
100 See below, section 1.1.2., "All roads, it is said, lead to Rome". 
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in exile had an equivocal attitude towards the violent course of action adopted by the 
armed groups (partly as a means to maintain a certain control over violence). Until the 
February 1994 FIS declaration which made a distinction between the "armed struggle" 
and "terrorism", not all FIS leaders in exile did systematically and clearly condemn 
violence, notably when it was perpetrated against foreigners. Even after this 
declaration, while some terrorist attacks were strongly condemned, others were 
condemned but at the same time justified. For instance, reacting to the killing of the 
five French consulate agents in early August 1994, Kebir condemned the act but 
added that "he who sows the wind shall reap the whirlwind"101. These justifications 
were understood in Paris as a clear FIS support to violence against France. The 
reprisal threats of the FIS's military wing reinforced this view. Inasmuch as there 
were strong concerns about the potential transformation of AIS and GIAs support 
networks into cells undertaking terrorist action, no longer from, but against France, 
the view that the FIS was backing violent acts against France (even though it was not 
necessarily involved in them) was certainly a contributing factor to the Balladur 
government's opposition to the FIS, at least until September 1994. 
4. Economic relations : limited risks 
In general, members of the French political establishment expressed no 
anxiety about the eventuality of a questioning of the Franco-Algerian economic 
relationship by a FIS regime. As of Summer 1993, it was thought that only 
compromise could lead the FIS to power and that, as part of a coalition government, 
the FIS would not bring Algeria's economic relationship with France under review. 
As a result, economic concerns cannot explain the French government's opposition to 
a re-integration of the FIS into the political process. To a certain extent, it was also 
believed that, even if the FIS seized power by force, it would not fundamentally 
question economic relations because, Algeria being more dependent on France than 
101 Quoted in Le Monde, 6 aoüt 1994. 
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France on Algeria, doing so would cause more damage to the Algerian economy than 
to the French one. In the hypothesis where a FIS revolutionary regime would despise 
economic realities, a questioning of the economic relationship would not bring about a 
collapse of the French economy -- France having much less important economic 
interests in Algeria than is usually thought. However, a diversification of trade away 
from France, a questioning of French investments and perhaps a non-reimbursement 
of the debt owed to France would have a cost. This would all the more be true if 
radical Islamist regimes emerged in Morocco or Tunisia and endeavoured to do the 
same. It may thus be argued that, up to the point it was feared that the FIS might take 
office through warfare, the impossibility to predict exactly how a FIS revolutionary 
regime might behave and the fear of cascading dominoes contributed to the French 
government's opposition to the FIS in the sense that, in face of a potential risk, it was 
concluded that the status quo would be better than the FIS. 
To demonstrate that economic concerns did not play a crucial role in the 
French government's opposition to the FIS -- or only as a contributing factor -- I 
examine, first of all, the arguments brought forward by members of the French 
political establishment for believing that a FIS regime would not question economic 
relations with France. I then give credence to their viewpoint by proceeding to an 
analysis of the Franco-Algerian economic relationship. Three aspects of this 
relationship are reviewed : trade, investments and finance. 
4.1. No foreseen questioning of the economic relationship 
Members of the French political establishment have argued that it was 
unrealistic to think that the FIS would resort to a ceasing of its economic relationship 
with France. Their argument was based on two main considerations. Firstly, at the 
very beginning of the 1990s, FIS leaders gave assurances that France's economic 
interests in Algeria would not stand to suffer from a coming of the FIS to 
government102. Later, spokesmen for the FIS warned that, once in power, the FIS 
102 Interview with Georges Morin, June 29,1994. 
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would review international agreements signed since 1992, such as import contracts, 
oil exploration deals and the IMF agreement103. Yet, at the same time, they argued 
that an Islamist government would be attached to good-neighbourliness and open to 
foreign co-operation. Anwar Haddam also maintained that "Whether one wants it or 
not, the French and Algerian people will continue to have relations in the 
future (... ). " 104 These contradictory statements were part of the FIS's carrot and 
stick strategy, aimed at bringing the international community to cease its support to the 
Algerian regime. The French political establishment was apparently quite aware of 
that. It remained convinced that a FIS regime would not implement drastic measures 
in the realm of its economic relations with France because -- and this is the second 
consideration -- Algeria's economy is more dependent on that of France than vice- 
versa. 
Trade relations are significantly asymmetric and Algeria needs foreign capital 
in the form of both foreign direct investments and economic aid. Consequently, 
whichever way the FIS came to power, it was very unlikely that it would resort to 
"punitive" acts which would cause damage to the Algerian economy more than to the 
French. It was reckoned that the FIS was more likely to take measures in the symbolic 
field of cultural relations105 (total Arabisation, removal from the political vocabulary 
of Western political wording, etc... ) since one of its central claims is to replace 
Western political culture by the indigenous Muslim one in order to organise society, 
economy and political power. 
By examining trade relations, investments and the debt, it appears that, 
indeed, it would not be in the interest of a FIS regime to question economic relations 
with France. In addition, the French economy would not be greatly disturbed by such 
an event. 
103 See Anwar Haddam's interview with Liberation, 6 mai 1994 and Rabah KMbir's with The 
Financial Times, August 20-21,1994. 
104 Interview with Al Hayat reproduced in Le Courrier international (198), 18-24 aoüt 1994. 105 Interview with Jean Audibert. June 7,1995. 
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4.1. Trade relations 
The analysis of trade flows between France and Algeria shows that, in the 
main, Algeria is more dependent on its exports to France than France is on its exports 
to Algeria. It also shows that, as regards its consumption, France is not dependent on 
Algerian supplies, even in the sensitive case of natural gas. As a result, the Algerian 
economy would stand to suffer most from a deterioration of trade. 
4.1.1. Asymmetry and decline 
On top of being consistently asymmetrical since Independence, as shown in 
table 4, the Franco-Algerian trade relationship also shows another striking feature : it 
has lost much of its importance since 1962, although only relatively. Indeed, although 
France's share in Algeria's trade activities has decreased, it remains significant. With 
a market share of 24.2% in 1992, France was Algeria's prime supplier before Italy 
(14.4%) and the USA (11.5%). France has lost its rank of prime client to the benefit 
of Italy since 1989. But it still bought 18.3% of Algeria's exports in 1992, thus 
ranking second behind Italy (21.7%) and before the USA (13.9%)106. In parallel, 
although Algeria has been accounting for merely about 1% of France's trade since the 
latter part of the 1980s, it was France's prime trade partner in the developing world 
for many years. Today, it remains France's first client in the developing world. It has, 
however, lost its prime supplier rank since 1992. Morocco took on the title, 
confirming the long-run trend of redistribution of France's trade within the Maghreb 
to the benefit of Morocco and Tunisia (see table 5). 
106 UN (1994), volume I, p. 8. 
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Table 4: Algeria's share in France's world imports and exports and France's 
share in Algeria's world imports and exports, 1960-92 
%v in 
1960 1970 1980 1990 1992 
France 
Imports from Algeria 8.0 3.4 1.3 0.8 0.8 
Exports to Algeria 16.0 2.9 2.4 1.3 1.0 
Algeria 
Imports from France 83.0 42.0 23.2 23.1 24.2 
Exports to France 92.0 53.5 13.4 17.3 18.3 
Source: I. Brandell (1981), p. 168 and UN, International trade 
Statistics Yearbook. 
French exports to and imports from Algeria must be reviewed in greater details 
in order to demonstrate that if a FIS regime attempted to divert its trade flows away 
from France this would certainly incur a cost but not cause great damage to the French 
economy. 
4.1.2. French exports to Algeria 
Nation-wide, French exports to Algeria, although not negligible, are not 
particularly important (table 5). They have been cut by half since the 1986 oil 
countershock and since Algeria went into financial troubles. The downwards trend 
was reversed in 1993 and, particularly in 1994, as a result of France's continued 
gran g of tied commercial credits to Algeria. Yet, current levels do not compare with 
that of the mid-1980s. 
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Despite its relatively low imports from France, Algeria remains an interesting 
export market for numerous French service companies, constructors, manufacturers 
and, increasingly, agribusinesses107. Small and medium enterprises located 
in 
Southern France and for which Algeria is a significant outlet, would be quite seriously 
hit by a diverting of Algeria's import flows. Nevertheless, and however troublesome 
it would be, a cut in Algerian imports from France or a diversification of suppliers 
would not generate a catastrophe for the French economy as a whole. 
While a FIS regime could question the place of France as prime supplier, it 
could not abruptly put an end to some of its imports from France. It is the case, 
notably, of spare parts for "ready for use" imported factories or French vehicles 
which prevail on the Algerian market. In addition, by challenging France's prime 
supplier status, Algeria would come in for retaliation : France could decide to buy 
less. Indeed, as shown below, France is not dependent on its imports from Algeria 
for its consumption -- natural gas being a sensitive case but not one of complete 
dependence. 
4.1.3. French imports from Algeria 
France imports almost exclusively hydrocarbons. In 1994, hydrocarbons 
accounted for 96.1% of French imports from Algeria. France primarily buys natural 
gas (56.3% of French imports of Algerian hydrocarbons). Refined petroleum 
products come second (26.2%) and oil last (17.5%)108. Hydrocarbon exports are 
central to the Algerian economy : they provide 95% of foreign exchange revenues, 
with gas exports accounting for about a third, and crude oil and refined products for 
less than a quarter each (the balance being made of condensates and liquefied 
107 In 1992,2 745 French firms exported to Algeria (Chambre de commerce et d'industrie de Paris 
(1993), p. 68). French exports of agricultural products (mainly cereals and dairy products) have 
increased significantly since the latter part of the 1980s as a consequence of Algeria's growing food- 
dependency. Whereas in the early 1980s French exports of agricultural products accounted for less 
than a tenth of French total exports to Algeria, they now represent almost a quarter. The remaining 
three quarters consist almost entirely of finished manufactured products (capital goods, vehicles, spare 
parts and consumer goods). See DREE (1995), p. 163. 
108 Ibid. 
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petroleum gas exports)109. 
Oil trade 
Oil trade used to constitute the crux of the Franco-Algerian relationship back in 
the 1960s. The 1971 nationalisation of the French oil companies operating in Algeria 
led to a clear disengagement from the Algerian market throughout the 1970s. In the 
1980s and 1990s, oil imports from Algeria have continued to decrease (see table 6). 
Two reasons for this decrease can be put forward. One is related to France's energy 
policy which has sought to substitute oil by nuclear energy, leading to reduced world 
oil importst10. The other is directly related to Algeria whose potential as a crude oil 
exporter is limiteds t 1. Algeria has relatively limited reserves of oil (9.2 billion 
barrels112). As domestic consumption of oil rises, oil exports represent a declining 
share of outputs 13 and, at the beginning of the next century, Algeria is expected to use 
most of its oil for domestic purposes114. 
French imports of Algerian crude oil concern very little quantities. In 1993, 
they amounted to 746 000 metric tons (table 6), which was less than France's 
domestic productiont15. Imports of Algerian crude oil represent a low share of 
France's world crude oil imports : 1% in 1993, placing Algeria as fourteenth supplier 
(table 6). France imports more than 95% of its total supply of crude oil116. As a 
consequence, the fact that imports from Algeria represent a low share of French total 
imports implies that the Algerian crude oil covers a low share of French consumption. 
France is, thus, not dependent on Algeria for its supplies of crude oil. 
109 Maison Lazard et Compagnie et. al. (1993), p. 22. 
110 Whereas the share of oil in total primary energy supply decreased from 61.8% to 39.3% between 
1979 and 1992, that of nuclear power rose from 5.5% to 38.1% (lEA (1994a), p. 239). 
111 This point was emphasised by J. P. Brevost (Total), interview on December 9,1993. 
112 OPEC (1994), p. 10. 
113 Whereas in 1973 90.5% of crude oil was exported, this share dropped to 41.2% in 1993 (My 
calculations from ibid., p. 14 and 24). 
114 A. lliri the (1989), p. 109. 
115 IEA (1994b), p. 270. 
116 Ibid., p. 269. 
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As regards Algeria, a ceasing in its crude oil exports to France may not have 
dramatic consequences on its foreign exchange receipts considering the small volume 
involved. Algeria could easily find alternative clients on the now generalised spot 
market. Yet, inasmuch as an end to exports to France would not provoke problems 
for the French economy, one does not see why an Algerian government would take 
the trouble of shifting its crude oil exports away from France. 
Refined petroleum products 
Just as for oil, France is not dependent on its Algerian supplies of refined 
petroleum products. In the 1970s, French imports of Algerian refined products were 
low both because of Algeria's low offer and because France had its own refining 
industry. The late 1970s deregulation, and notably the waiving of the obligation for 
French oil companies to refine oil in a proportion of 50% in France, led to increased 
imports throughout the world. In 1980 French world imports of refined products 
were twice as high as in 1970117. In 1993 they were about double their 1980 level, 
covering a quarter of French consumption (see tables 7 and 8). 
Algeria has not wholly benefited from this growth. After significantly 
increasing in the early 1980s, French imports of Algerian refined products stabilised 
thereafter, varying between 1.2 millions of metric tons (Mmt) and 2.4 Mmt. As 
France's world imports have grown faster than Algerian supplies, Algeria has lost its 
rank of second supplier since 1983 (with the exception of 1992), and has been 
relegated to the fourth, fifth or sixth place. Since 1986 (except 1992), France's 
imports from Algeria have accounted for less than 7% of its world refined products 
imports. Ever since 1980, they have never covered more than 3% of France's 
consumption of refined products. 
117 IEA (1987), volume I, p. 397. 
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With imports accounting for 15.3% of Algeria's exports of refined products in 
1993, France was Algeria's fourth client after the USA (25.8%), the Netherlands 
(18.2%) and Italy (15.7%)118. By ceasing its exports to France, Algeria would thus 
hurt itself more than it would hurt France. 
Natural gas 
France has been importing natural gas (only in a liquefied form) from Algeria 
since the 1960s. Algeria was its first foreign supplier. As other providers, it has 
benefited from the growth in French demand which has resulted from a rising 
consumption and a dismal domestic output119. Today, France's imports of Algerian 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) are regulated by four contracts (table 9) which provide for 
imports amounting to 10.15 billions of cubic meters (Bcm) per year at least until 
2002. 
Table 9: Gaz de France's LNG contracts with Sonatrach 
Contracts Yearly volume 
Ban 
Validity period Renewal Ending date Total yearly volum 
Ban 
1 0.50 1962-1987 December 1991 2002 0.50 
2 3.50 1971-1987 December 1991 2013 4.00 
3 5.15 1982-2002 December 1991 2013 9.15 
4 1.00 1991-2002 - 2002 10.15 
Source : GDF (1990) and Le Monde, 27 decembre 1991. 
Although French LNG imports from Algeria have, in effect, been lower than 
the contracted volumes (table 10), they have been significant in relation to both 
France's world imports and its consumption of natural gas. Since 1982, imports of 
Algerian gas have accounted for about 30% of France's total imports, placing Algeria 
118 My calculations from OPEC (1994), p. 88. 
119 France's natural gas consumption tripled between the early 1970s and the early 1990s (lEA 
(1994b), p. 91). France's domestic output accounts for only 10% of its total natural gas supplies 
(GDF (1994a) p. 14) and the biggest gas field is expected to run dry in the first decade of the next 
century. 
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as prime or second furnisher after the Netherlands or Russia. Since then, they have 
also covered between a quarter and a third of French consumption (table 11). This 
high rate suggests a certain dependence on Algeria's supplies because of the rigidities 
inherent in natural gas trade. 
Despite an emerging spot market, natural gas trade is mostly regulated by 
long-term bilateral contracts (10 to 25 years) which allow both parties to plan the 
particularly heavy investments required to explore, produce, process, transport and 
store natural gas and to wait until they are paid off. If suppliers can always be 
switched, this is an experience that any purchaser would like to avoid. New supplies, 
indeed, cannot be obtained at short notice. Because of the difficulties in storing gas 
and because of the long-term contracts tying suppliers to their clients, producers do 
not hold huge reserves of gas immediately available for sale. In addition, diverting 
import flows may involve new investments in infrastructures. While incurring a loss 
over former investments, this implies new costs and a time-lag. For the gas producer, 
diverting its export flows may also prove difficult : new clients must be found and 
supplying them may require new investments. 
Since the early 1990s, the French gas utility's concerns over the security of 
foreign natural gas supplies have been growing because 60% of its imports come 
from two specific countries -- Russia and Algeria -- which both represent a risk, 
although of a different nature. Since the creation of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States in 1991, the issue of the security of Russian supplies is no longer 
related to the context of the Cold War, but linked to the fact that gas pipelines cross 
several states before reaching Western Europe. The risk is that gas supplies to 
Western Europe may be disturbed by, or used as a pressure tool in, a quarrel between 
two or more neighbouring states. In so far as Algeria is concerned, the issue of the 
security of supplies is of a wholly different nature since imported LNG arrives by 
tankers directly to the French gas terminals. 
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Actually, the late 1950s decision to import gas in a liquefied, rather than in a 
gasified, form was taken both for technical and security reasons120. The option of a 
submarine pipeline linking France to Algeria was excluded because of the distance and 
depth of the Mediterranean sea. Two other possible routes had, however, been 
identified : either a pipeline crossing Tunisia, landing on Sicily via the Tunis Canal, 
and then crossing Italy, or a pipeline crossing Morocco and linked to Spain via the 
Straits of Gilbratar. Both these options were waived not only because of the 
difficulties in crossing the Alps or the Pyrenees, but also because, at the time, 
Morocco and Tunisia supported Algeria in its War of Liberation121. 
Today, the potential risks concerning the security of Algerian supplies derive 
primarily from the uncertainties as to the future political evolution of the country. The 
context of guerrilla warfare has, apparently, not affected the regularity of LNG 
supplies. France's imports of Algerian natural gas decreased by 10% in 1994, but this 
was an expected development resulting from the revamping of the Skikda liquefaction 
facility122 -- a modernising operation to be completed in 1996 and in which GDF is 
actually taking part123. The major factors linked to the security situation that could 
have led to irregular supplies did not occur. When the armed rebellion started more 
than three years ago, it was thought that Islamist armed groups may resort to sabotage 
operations against hydrocarbon infrastructures in order to strike at the regime's export 
earnings. There have been reports in the Algerian press of a frustrated venture of this 
type against the iron and steel complex of Annaba124. The GIA also claimed 
responsibility for the destruction by fire of some equipment of an oil drilling base125. 
Up to the time of writing, however, no sabotage operations against gas infrastructures 
120 Interview with Sadek Boussena, July 26,1993. 
121, These two projects have, nevertheless, materialised. The TransMediterranean pipeline, mainly 
supplying Italy, has been in operation since 1981. By 1996, this revamped pipeline should have a 
capacity of 24 Bcm and supply Eastern Europe (Le Monde, 16 mai 1995). The Euro-Maghreb 
pipeline is now under construction and should be operative in 1996. For the time being, the Euro- 
Maghreb pipeline is meant only for Spain (6 Bcm) and Portugal (2.5 Bcm), with Morocco taking 1 
Bcm and Algeria 0.6 Bcm. But, in a later stage, the capacity of the pipeline is to be doubled in order 
to supply other European countries (Le Monde, 4 mai 1991). 
122 Le Monde, 9 fevrier 1995. 
123 GDF (1994a), p. 14. 
124 Liberte, 14 avril 1994. 
125 Le Monde, 25 octobre 1994. 
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have taken place. This means either that these infrastructures are so protected that they 
are beyond reach or that their sabotage is not an essential vector of the Islamist armed 
groups' strategy. The regularity of LNG supplies could also have been affected by 
strikes. Algerian oil and gas workers went on strike several times, but not long 
enough to unsettle export flows126. Whereas Algerian workers protested against their 
government's domestic economic policy, their French counterparts, when striking, 
did so in relation to the lack of security in Algeria. Thus, after the Airbus hijack in 
December 1994, the crew of one of GDF's gas tankers refused to take the gas supply 
in Skikda, arguing that the French government ought to increase protection in 
Algerian waters and harbours127. The strike in itself was not long enough to disturb 
trade. It was also the only one that occurred. 
From the angle of political changes in Algeria, the hypothesis of a complete 
cut of Algerian LNG supplies to France, in the case of a FIS takeover, is quite 
improbable. France imports 24.2% of Algeria's natural gas exports and is this 
country's second client after Italy (37.2%)128. Whether or not the Islamists would 
hold the reins of power on their own or with others, they would neither sacrifice 
important export revenues, nor take the risk of having to switch clients, just to annoy 
the French. They could, on the other hand, irregularly deliver the supplies as a means 
to retaliate against France's specific acts showing hostility to the new regime. If this 
were to happen, consequences on France would be less important than could be 
thought at first sight because of the existence of security stocks. According to GDF's 
official data, storing capacities amount to 9.6 Bcm129 and, thus, wholly cover 
France's annual imports from Algeria. In the event of frequent and significant 
disturbances or even in the unlikely hypothesis of a complete cut in deliveries, GDF 
would have at least a year to find another supplier. Despite difficult relations with 
126 See The Financial Times, November 29,1994. 
127 Le Monde, 31 d6cembre 1994. After the hijack, the French-managed air and maritime passengers 
services to Algeria were cut. This did not include commercial transport (Le Monde, 28 decembre 
1994). 
128 My calculations from S. Cornot-Gandolphe & M. F. Chabrelle (1995), table 35. 
129 GDF (1994a), p. 15. In reality, France's security stocks are said to be equivalent to a year's 
supply of its two major suppliers. 
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Libya, the Quai d'Orsay considers it as a potential alternative supplier130. This is 
probably best explained by the fact that Libya exports LNG. Consequently, imports 
from Libya would neither cause a waste of invested capital nor would it require new 
investments in infrastructures. 
The analysis of trade flows between France and Algeria shows that, in the 
main, Algeria is more dependent on its exports to France than France is on its exports 
to Algeria. It also shows that, as regards its consumption, France is not dependent on 
Algerian supplies. As a consequence, the Algerian economy would stand to suffer 
most from a deterioration of trade. The same conclusion would be reached if one were 
to think of bandwagoning in Morocco and Tunisia. For the same asymmetrical pattern 
characterises their trade relationships with France131. In addition, compared to 
Algeria, they have the disadvantage of exporting products like clothing, vegetables 
and manufactured goods (notably electric appliances) which are easily found on the 
world market132. 
4.2. French direct investment 
Just as for trade, the Maghreb is a marginal partner in France's direct 
investment activities. In 1992, France's direct investment stock in the Maghreb merely 
amounted to FF 3.1 billion (about $ 585 million). This accounted for 0.4% of 
France's world stock. Unlike trade, however, French direct investments in the 
developing world are not mostly channelled to the Maghreb. Indeed, France's direct 
investment stock in the Maghreb accounted for just 5% of its stock in the non-OECD 
countries in 1992. Within the Maghreb, France's foreign direct investments are 
mainly located in Morocco (stock of FF 2.3 billion in 1992) and only marginally in 
130 Interview with Christophe Bigot, April 21,1994. 
131 In 1993 France accounted respectively for 23% and 33.2% of Morocco's imports and exports (UN 
(1994), volume 1, p. 632). For its part, Morocco accounted for 1% of both France's world imports 
and exports (calculated from table 5). As for Tunisia, France represented 26.9% and 30% of its 
imports and exports (UN (1994), volume 1, p. 970). Tunisia accounted for 0.6% and 0.8% of 
France's imports and exports (calculated from table 5). 
132 See DREE (1995), p. 190 and 209. 
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Tunisia (FF 648 million) and Algeria (FF 196 million)133. In terms of flows, 
France's direct investments to the Maghreb were multiplied by four between 1990 and 
1993, mostly as a result of greater investments to Morocco. Yet, totalling FF 791 
million ($ 139 million) in 1993, they accounted for just 1% of France's world 
outflows134. 
From the Maghrebi countries' viewpoint, foreign direct investment (FDI) is 
being actively sought as a means to save foreign exchange and create employment. 
Encouragement to FDI is also required by the IBRD's restructuring programmes in 
force in each of the Maghrebi states. Despite the adoption of flexible investment 
codes, FDI, which is the most dynamic in Morocco and Tunisia, has not been as high 
as expected. In these two countries, advantageous legislation did not produce its 
effects before the early 1990s'35. Two main factors have played against Morocco and 
Tunisia. First, cheap labour, which is their main comparative advantage, has been in 
cut-throat competition on the world labour market. This has made it harder for them to 
attract production delocalisation. Second, financially solvent demand has been low as 
a result of the austerity economic policies carried out under the guidance of the Bretton 
Woods institutions. As a consequence, import substitution FDI has also been 
constrained136. In Morocco, France's contribution as a foreign investor has been 
growing throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In 1993, French direct investment 
($ 114.7 million) accounted for 22% of world FDI to Morocco. By contrast, French 
investors did not contribute to the growth of FDI in Tunisia. In 1993, with 
$ 14.4 million of investment, they accounted for a mere 6% of Tunisia's total 
inflows137. 
Algeria is quite a special case since it was closed to FDI throughout the 1970s 
as a result of extensive state monopolies and unfavourable legislation. Algeria 
133 For all these figures see BDF (1994c), p. 75 and 87. 
134 My calculation from BDF (1994a), p. 219 and annex, p. 35. 
135 See IMF (1994), p. 458 and 716. 
136 L. Tahla (1993), pp. 927 and 932-4 and B. Khader (1992), pp. 99-107. 
137 My calculations from : IMF (1994), p. 458 and 716 regarding world FDI in Morocco and 
Tunisia ; bilateral balance of payments between France and these two countries (document obtained 
from BDF). RAF's exchange rates. 
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progressively opened its economy to FDI throughout the 1980s (the August 1982 and 
August 1986 laws). However, the majority shareholding principle was not abrogated 
before April 1990, and was maintained in the hydrocarbon field. The November 1991 
hydrocarbon law, nevertheless, allowed foreign oil companies to participate in oil and 
gas prospection and exploitation, whereas the August 1986 law had forbidden them to 
exploit existing oil fields and to engage in the gas sector. In October 1993, an 
advantageous new investment code was adopted. In accordance with the 1994 
structural adjustment programme, privatisation will be opened to foreign investors138. 
Algeria's efforts at attracting FDI have not been crowned with much success. Since 
1992-93, this has essentially resulted from the dangerous security context. Guerrilla 
warfare and the killing of foreigners have made operating in Algeria a difficult task, 
indeed. Besides this unfavourable security context, FDI has been constrained by three 
other factors : governmental instability, lack of guarantees for investment protection 
and vested interests. Since the April 1990 money and credit law which definitively 
opened Algeria to FDI, governmental turn-over has been high : five governments 
were appointed. Foreign investors adopt a wait-and-see attitude in front of 
governmental instability because changes in fiscal, pricing or foreign exchange 
regulations may significantly alter the profitability of their investment projects. The 
abrogation of some provisions of the money and credit law under Abdesselam's 
premiership is a case in point. FDI has also been hampered by the fact that Algeria did 
not move to reassure investors : it signed the New York Convention on international 
arbitration only in April 1993 and has not yet ratified international conventions on the 
protection of foreign investments139. As previously mentioned, it was not until 1993 
that a bilateral accord for the protection of investments was signed with France. Last 
but not least, opening the economy to FDI questioned domestic vested interests in 
production and distribution as well as commissions pocketed on import contracts. FDI 
projects (concerning tyres, pharmaceuticals or vehicles, for instance, in the case of 
138 On the 1982 and 1986 laws, see R. Abdoun (1989). On the 1990 money and credit law, see R. 
Zouaimia (1991). On the 1991 hydrocarbon law, see Petroleum Economist (58), December 1991. The 
October 1993 investment code is reproduced in Algdrie Actualitd (1481), 4-10 mars 1994. 139Algerie Actualize (1469), 7-13 decembre 1993. 
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France) were never carried through because of these problems140. French direct 
investment to Algeria concern very low amounts but have been growing since 1991. 
They amounted to $ 400 000 in 1990, $ 4.8 million in 1991, $ 9.4 million in 1992 
and $ 9.6 million in 1993141. In 1991, French direct investment to Algeria accounted 
for 40% of total FDI inflows in Algeria ($ 12 million). The latest IMF data stop in 
1991 and it is, thus, impossible to calculate France's share thereafter. Considering the 
growth of French outflows to Algeria, on the one hand, and Algeria's unattractive 
environment for FDI, on the other, France may well have remained an important 
contributor. 
As a concluding note, it may be underlined that, in the hypothesis of inimical 
Islamist regimes taking power in the Central Maghreb, these regimes, like the current 
ones, could not spare foreign capital in the form of foreign direct investment. If they 
were to discriminate specifically against French enterprises, this would not generate a 
profound alteration of France's FDI strategy. In addition, if French subsidiaries 
operating in the Maghreb were forbidden to continue their activities there, this would 
not cause much damage to the French economy as a whole. 
4.3. Financial relations 
If Algeria is marginal in France's world trade and foreign direct investment 
activities, what about the financial links between the two countries ? As seen in 
chapters one and two, France's financial transfers to Algeria (together with its 
drumming up support from the Bretton Woods institutions and the EU) have been a 
central vector of its political backing to the Algerian regime. Through the financial 
protocol established in 1989, the French state has also become an active agent in the 
financial relationship with Algeria. Algeria's official debt is known to be owed in 
great part to the French state and there may have been concerns in French policy- 
making circles that a revolutionary FIS regime would decide not to pay back. Before 
140 See Audibert's interview with Jeune Afrique (1742), 26 mai -I juin 1994. 141 Bilateral balance of payment France-Algeria, obtained from BDF. IMFs exchange rates. 
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addressing this issue, it must be underlined that it is virtually impossible to know 
exactly what amounts are due to France and for how much Algeria's debt to France 
accounts in Algeria's total debt. Is it because the bilateral financial dossier is primarily 
a political one ? Despite the irksome aspect of getting into financial details, I think it is 
worth mentioning the main problems encountered, for they suggest that data 
accessible to the public are, to some extent, unreliable. 
4.3.1. No personal audit possible 
From published data it is impossible to exactly know how much has been 
transferred annually to Algeria. It also impossible to make out the precise amount and 
structure of Algeria's debt due to France. 
Regarding yearly financial transfers to Algeria, a follow-up of the contents of 
the financial packages shows that some credit lines were never consumed by Algeria. 
As a consequence, the announced, say, FF 5 billion commercial and governmental 
credits were not effectively transferred to Algeria in a particular year. To establish 
actual financial transfers, one must refer to the France-Algeria balance of payments. 
This balance (not published but accessible to the public) does not show short-term 
capital transfers (one-year loans) of the banking and official sectors. This is a general 
rule applied by the French Central Bank to all countries. The problem is that many 
buyer-credits142 are short-term. So that the sums given in the Central Bank's 
document (see table 12) do not reflect effective transferred amounts. 
Two other puzzling facts in this document are worth mentioning. Firstly, we 
are being told that gross long-term buyer-credits from France to Algeria -- for which, 
surprisingly, no sum appears in 1992 -- amounted to a mere FF 21 million in 1993. 
This appears to be underestimated. The Coface certainly reduced its buyer-credits 
guarantees since 1992 but to an amount that still reaches about FF 2.5 billion per year. 
Would all this imply that gross short-term buyer-credits amounted to more than 
142 Buyer-credits are granted by French banks to foreign enterprises which use these credits to pay 
their French supplier for imports operations. In most cases, buyer-credits are guaranteed by the Coface 
so that the French banks are insured against non-reimbursement risks. 
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FF 2.4 billion in 1993 ? Secondly, in 1989 and 1990, the state would have disbursed 
only FF 916 million, whereas the financial protocol provided for FF 4 billion. Even 
when considering possible frozen credits, this seems too low an amount. 
Trying to evaluate Algeria's debt due to France and, in particular its structure 
by types of credits, is also difficult. The Quai d'Orsay states that Algeria's total short 
to long-term debt due to France amounts to FF 35 billion143 (about $7 billion), 
which implies that France holds about a quarter of Algeria's total debt. The debt due 
to France is made up of the official and private debts. The official debt comprises 
debts due to the French state and debts due to the Coface. According to the Quai 
d'Orsay, the official debt amounts to FF 31 billion (i. e. about 46% of Algeria's total 
official debtt44). The private debt comprises non-guaranteed debts to the French 
banking and non-banking sectors. It would amount to FF 4 billion (i. e. about 11% of 
Algeria's private debt). 
Using data published by the French Central bank, one cannot dig much 
further. There is, indeed, a major problem with the stated amount of outstanding 
Coface-guaranteed credits to Algeria. According to the Central Bank, they amounted 
to FF 14.6 billion in December 1993145. From the structure of the Bank's table, this 
appears to be including the short-term. This sum has two implications. It would 
mean, on the one hand, that the debt due to the French state would amount to 
FF 16.4 billion. This is a surprising amount because, prior to 1989, there were no 
direct governmental credits to Algeria apart from official development aid which was 
low. The second implication of such low guaranteed credits is that Algeria's non- 
guaranteed debt to France would be higher than that quoted by the Quai d'Orsay. 
Indeed, according to the Central Bank, the French banking sector's total outstanding 
credits to Algeria come to FF 21.5 - 23.9 billion146. By deducting the amount of 
guaranteed commercial credits, the banking sector's outstanding (non-guaranteed) 
143 interview with Christophe Bigot, April 21,1994. 
144 Calculated on the basis of table 13. IMFs exchange rate. 
145 BDF (1994b), p. 188. 
146 FF 21.5 billion in the case of the debt due by Algeria to the resident banking sector and FF 23.9 billion in the case of the debt due to the resident banking sector and to the French banks' 
subsidiaries abroad. Ibid, p. 185 and 188. 
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Table 12 : Extracts of the France-Algeria Balance of Payments. 1985-93 
in millions of FF 
1985 1998 1989 1 990 1991 1992 1993 
CREDIT (-) 
Current transfers 
Official sector 2 10 7 8 2 2 31 
Long-term capital 
Commercial credits 2 870 1 776 2 070 802 4 397 451 
Loans 
PNBS * 1 1 7 13 9 
Banking sector 70 41 490 593 1 679 283 1 579 
. 
Official sector 74 158 134 83 68 529 40 
Short-term capital 
Loans and assets 
PNBS * 9 111 44 
Total Inflows 
(Algeria -> Frances 3 025 1 986 2 813 684 2 5581 5 268 2 110 
DEBIT (-) 
__ 
Current transfers 
Official sector 68 254 282 259 436 264 250 
Long-term capital 
Commercial credits 7 8" 3 273 837 2 039 1 156 21 
Loans 
PYBS * 4 1 1 154 929 
Banking sector 1 024 568 528 729 
Official sector 31 6 42 333 4-33 686 544 
Short-term capita 
Loans and assets 
. P. N BS * 102 9 -43 185 
Total outflows 
(France -> Algerial 9 000 1 203 ,1 689 2 641 2 079 1 833 1 929 
BALANCE 
Current transfers 
Official sector - 66 - 244 - 275 251 -434 - 262 . _21() Long-term capital 
Commercial credits -5 003 1 50; 1 243 -2 039 - 35-3 4 397 430 
Loans 
P\BS -4 1 I -1 6 - 141 -920 
Banking sector -954 - 52 - 38 593 1 6%9 . 440 1 579 
Official sector 43 1.52 92 2.50 - 2-5 - 157 . 5O"3 
Short-term capital 
loan, and a, üts 
IINBS 9 - 102 111 .9 - 4: 44 - 185 
Total -5 975 783 1 124 -1 957 479 3 435 131 
*: Private non-banking sector 
Source : Banque de France. document obtained on request. 
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credits to Algeria would amount to FF 6.9 - 9.3 billion. To this must be added the 
French non-banking sector's non-guaranteed credits to Algeria. They amounted to 
FF 186 million in December 1992147. Algeria's private debt due to France would, 
hence, be FF 7.1 - 9.5 billion, as opposed to FF 4 billion. 
It may well be that, despite appearances, the sum of FF 14.6 billion in Coface 
guaranteed credits does not include the short-term. This would be in keeping with the 
Central Banks's practice of retaining information on short-term capital transfers. The 
problem generated by this practice is that it makes it impossible for the public to know 
exactly how much is lent by France to foreign governments each year and how much 
is exactly owed by these foreign governments. One is, therefore, forced to rely on 
what the French government is willing to say. 
4.3.2. No paying back ? 
Relying on the French government's data, it appears that the debt due to 
France is significant : it is, for instance, more than twice as high the 1995 budget of 
the French Foreign Affairs Ministry. The agent which is the most involved in the 
financial relationship is the French state, although this situation arises only indirectly 
via its engagement to finance the deficit of the Coface if guaranteed credits are not 
returned. It is possible that in opposing a FIS takeover, the French government was 
motivated by a fear that a revolutionary FIS government might not recognise the 
previous regime's debt and thus might decide not to pay back. Nevertheless, it could 
not be disregarded in Paris that, by adopting such a course of action, a FIS regime 
would put itself in a very difficult situation as its access to international finance would 
most probably be seriously constrained. Again, in face of the unlikelihood of the 
hypothesis, one is tempted to say that if concerns about the debt played at all a role in 
the French government's opposition to the FIS this would have had to result from a 
preference for minimising risks and not from an objective threat. In addition, as of the 
moment it was realised that a FIS in government would necessarily be a FIS in a 
147 BDF (1993), p. 148. The data for 1993 no longer show the figures for Algeria. 
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coalition government, there were no grounds to believe that, specifically for political 
reasons, Algeria's debt to France might not be honoured. 
On the whole it, thus, seems that economic issues were not at the heart of the 
French government's opposition to a FIS takeover or to its integration in the political 
process in Algeria. Indeed, it was thought that even if the FIS took power violently it 
would not fundamentally question its economic relationship with France for the 
simple reason that Algeria is structurally more dependent on French goods, services 
and capital than vice-versa. Of course, if taken in a revolutionary whirl, a FIS regime 
did review economic links with France, this would have a cost and this cost would be 
even greater if the Moroccan and Tunisian dominoes fell. In this sense, up to the point 
when it was no longer feared that the FIS might overthrow the Algerian regime, 
economic concerns may have played the role of a contributing factor to the French 
opposition to the FIS merely because the French government wished to avoid risks. 
But after Summer 1993, when it was assumed that the FIS could come into office 
only via a compromise, there were no reasons to believe that the economic 
relationship would come under review (although there may today be concerns that 
Algeria will not be able to pay back its debt because of economic problems, not 
political ones). Thus, the Balladur government's opposition to conciliation until 
September 1994 cannot be explained by worries over economic issues. 
In justifying its opposition to conciliation with the FIS, the French 
government not only put forward immigration concerns and fears about the domino 
effect, but also ideological motives. Particularly under the Right, the religio-political 
ideology conveyed by the FIS was described as an ideological ill that needed to be 
combated. The socialists did not insist on ideological views in their public statements 
and this must be understood in terms of the policy they sought to promote in Algeria 
until January 1993. In the main, however, the socialists also saw the FIS's political 
project has regressive although some recognised that secular authoritarianism was not 
a panacea. The coming section examines this dimension of French hostility to the FIS. 
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5. The ideological and psychological dimensions 
Much has already been written about the ways in which Westerners' images of 
a threatening, militant and fanatical Islam were formed and reproduced from the time 
of the Crusades up to today's threats against Taslima Nasreen and terrorist attacks 
against foreigners in Algeria or elsewhere. I shall therefore not deal with this 
subject14s. 
The point I wish to make here is that the French government's opposition to 
the FIS, while certainly nourished by pre-determined presumptions against Islamism 
as a necessarily intolerant force, partly derived from its feeling of repulsion towards a 
political force that asserts itself against France. The anti-French outlook of the FIS or, 
for that matter, of all the Islamist movements in Algeria, is not understood in this 
paper in terms of their (violent or not) protests against the fact that "France made itself 
a party to the conflict in Algeria by standing by the exclusivist forces [the 
eradicators]"149. Rather, it is understood in terms of the challenge that the FIS and, 
more generally, Islamism represent for the hegemony of Western thought to which the 
French Revolution brought its contribution -- a challenge which is perceived as anti- 
Western and anti-French because its potential legitimacy is denied from the start. The 
French government and, in particular, Jupp6's did not hide that, in addition to its 
concrete worries about immigration, terrorism, economic relations and falling 
dominoes which led it to oppose the FIS, it also did so on ideological grounds. To a 
certain extent, the "ideological confrontation logic", into which the French 
government allowed itself to get in, is representative of the West's general hostility 
towards political Islam. At the same time, however, it seems to me that such 
confrontation would not have occurred if the FIS was not an Algerian party. In this 
sense, the ideological element in the French opposition to the FIS would not have 
taken root if the "psychological" dimension of the Franco-Algerian relationship was 
148 See e. g. E. Said (1991) ; M. Rodinson (1988) ; H. Jait (1985). 
149 Sheik Abdullah Djaballah (leader of the MNI), comment made during the conference on "The 
Future of Maghrib" organised by the Geopolitics and International Boundaries Research Centre, 6-7 
October 1994, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. 
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not so peculiar in itself. For, at bottom, if the FIS's religio-political ideology has been 
felt as an attack against one of France's most cherished values -- secularism --, what 
was the most badly lived was the FIS vote, that is the fact that part of the Algerian 
people does not recognise itself in France and in what the French think France 
represents. 
In proceeding in my arguments about the French political establishment's 
perceptions of Algerian society which have largely been shaped by the Algerian 
gallicised political and intellectual elite, I shall necessarily make some generalisations 
which may not apply to every single French politician or high civil servant. The 
argument runs a bit the risk of being oversimplified but it is not inaccurate and fairly 
accounts for the general trend. Since I have the privilege of holding the agenda of this 
paper, I shall start by relativising another simplification : the view according to which 
the French political establishment completely failed to understand the underlying 
dynamics of Islamism in Algeria. This is done less in defence of the French political 
establishment than to give us a chance to briefly review what has been written on the 
rise of Islamism in Algeria. 
5.1. An economicist view ? 
The French political establishment has been criticised by a few in France for 
holding an economicist view of the Algerian crisis and more specifically of the rise of 
Islamism. It was argued that the French government failed to see the Islamic 
resurgence otherwise than as a response to economic hardship and that this failure 
could be inferred from French policy which consisted in believing that, by pouring 
money into Algeria, the force of political Islam would be held in checktso. It is true 
that the French political establishment as a whole attached great significance to the 
socioeconomic determinant in the rise of Islamism. Although the Left also viewed the 
lack of socioeconomic development in Algeria as a major contributing factor to 
150 F. Burgat (1995), pp. 39-40 who generalises the argument to most "international observers" and J. Cesari (1994/95), pp. 177-9. 
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political instability and to the rise of Islamism, this was particularly obvious 
in 
Juppd's speeches. They, indeed, often emphasised that "underdevelopment [was] a 
fertile ground where bad ideologies proliferate"151 and that, therefore, Algeria needed 
foreign help while proceeding with its transition to market economy : 
"It is evident that Algeria's political stabilisation will depend on its success in its economic 
recovery programme, notably in improving the people's plight. (... ) When people are housed, 
when they can decently get supplies and when they have jobs, they do not have the same 
inclination for political agitation as when misery and underdevelopment are acute. " 152 
Despite the centrality of socioeconomic thinking in the French political 
establishment's view of the success of Islamism in Algeria, it is a simplification to 
argue that, to its eyes, political Islam came down to a question of bread and butter. 
The analysis of Islamism put forward by the French political establishment was, 
indeed, more comprehensive in scope and, in fact, very close to the content of the 
academic production on that subject. Nevertheless, despite its "theoretical tools", the 
French political elite was unable to appreciate the extent of the success of the Islamist 
discourse in Algeria because its contacts with Algerian society were (and remain) 
restricted to the secular Western-oriented elite. As a result, French perceptions of 
Algerian society have been truncated : the Algerian society at large has, in some way, 
been seen as a mirror image of France. 
5.1.1. Islamism in Algeria : explanations 
The political establishment's view 
As indicated above, for all its underlining the socioeconomic dimension of the 
FIS's success in Algeria, the French political establishment did not hold a completely 
reductionist/economicist view of political Islam. Juppd, for instance, always argued 
that Algeria's socioeconomic crisis was an important, but not an exclusive, 
151 Speech to parliament, October 11,1994 in MAE (septembre-octobre 1994), p. 204. 
152 Press conference on June 23,1994 in MAE (mai-juin 1994), p. 317. 
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explanatory factor of the FIS's success. In his October 11,1994 speech to parliament, 
he also pointed out "political" and "moral" factorst53. The administration of the Quai 
d'Orsay also had a non-reductionist analysis of Algeria's crisis and of Islamic 
revivalism. Bigot argued that Islamism was not a new phenomenon in Algeria : it had 
its roots in the anti-colonial struggle against France and, if at Independence the secular 
nationalists got the upper hand, movements drawing upon the Islamic idiom emerged 
again particularly in the 1970s and 1980s. Bigot further argued that the FIS's success 
in the late 1980s was to be explained by the combination of economic, political and 
sociocultural factors. The socioeconomic crisis allowed the poor strata to jump on the 
Islamists' bandwagon and thus to swell the ranks of the FIS's sympathisers. Political 
factors also contributed to the FIS's success. First and foremost among them, was the 
legitimacy crisis of the Chadli regime which was associated with economic 
mismanagement and widespread corruption, thus generating a tremendous popular 
feeling of injustice. Other political factors were also identified by Bigot, notably, the 
lack of a structured secular opposition. Lastly, it was recognised that the attractiveness 
of the FIS's discourse resulted from the identity crisis of the Algerian nationt54. 
The Quai d'Orsay's analysis of Islamism in Algeria basically incorporated all 
the ingredients that can be found in the academic literature dealing with this subject or 
with Islamism more generally. 
The academic view 
In the main, although academics may disagree about what they see as the 
overriding factors explaining the existence and success of Islamism in Algeria, there is 
a general consensus around the following issues. First, that the origin of the 
contemporary Islamist movement in Algeria must be traced back the salafiyya 
movement incarnated by Sheik Ben Badis's Association of the Reformist Ulema 
153 In MAE (septembre-octobre 1994), p. 204. See also his press conference of April 14,1994 in 
MAE (mars-avril 1994), p. 176. 
154 Interview with the author. April 21,1994. Claude Cheysson insisted for his part on the lack of 
socioeconomic development (due, in part, to the legacy of French colonialism) and on the identity 
crisis of the Algerians (Interview with the author. April 22,1994). 
207 
(1931)155. Partly as a reaction to French colonialism, the Association of the Reformist 
Ulema called for an Islamic revival, a reinterpretation of the original text to find 
answers to the state of subjugation of Algeria. Islamic revivalism, through Arab and 
Islamic self-assertion, was seen as going hand in hand with liberation from colonial 
rule. Ben Badis, indeed, argued in 1936 that "(... ) this Muslim Algerian nation is not 
France, (... ) it is not possible for her to be France. (... ) this is a nation totally 
removed from France, by her language, her customs, her ethnic origins, and her 
religion. "156 During the anti-colonial war (1954-62), the Association of the Reformist 
Ulema (as all the nationalist movements) joined the war-time FLN157. When the latter 
transformed itself into a state machine at Independence, the ulema were co-opted 
through the establishment of official Islam and, at the same time, marginalised 
because their project for building an Islamic state was not part of the secular 
nationalist elite's agenda. However, this dual process of co-optation/marginalisation 
generated resentment among some ulema who, as early as 1964, founded an 
independent Islamic organisation : the Association Al Qiyam (The Values). Al Qiyam 
developed as a religious "soft-opposition", placing its own religious discourse 
between "fundamentalism" and "Islamism". It did not restrict its religious activism to 
the moral sphere of private life. Although careful not to directly challenge the authority 
of the Ben Bella and Boumediene regimes, it developed themes that contested both the 
social and political order of Algerian society : it advocated re-Islamisation and the 
implementation of the shari'a ; demanded official support for religious observance ; 
155 See e. g. C. Spencer (1994) ; M. Gilsnan (1992) ; A. Khelladi (1992) ; A. Lamchichi (1992) ; 
M. Al-Ahnaf et. al. (1991) ; L. Anderson (1991) ; F. Jeanson (1991) ; F. Burgat (1988a) ; 11. 
Roberts (1988). 
156 Quoted in P. Djitd (1992), pp. 17-8. It was actually on the basis of Ben Badis's trilogy "Arabic 
is my language, Algeria my country and Islam my religion" that the various pre-nationalist 
movements came to claim Independence from France. 
157 The FLN was created on November 1,1954 with the launching of the insurrection against 
French rule. Its historical figures had all been members of the paramilitary branch of Messali I ladj's 
Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD), but had split from it in creating a 
Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action (CRUA) in March 1954. The CRUA was aimed at 
reviving the insurrectional activities of the Special Organisation (OS), dismantled by the French in 
1950. The FLN then progressively rallied the various nationalist movements in its armed struggle. 
By 1956, the "centralists" of the MTLD, Ferhat Abbas's party, the Association of the Ulema, and the 
Communist Party had all been integrated within the FLN. Messali Hadj refused and created his own 
party, the Algerian National Movement (NINA), whose sympathisers were progressively eliminated 
by the FLN. 
208 
denounced the laxity of morals and reliance on non-Islamic cultural manifestations ; it 
also criticised imported foreign ideologies (secularism, socialism and communism) for 
being "un-Islamic". Among the members of Al Qiyam who had been befriended with 
Ben Badis's Association, there were such personalities as Ahmed Sahnoun (1908-) 
and Abdellatif Soltani (1902-84). Both played a significant role in organising the 
Islamist movement in Algeria. Abassi Madani (1931-) also joined Al Qiyam. Although 
Al Qiyam was banned in 1970, religious currents continued to operate more or less 
undercover outside the sphere of official Islam, notably through "free mosques" in the 
student and popular milieu. Throughout the 1970s, new figures emerged and were to 
re-appear in the 1980s : Abdullah Djaballah (MNI) created and animated the mosque 
of the University of Constantine and Mahfoud Nahnah (Hamas) protested against the 
1976 National Charter's secular and socialist content. 
The present day Algerian Islamist movement can thus be seen as the offshoot 
of the counter-society that grew out of the co-optation of the ulema and out of the 
original rift between the nationalist elites as to their political project for independent 
Algeria. As it developed, the Algerian Islamist movement became indebted to varied 
sources of inspiration and became itself more diversified in terms of its approach to 
politics (greater emphasis on predication or on political activism, greater emphasis on 
a legalist approach or a violent one to political power) and in terms of what "the 
Islamic solution" was meant to bring to Algeria (a fundamentalist or modernist Islamic 
state). 
Second, there is a general consensus among academics as to the factors that 
contributed to the success of the FIS in the 1980s (even if there is sometimes a 
tendency to take these factors as an explanation of Islamism per se whereas they 
merely explain its success). Basically, there are three agreed hard-core elements of 
explanation for the success of Islamism in Algeria : socioeconomic marginalisation, 
political exclusion, and the "crisis of identity". Whether theorised in the concept of 
"the crisis of the authoritarian rentier state"158 or not, there is a wide 
158 B. Dillman (1992) ; J. Entelis (1992). 
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acknowledgement that the faltering economy allied to corruption and nepotism 
favoured political protest on the part of all those -- that is the majority -- who were 
economically and politically marginalised, both often working in tandem. In this 
sense, socioeconomic and political exclusion prepared the ground for dissent159. It is 
also recognised that if the FIS managed to capitalise on these "economic and political 
frustrations", it was not only because it addressed the people's grievances against a 
failed political establishment, but also because its discourse responded to a "quest for 
authenticity". The quest for authenticity is generally seen as being ultimately rooted in 
the "identity crisis" of the Algerian nation which has resulted from contradictory 
cultural and political dynamics. Whereas emphasis has been put on the Arab-Islamic 
character of the Algerian nation ever since the anti-colonial struggle, the post- 
independence state has relied on Western models of socioeconomic and political 
organisation : secular nationalism, French-designed state-capitalism through the 
"industrialising industries" model and then economic liberalism. The contradiction 
between the maintenance of a traditional value system through official Islam and the 
introduction of a radical modernisation policy involving rapid social change inevitably 
created tensions in national identification processes and, thus, fuelled a deep sense of 
bewilderment and alienation160. The Islamist discourse, by tapping within the 
reservoir of the norms and categories of what appears to be a lost indigenous culture, 
resolves the contradiction and is thus appealing to those in search of an identity. 
In addition to these hard-core explanatory factors (socioeconomic and political 
exclusion and crisis of identity/quest for authenticity), some have also argued that if 
Islamism had been better at mobilising the masses than other opposition forces it was 
because : 1) it had benefited from a "logistical advantage" over secular forces since "free 
mosques" and social activities provided an independent political space for opposition that 
159 C. Spencer (1994) ; E. Hermassi & D. Vandewalle (1993) ; J. Tzschaschel (1993) ; A. 
Lamchichi (1992) ; J. Ruedy (1992) ; R. Mortimer (1991) ; T. Fabre (1990). 
160 C. Spencer (1994) ; A. Lamchichi (1992) ; J. Ruedy (1992) ; T. Fabre (1990). For an account of 
the failed cultural synthesis in Algeria, see I. Zartman (1985). For an insight into the contradictory 
effects of Arabisation, see J. Entelis (1981). The themes of discredited regimes and of the crisis of 
identity are also found in the general literature on Islamism. See e. g. N. Ayubi (1991) ; J. Esposito 
(1988). 
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non-religious forces could not enjoy under authoritarian rule161 ; 2) Algeria's secular 
forces showed complete disorganisation162 and 3) to come full circle, the discourse of 
these opposition forces was not appealing because it relied on the same political 
paradigms as the FLN'S163. 
This rapid literature review thus shows that the French political establishment 
had about the same analysis of Islamism in Algeria as academics did. In defence of a 
policy that sought to undermine the success of Islamism by financially backing the 
Algerian regime, the assistant-deputy to the Maghreb-Mashreq department argued that 
there was not much France could do otherwise : it could not help towards the lack of 
legitimacy of the Algerian regime and could not really intervene in matters of identity 
crisis164. This reasoning was logical since the French government backed the 
Algerian regime and was disquieted about the potential coming into power of the FIS. 
Despite its comprehensive view of the rise of Islamism, the French political elite, 
nevertheless, failed to properly gauge the success of the FIS's discourse because it 
wore blinkers when looking at Algeria. 
5.1.2. French truncated perceptions of Algerian society 
The French political establishment failed to understand that the FIS 
phenomenon was not ephemeral and not just the result of a "sanction vote" against the 
FLN because it did not realise that in Algeria, as in many other parts of the Muslim 
world, Islam as an ideational system permeates popular culture as well as social and 
political life. Islamic categories, values and norms have remained central features of 
161 J. Ruedy (1992) ; L. Addi (1990) ; H. Roberts (1988). The view that, in authoritarian regimes, 
the mosque becomes the privileged channel of political protest is also developed in the literature 
dealing with Islamism. See e. g. S. Zubaida (1993) or L. Hadar (1993). On the development of "free 
mosques" in Algeria, see A. Rouadjia (1990). 
162 B. Dillman (1992) ; D. Brumberg (1991). 
163 B. Dillman (1992) ; F. Burgat also argued that the French media and the political class had 
contributed to undermine the credibility of the secular opposition forces by openly supporting them 
before the June 1990 elections (document given by the author, dated June 24,1994). Because of the 
past relationship with Algeria, political credibility in Algeria derives from the capacity of a political 
party to dissociate itself from France (notably by anti-French rhetoric which the FL N also used). 
164 Interview with Christophe Bigot, April 21,1994. See also Juppd's claim that "The only card we 
are left with today in order to avoid the destabilisation of that country (Algeria], with the domino 
effects that could follow from it, is the economic card. " (in MAE (mai j uin 1994), p. 199). 
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culture in Algeria, not because they would derive from a trans-historical transposition 
of an unchanging Islamic tradition permeating the Muslim psyche165, but because 
they were given particular salience historically. The anti-colonial struggle against the 
French occupier played a crucial role in this process because it was by reaction to 
colonialism that the definition of the Algerian national identity along an Arab-Islamic 
line emerged -- somewhat at the expense of history and diversityt66. The way in 
which the war-time FLN was formed (by co-optation or elimination of competing 
nationalist movements) and the way in which it survived in the post-Independence era 
also played a role in the reproduction of Islamic culture because the integrätion of part 
of the salafiyya-orientated nationalist movement within its fold implied that the 
ulema's Islamic project had to be accommodated in some way. Since the FLN never 
split over ideological disagreements 167, it found an accommodating solution in a 
hybrid system of "Islamic secularism", as coined by Henri Sanson168. The state has 
neither been Islamic nor secular : with the exception of personal status169, state 
policies have not been governed by Islamic jurisprudence. Yet, Islam has been 
consecrated as the state religion in all the Constitutions promulgated since 1963, and 
the state has the duty to encourage religious practice. Islamic principles have, thus, 
inspired, in part, the organisation of public and private life : definition of the Algerian 
nationality by reference to religion (1963) ; compulsory religious education at school 
(1963) ; prohibition of gambling and of the sale of alcohol (1976) ; weekly holy day 
165 For a critique of essentialism, see S. Zubaida (1993). 
166 The European and/or Christian heritage bequeathed by the Carthaginians (1100 - 147 BC), the 
Romans (146 BC - 432), the Vandals (432 - 533), the Byzantins (533 - 633), the short Spanish 
occupation in the late fifteenth century and French colonialism was wholly rejected. The Arab-Islamic 
dimension of Algeria's history, which began in the late seventh century with the ousting of the 
Byzantines by Muslim Arabs (755-1516) and which was reinforced in its Islamic aspect by the 
Ottoman Empire (1516-1830), was the sole to be retained. The berber heritage was also simply 
negated (the Berbers, who peopled the area before these invasions and who constitute some 20% of 
the Algerian population today, were Arabised and Islamised in the early eighth century. Nevertheless, 
they constitute an ethnic group with its own language and customs). 
167 H. Roberts (1993a), pp. 438-9 and 445. 
168 H. Sanson (1983). 
169 Until the promulgation of the 1984 Family Code, largely inspired by Islamic jurisprudence, 
several projects to regulate the personal status (family law, inheritance law and legal representation) 
had been proposed successively in 1966,1973 and 1981. The polemic between the religious current 
and secular leftists around the issue of family and of women's rights did not allow the adoption of any 
of these projects. As a consequence, until 1984, this domain was regulated both by a colonial decree 
of 1959 and Islamic jurisprudence. In most cases, the fiqu and customary law were applied. See 11. 
Dennouni (1986). 
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on Fridays (1976) ; forbidding of pig breeding (1979) and regulation of the personal 
status according to the fiqu (1984). In addition, while controlling the ulema by turning 
them into civil servants, all Algerian regimes have used the vocabulary of Islam to 
legitimise their polities -- the typical example being the justification of socialism on 
religious grounds : Algeria's socialism was deemed to be Islamic because it responded 
to the Islamic tradition of social justice170. Official Islam, thus, reproduced the 
centrality of Islamic categories, values and norms and did not allow any effective 
secularisation of religion. 
This was a process of which Westerners and, more particularly, the French 
were not markedly aware because the FLN regime presented a secular face when 
addressing the rest of the world. But Boumediene, for instance, could very well 
defend the Third World in terms of imperialist exploitation in international conferences 
and, at home, launch a "campaign against the relaxation of morals" (1970)171 or have 
officials to cultivate the themes of the need for authenticity and castigate the 
degradation of morals incited by the West in the ministry for religious affairs' Al- 
Asala review (1971-81)172. This relative unawareness in France was reinforced by 
the contacts of the French political elite which, in most cases, were limited to the 
Algerian gallicised intelligentsia. The secular, Western-oriented elites (in power or in 
opposition) simply projected a replica image of France and, thus, promoted the 
creation of an incomplete vision of Algerian society in French perceptions of that 
country. Because of this partial vision of Algerian society, the French political elite 
could not realise the extent to which a discourse revolving around the simple formula 
"Islam is the solution" was appealing to so many Algerians. It could not accept it 
either. 
170 For details on the use of Islam by the state as a legitimising tool, see e. g. M. Tozy (1993) ; A. 
Rouadjia (1990). 
171 A. Rouadjia (1990), pp. 20-3. 
172 LW. Deheuvels (1991). 
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5.2. Ideological and psychological motives 
Ideological and psychological motives played their part in the French political 
establishment's opposition to the FIS. Opposition on ideological grounds has been 
linked to the fact that the FIS challenges France's political legacy by rejecting the 
principle of secularism which makes it, to the eyes of the French, an inherently 
regressive political force. This attitude has been similar to the more general Western 
reaction in front of a new type of nationalism. However, the ideological dimension 
would not have found its place in the French public discourse if Franco-Algerian 
relations had not been tainted with a closeness that hampers France from "letting 
Algeria go". 
5.2.1. Islamism and the challenge to Western ideological and cultural 
hegemony 
If Islamism is a vehicle for political opposition to the regimes in power, it 
indirectly relates to the West since its chief criticism against ruling regimes is to have 
adopted Western modes of government and Western modes of socioeconomic 
development which are perceived as the root of Muslim societies' ills. Islamism may 
be understood as the product of disillusionment with the ideologies underpinning the 
models adopted in the post-independence period. However, it is often too rapidly 
concluded that Islamism rejects all these models at one go. In reality, if there has, 
indeed, been a disillusionment with models that did not bring about "true" 
independence, the original goal (independence from Western hegemony) remains 
alive. "It is [thus] in the soil of the old dynamics of decolonisation that, for the main 
part, 'Islamism' finds its profound roots. " 173 In this sense, Islamic self-assertion and 
the re-appropriation of the Islamic idiom can be viewed as a "cultural nationalism" 
meant to repel Western continued ideological and cultural hegemony. As several 
scholars have argued, more than a break with nationalism, Islamism is its natural 
173 F. Burgat (1995), p. 77. 
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development to the ideological and cultural sphere174. That Islamism is a "new-wave 
nationalism"175 or the "supreme stage of nationalism"176 is well reflected in the FIS's 
discourse which accuses the secular FLN regime of betraying the call of November 1, 
1954 for "the restoration of the sovereign, democratic and social Algerian state within 
the framework of Islamic principles" 177. Indeed, Abassi Madani, who received 
primary education in the medersa of the Association of the Reformist Ulema and who 
joined the FLN's insurrection (and was jailed by the French throughout the 
Independence War as a result), indicated very clearly that the FIS did not repudiate 
nationalism as such, but the secular form it took at Independence : 
The Algerian state in 1962 did not correspond whatsoever to the state about which we were 
dreaming on November 1,1954 and for which we took up arms : an independent state based 
upon Islamic principles. The state that saw the light under our eyes was grounded on secular 
and socialist principles. This was a grave deviation, the opened door to ideological and 
intellectual misleadings with, as a consequence, their inevitable backlash effects from the 
political and economic viewpoints. (... ) We were entering into the era of despair, failure and 
disaster. " 178 
By transposing nationalism onto the ideological and cultural sphere, Islamist 
movements oppose the inroads of Western culture which, incidentally, has often been 
referred to as "world culture" in the West. The rejection of Western political 
paradigms for Islamic ones is not comprehensible to the West. There is nothing really 
odd about this, since the Revolutions that brought about the West's value system were 
174 See, in particular, the seminal work of F. Burgat (1995) and (1988a). N. Ayubi (1991) also sees 
Islamism as cultural nationalism. S. Zubaida (1993) shows that such international events as the Gulf 
War brought Islamism to be the voice of nationalism and of opposition to Western (political and 
military) hegemony. Other authors, without concluding that Islamism is nationalism, nevertheless 
identify it as a reaction to the Westernising colonial legacy or simply to Westernisation : J. Esposito 
(1992) and (1988) ; H. Hassan (1990). 
175 This is my own formula to sum up the argument of G. Salamd (1993, pp. 22-6) according to 
which third-generation Islamists (the new wave of militants) would like to be viewed as the true anti- 
imperialist force. 
176 B. Stora interviewed by Jeune Afrique (1539), 27 juin-3 juillet 1990. 
177 M. Gadant (1982, p. 31) whose book is enlightening about the dynamics between Islam and 
secularism at the time of the War of Independence. 
178 Madani interviewed by S. Zdghidour (1990), p. 180. The brochure of the Algerian Brothers in 
Britain, "Jihad in Algeria" (October 29,1993) also develops the theme of the "hijack of Algerian 
Independence by the leftists". Several authors have underlined that, at any rate in the Algerian case, 
Islamism is not the repudiation of populist nationalism but its re-appropriation : H. Roberts (1993a) 
and (1993b) ; B. Story (1993) ; R. Leveau (1992) ; R. Mortimer (1991) ; L. Addi (1990). 
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lived as extremely positive experiences for progress. The Islamists' rejection of the 
principle of secularism, more than their supposedly anti-democratic agenda179 -- is at 
the core of the West's profound unease. Indeed, to Westerners, secularism incarnates 
the freeing of human reason from a supposed God's will and the guarantee of 
freedom for individuals and minorities. To reject secularism is, thus, equated with 
repudiating modernity, subordinating Man to God and enforcing a medieval human- 
made law seen as the word of God'80. This makes the Islamists' agenda particularly 
reactionary and retrograde to Westerners' eyes and it is particularly so in France 
where secularism achieved a purist form as a result of the long battle between 
republican secularists and (often monarchist) clericalists. It is actually noteworthy that 
if, traditionally, the French Left has been readier than the French Right to defend 
secularism, the rise of Islamism on the southern shore of the Mediterranean has led 
the Right to become the champion of secularism, which indicates a reactive resort to 
the value system of the Republic. 
As argued by Lahouari Addi, the religio-political vocabulary used by the most 
radical Islamists (in the Algerian case, by All Benhadj) generates puzzlement because 
it does not correspond to the landmarks of modern Western political thought181. It 
also generates a feeling of repulsion perhaps less because this religio-political 
language revives negative images created by the conflicts between Christendom and 
Islam than because it recalls Europe's dark Middle Ages against which modern 
thought triumphed. The replacement, in radical Islamists' discourse, of the vision of 
an opulent North exploiting the South by the image of a Christian crusader campaign 
against Islam is greeted in the West as irrational and, as a result, as threatening. But, 
179 M. AZZam has rightly argued that the argument, according to which an Islamic system of 
government needed to be resisted because it was unlikely to be democratic, was weak in light of the 
fact that the vast majority of Arab regimes were undemocratic (1994, p. 92). The issue whether 
Islamist movements are prone to democratic practices or pathologically anti-democratic has been 
hotly debated. The view that Islamism and Islamist movements should no longer be treated as a 
monolith is, however, gaining ground. With it, it is recognised that whereas some movements or 
some factions within Islamist movements advocate an anti-democratic agenda, others participate to 
the democratic process and see no incompatibility between Western democratic principles and Islamic 
principles (shura, ijma, mubaya and institutionalised ijtihad). For a discussion over this issue see e. g. 
B. Korany (1994) ; J. Esposito (1992) ; J. Esposito & J. Piscatori (1991) ; J. Iqbal (1983).. 
180 On the shari'a-fiqu distinction, see N. Ayubi (1991), pp. 1-33. 
181 L. Addi (1991), pp. 24-5. 
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at the bottom-line, are not Islamists saying exactly the same thing as their secular 
nationalist opponents, albeit in another form ? 
As the frontal attack on secularism is generally lived in the West as an 
aggression, it is also seen as something that must be fought back. Jupp6 made the 
clear demonstration that, along with all the concrete concerns that the FIS's coming 
into power would cause, he also opposed the FIS on ideological grounds : 
"(... ) we have explained that we will show no leniency towards those who struggle against 
us, against what we represent, against our values, our philosophy of History and Man 
(... )"182 and that "(... ) we shall combat ideologies that combat us. -183 
It makes few doubts that such responses will be understood in Islamist lands as 
another proof of the West's "crusader mentality" or of the most pernicious aspect of 
its neocolonialist scheme : "depersonalisation" 184. That, as a result, such a language 
is an engine for self-fulfilling fears about confrontations is also quite obvious. 
By entering the field of the "ideological war", with its simplifying logic, the 
French political establishment was led to mistakenly consider Islamism as a 
threatening monolith. As any other social and political movement, Islamism has its 
radicals and moderates who differ not only in terms of the means they intend to use to 
reach their aims but also in terms of their final objectives (e. g. what an Islamic state 
should be, how the shari'a should be understood and implemented, etc. ). In this 
respect, if Islamism will be part of the indigenous political equation of the Muslim 
world, as all indicators suggest, the question to be addressed is which of the Islamist 
movements, or which of their factions, will get the upper hand. Also, since Islamism 
was born in the late 1960s, it has been characterised by an internal evolutionary 
dynamics to the effect that some Islamist movements do not just seek to return to a 
182 Interview, March 7,1994 in MAE (mars-avril 1994), p. 24. 
183 Speech to parliament, October 11,1994 in MAE (septembre-octobre 1994), p. 204. 
184 One of the Algerian Islamists' favourite themes is the acculturation objective that France would 
be seeking in Algeria (see M. Al-Ahnaf et. at. (1991), pp. 267-88). It will be noted that whereas 
Islamists denounce such an objective in terms of a crusader mentality, secular nationalists did so in 
terms of "cultural imperialism" (see e. g. Moroccan B. El Mellould Riffi's account of French policy 
towards the Maghreb since Independence, (1989), pp. 62-84,206-23,249-60). However, both 
denounce this cultural neo-colonialism which is seen as a means to maintain Algeria in a state of 
depmkncr- 
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mythical past but wish to make their tradition fit into the framework of modernity. It is 
this internal flexibility and process of change that now needs to be recognised'85. 
I suspect that the French political establishment would not have advanced itself 
on the mined ground of ideological confrontation if the new "voice of the South"186 
had not come from its ex-colony. The psychological component has, indeed, played a 
central role in French opposition to the FIS. 
5.2.2. The FIS vote :a psychological trauma for France 
Relations between France and Algeria have always been complex, passionate, 
marked by an attraction/repulsion dynamics. The colonial venture and the atrocities of 
the war of decolonisation have left their stamp on the "mental universe" 187 of the 
bilateral relationship and locked both countries in a face-to-face from which they have 
not yet managed to liberate themselves. After the June 1990 elections in Algeria, 
Benjamin Stora, who fathomed the French collective memory/amnesia regarding 
Algeria, argued that, through the FIS vote, "Algeria [was] about to become truly 
independent and to break its attachments with the old colonial power" and that "the 
French ought to understand that. " He concluded that the FIS vote allowed Algeria to 
become a truly foreign country to France'88. As the events were to show, the French 
have not really accepted that Algeria, which in the "French psyche" has always 
remained a part of France, may assert itself against "the only good things" of the 
colonial legacy. 
Generally speaking, the reaction of the French (including the political and 
intellectual elite) to Islamism in Algeria has worked along three lines. For the partisans 
of "French Algeria" who never accepted de Gaulle's "treason", the reaction has been 
185 Diversity and internal change are two themes that were particularly developed by F. Burgat 
(1995) and J. Esposito (1992). Note will be taken that, as of September 1994, Juppd recognised that 
the Islamist movement in Algeria was divided (see chapter two). Also, it is worth mentioning that, in 
April 1994, Cheysson argued that it was not possible to talk with the "fundamentalists", but that 
dialogue could be established with the "Islamists" such as Hamas (interview, April 22,1994). 
186 F. Burgat (L'Islamisme au Maghreb. La voix du Sud, Paris : Karthala, 1988 -- a book whose 
major chapters are referenced as articles in this paper) . 187 JR. Henry (1992). 
188 B. Stora interviewed by Jeune Afrique (1539), 27 juin-3 juillet 1990. 
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to say in substance : "they wanted independence ; they got it ; they want the FIS ; let 
them have it ; it is their problem and they should face its consequences". It is the 
"revanchist reaction", common in extreme-right circles189. For all those who 
supported Independence or the socialist adventure of the new independent state, the 
failure of the FLN regime is felt as a personal one. One sentence that turns up a lot 
today among leftist Frenchmen belonging to the "Algerian generation" (that is all those 
who whatever their age were confronted to the "Algerian question" at the time of the 
war of decolonisation) is : "all this for just that". By saying this, they express their 
shattered hopes in a Revolution that turned sour and their puzzlement in discovering in 
Algeria a "new" country that does not correspond to "their" Algeria. Lastly, for 
others, and notably the Pieds-noirs, the FIS vote is simply felt as a personal loss, as a 
heartbreak. More generally, one could say that, in a diffuse way, the advent of an 
Islamic state in Algeria would be felt in France as the third and final severing of the 
umbilical cord between the French metropolis and its former colony. Earlier severings 
were in sequence : (1) political Independence under de Gaulle in 1962 and (2) so- 
called "normalisation of bilateral relations" declared by president Pompidou in the 
wake of Algeria's attempts at achieving economic independence through the highly 
symbolic oil nationalisation measures in 1971. 
In addition to these collective attitudes, it is also worth underlining the crucial 
role played by the bonds of understanding and, sometimes, of friendship that were 
woven throughout the years between the French and Algerian political elites. As 
shown in chapter one, the fact that Dumas was a good friend of Taleb Ibrahimi, who 
represented the Islamic trend of the FLN party, played a role -- even though it was not 
the determining one -- in designing a policy that sought to promote a compromise that 
might have satisfied Islamist challengers without having them in control of the wheels 
of government. In general, however, bonds of friendship have rather been with the 
189 It is, for instance, the "le Penist" reaction. Le Pen, who fought in Algeria and who was a 
sympathiser of the OAS's cause, created in 1960 the National Front for French Algeria (Front 
national pour l'Algerie francaise). The OAS (Armed Secret Organisation) was a terrorist organisation 
created in 1961 to rally French settlers in Algeria against Independence. General Salan who took part 
in the abortive putsch against de Gaulle's decolonisation scheme was a member of the OAS. 
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gallicised Algerian political elite which has been threatened, first politically and now 
physically, by Islamism and its extremist fringe. In respect to those deep 
transMediterranean bounds of friendship, Cheysson's comment deserves to be quoted 
in full. In this interview, Cheysson was not giving an explanation of his reaction to 
the FIS in particular. However, his memories are precious to the scholar because they 
provide the keys to understanding much about the French political elite's reaction to 
the FIS : 
"I cannot be objective when it comes to the Maghreb and most particularly to Algeria. I had 
the pleasing surprise of being asked by General de Gaulle to be in charge of the Sahara at the 
time of the signature of the Evian accords. [It was a] fascinating co-operation, with a country 
that just got out of a war against France, on a major subject of economic independence. I am 
very Algerian in my reactions all the more because, out of the politicians of the last few 
years in Algeria, more than half had been my collaborators or advisers during that period. So, 
I am not impartial. " 190 
Cheysson may represent the case par excellence of the "closeness" of the relationship 
between the Socialist Party and the FLN. Nevertheless, his testimony of the impact 
that close relations with the Algerian elite have on the French political establishment's 
view of political developments in Algeria remains valid. Indeed, in its vast majority 
the French political elite reacted negatively to the FIS because of the reasons I 
mentioned throughout this chapter but also by solidarity with its peers in Algeria. FIS 
militants are exaggerating but are not wide of the mark when they say that if the 
French opposed the FIS it was because "They cannot accept an Islamic government 
which would not be under the Elysde's orders. "191 They are exaggerating in the sense 
that none of the Algerian governments has ever been "under the Elysde's orders" even 
if they encapsulated pro-French elements. But they are not far from the mark either 
because a FIS team in Algiers would certainly imply many changes in the way 
personal relations have until now operated. 
190 Interview with the author, April 22,1994. A Franco-Algerian public body was created by the Evian Accords to overview the exploitation of oil in Algeria and the construction of infrastructures. 191 M. Bedayoun (1993). 
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To conclude, the main arguments of this chapter may be quickly recalled. I 
have shown that the French political establishment forecasted that the FIS's coming 
into power would have direct negative consequences on France because of the 
immigration, national security and economic impacts it would cause. Out of these 
three types of concerns, only immigration problems, in fact, satisfactorily explain 
France's opposition to both a violent FIS takeover and a compromise between the 
Algerian regime and the FIS. Indeed, an immigration wave consisting of Algeria's 
"modernist" substance and an encouragement to re-Islamisation within the Muslim 
community living in France were thought possible whichever way the FIS came into 
power. It was assessed that these events would create tremendous tensions in 
France's sociopolitical system. By contrast, apprehensions about a possible 
questioning of the economic relationship were very low. It was thought unlikely that 
the FIS would fundamentally review this aspect of the Franco-Algerian relationship, 
even if it seized power. Nevertheless, economic concerns probably contributed to the 
French government's opposition to a FIS takeover because, if against all odds the FIS 
reviewed economic relations, this would have a cost for the French economy 
(without, however, being catastrophic). But, economic concerns played no role at all 
in the French government's opposition to conciliation in Algeria inasmuch as, within a 
coalition government, the FIS would not have the power to question economic 
relations with France. National security concerns presented, as it were, an 
intermediate case. Anxiety about the possible resort to state-sponsored terrorism by a 
FIS regime explained France's opposition to a violent FIS takeover and, to a certain 
extent as well, to conciliation in the sense that the FIS's ambiguous attitude towards 
violence probably contributed to the view in Paris that France would be better off 
without the FIS included in government in Algiers. 
A FIS victory (by violence or not) was also opposed by France because of the 
snowball effect it could have throughout North Africa and, in particular, in France's 
ex-protectorates : Tunisia and Morocco. It was feared that, by demonstration effect 
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and "revolution export", the end-result of a FIS victory might be the emergence of 
radical Islamist regimes on Europe's southern flank after a period of turmoil. 
If the 
Tunisian and Moroccan dominoes fell, the foreseen consequences of a FIS takeover 
on France, it was said, would be multiplied and thus more difficult to face. The 
domino effect argument, however simple at first sight, must be somewhat 
understated. For, insofar as the French political establishment recognised that the way 
in which the FIS came into power had different implications for Franco-Algerian 
relations, it probably also recognised that the way in which the Maghrebi dominoes 
might fall also mattered. The domino effect theory, in fact, raised some unanswered 
questions : would Islamist challengers in the Central Maghreb try to overthrow their 
governments or would they favour an accommodation strategy ? If they chose the 
course of violent action, could they in effect topple their regimes ? What kind of 
strategies would current regimes adopt in face of a more active Islamist challenge ? 
How radical and anti-French potentially sprouting up Islamist regimes may prove to 
be ? Did the French government have sound answers to all the questions ? If not, then 
one cannot truly understand why domino thinking was so central to the French 
government's opposition to the FIS unless one were to argue that the French 
government relied on the mere view that it was within the odds that neighbouring 
Islamist movements might take power violently, thus bringing about potentially 
radical regimes which would be likely to question the past relationship with France. 
The realm of the possible may, indeed, be a basis upon which foreign policy is 
decided. This may all the more be so when ideological motives are involved. 
As demonstrated in section five, ideological hostility to the Islamists' political 
project played a role in the French political establishment's opposition to a FIS 
takeover and to conciliation because the FIS's rejection of secularism has made it a 
necessarily anti-modernist political force to French observers. Beyond the issue as to 
whether the FIS should be considered as regressive or not, French ideological 
opposition to the FIS would not have arisen if the relationship between France and 
Algeria had not been so complex in itself. A century of colonisation and the War of 
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Liberation have marked collective attitudes on both sides. In France, Algeria has 
continued to be viewed as a part of France. It was perceived as a French-speaking 
country (even though it did not take part in the francophonie summits, denounced as 
sheer neocolonialism) whose polity was secular and in line with the times (claim for 
self-determination in 1960s, for international restructuring in the 1970s and shift to 
infatah economic policies the 1980s). The FIS vote demonstrated that if Algerian elites 
have the same frame of mind as the French, not all Algerians see France as a near kin. 
This very fact has been difficult to accept in France. Bonds of understanding and 
friendship between French and Algerian elites have reinforced French hostility to the 
FIS both because the French political establishment sought to defend its peers across 
the Mediterranean and because a "change of staff" in Algiers would question the way 
in which personal relations have operated until today. 
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Conclusion 
A shifting policy 
Starting from the premise that France's long-run foreign policy objective has 
always been to preserve its position as Algeria's "senior foreign partner", this study 
sought to determine what policy France implemented in order to achieve its end in a 
context where regime stability in Algeria has been threatened by the rise of Islamism -- 
a political force which has come to be the most popular form of opposition to the 
prevailing authoritarian order. The central finding brought to the fore in this thesis is 
that France has not followed one constant policy but several successive policies. A 
summary picture of French policy towards Algeria after the 1992 coup d'dtat until the 
May 1995 French presidential elections brings out a sequence of two shifts : the 
January 1993 shift (from promoting compromise with the Islamist mainstream to 
throwing France's weight behind the Algerian regime which refused such a 
compromise) and the September 1994 shift (from buttressing eradication to 
advocating conciliation). 
The shifting character of French policy resulted from the government's 
continuous reassessment of the evolution of Algeria's conflict on the ground. At first, 
Cresson's socialist government (which was not, however, united on this issue) 
believed that force would not resolve the problem of Islamism in Algeria and that, as a 
result, a certain form of compromise needed to be struck with the Islamists. The 
Cresson government did not wish the FIS to come into power nor did it wish its 
formal integration in the government. Cresson's foreign minister hoped that giving a 
greater weight to the Islamic trend of the state apparatus (and perhaps co-opting some 
Islamist personalities) would satisfy the Islamist movement. Reaching such a 
compromise offered a double advantage for Paris. It would avoid a repressive drift in 
Algeria thus sparing Paris the bad company of a police state and ensure steadiness in 
Franco-Algerian relations. Algiers refused to consider France's proposal and 
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embarked upon eradicating its Islamist opponents. Without severing relations with 
Algeria, the Cresson and Bdrdgovoy governments maintained minimal contacts until 
January 1993. At that stage, the Bdrdgovoy government reviewed its Algeria policy in 
light of the degradation of Algeria's security situation. The Bdrdgovoy government 
now thought that it was within the odds that the FIS might take over through guerrilla 
warfare. This prospect led it to repair the strained relationship with Algeria's rulers. 
A series of factors explains the Bdrdgovoy government's hostility to a FIS 
takeover. It was feared in Paris that a FIS victory would generate instability 
throughout the Mediterranean by domino and "revolution export" effects. The 
prospect of the advent of an anti-Western Islamic state in Algeria was difficult to 
accept ideologically and psychologically. In addition, such a prospect was perceived 
as threatening the stability of Franco-Algerian relations. Even though it was assumed 
in Paris that a potential FIS regime would probably not overhaul Algeria's economic 
ties with France, it was also considered that a new regime might broaden its horizons 
away from France. Paris was also disquieted about the prospect of a radical 
revolutionary Islamist regime which might be prone to international terrorism. Most 
importantly, the FIS coming into power was opposed by France because of its 
foreseen disturbing impact on France's sociopolitical system through the immigration 
problems it raised. 
This series of concerns also led the Balladur government to support the 
Algerian regime. From April 1993 to September 1994, the French Right fully backed 
eradication in Algeria. It provided the Algerian regime with economic aid and, in 
contrast with the socialists, established tight police and intelligence co-operation with 
Algiers. Some anti-guerrilla military hardware was also sold to the Algerian Army. 
Finally, France became Algeria's defender on the international scene. However, in 
September 1994, the Quai d'Orsay came to the conclusion that eradication might not 
be the best solution. Eradication had failed in its objectives since guerrilla warfare 
continued unabated, threatening to suck the whole country into an all-out civil war. In 
addition, as a political project, Islamism had not died. Conciliation was, therefore, 
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seen as the only means to restore political stability in Algeria. The fact that France was 
increasingly isolated internationally in its strong support to Algiers was also one factor 
leading it to switch to conciliation. Nevertheless, the Quai d'Orsay's September 1994 
shift did not translate into effective policy measures seeking, if not to force, at least to 
influence the reaching of a political settlement encompassing the FIS. The Balladur 
government did not directly intervene to bring pressure to bear on the Algerian regime 
because it considered that a conciliation imposed from abroad was not a viable long- 
term solution for stability in Algeria. In addition, an active conciliatory policy would 
have entailed risks of reprisal actions from Algerian eradicators included in 
government. Hence, the Quai d'Orsay's call for conciliation which was not 
accompanied with concrete efforts at promoting a way of weathering the storm in 
Algeria. 
Going backwards under Chirac ? 
ý ýEi ýr. 
Serguei in Le Monde, 14 septembre 1995 
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Serguei's cartoon was a reaction to the September 1995 decision by the new 
Chirac Administration to ban the distribution of a book dealing with state violence in 
Algeria'. This Livre blanc sur la repression en Algerie (1991-1994)2, henceforth 
referred to as the "White Paper", was written by the "Committee of Free Militants for 
Human Dignity and of Human Rights"3. This Committee is presumed to be mainly 
comprised of FIS militants exiled in Switzerland. Reporters Herzberg and de Barrin 
describe the book as a series of testimonies about state violence in Algeria (arbitrary 
arrests, torture, death sentences, imprisonment conditions in detention camps, etc. ). 
The subject of violence perpetrated by the Islamist armed groups is said to be wholly 
excluded from the text. This one-sided book may thus be categorised as a political 
publication4. 
The French Ministry for the Interior (at present led by Jean-Louis Debrd) 
justified the ban on this publication essentially on grounds of domestic security 
although political motives were not wholly absent: 
"'Ibere is [in this book] an underlying anti-French tone, but there Is especially such a violent 
denunciation of the Algerian regime that it could be understood as an incitement to hatred. 
From Algeria's home affairs' viewpoint, this is not exactly our problem. But here [in 
France], this denunciation can lead people who are likely to be responsive to this kind of 
proselytism to undertake acts leading to a breach of the peace. "5 
The Interior Ministry's worry about a "breach of the peace" is connected to the 
terrorist attacks that were carried out on French soil during Summer/Autumn 1995. 
Up to the time of writing, five attacks have occurred : Sheik Sahraoui was murdered 
on July 11 ;a bomb blew up in the Paris tube at the busy Saint-Michel station on July 
25 (7 dead, 85 casualties) ; in a public square near the Champs-Elysdes, a bomb 
placed in a rubbish bin exploded on August 17 (17 wounded) ; another (defective) one 
went off in a Parisian street market on September 3 (4 wounded). Lastly, a car bomb, 
1 Le Monde, 14 septembre 1995. 
2 Editions Hoggar : Geneva, 1995. 
3 In theory, a livre blanc is a document published by the government. It is intended to take stock of a 
controversial question and to formulate policy proposals. 
4 Le Monde, 14 septembre 1995. 
5 Quoted in ibid 
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parked close to a Jewish primary school, blew up in a suburb of Lyon on September 
7 (14 casualties). There were also several failed terrorist attacks. One of them aimed at 
the high speed train (the TGV) on the Lyon-Paris line on August 26. A young 
Algerian national who was brought up in France and who has always lived there is 
suspected of involvement and is now on the run. 
To Serguei, the banning order against the "White Paper" amounted to an 
exoneration of the Algerian regime. Indeed, his cartoon shows Marianne, the French 
Republic, laundering books with a bleaching soap that erases all blots. In an echo to 
advertisements for washing powder, the Algerian military men, stained with blood, 
show great satisfaction with Marianne's washing powers. Marianne's "spotless clean 
laundry", in conjunction with highly publicised round-ups of the "expected villains", 
raises anew the question of France's shifting Algeria policy. As prime minister, is 
Jupp6 going back to his pre-September 1994 policy stance of firm support to the 
Algerian regime ? It is too early to provide sure answers to this question. 
Nevertheless, several elements indicate that, under Chirac's presidency, France is 
supporting again the Algerian regime if only by proving tough on the FIS. Today, 
however, being harsh on the FIS seems to be motivated less by fears of the FIS being 
integrated in politics than by fear of the Algerian regime itself. 
With Jacques Chirac five months into his presidency, official discourse has 
been as contradictory as ever. On the one hand, Prime Minister Juppd has maintained 
a conciliatory discourse. He has, thus, argued that "It is through dialogue and free 
elections that the Algerians will be able to disentangle themselves from the meshes of 
violence and to come to a reconciliation around a [society] project that they themselves 
will have chosen for the future of their country. "6 Juppd has also continued to argue 
that only "real democratic elections" would make sense in Algeria7. Surely, Jupp6 
cannot describe a presidential run in which the signatories of the Rome platform will 
not take part as true elections8. At the same time, however, Juppd has stated that the 
6 Speech to parliament on the new government's policy orientations (May 23,1995), quoted in Le Monde, 25 mai 1995. 
7 In 7 sur 7, TFI, September 7,1995. 
8 On August 28,1995, the signatories of the Rome platform stated they would boycott the 
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FIS does not yet accept the principle of democracy and that, as such, it does not 
belong to the "party of democracy" which Paris says it is backing in Algeria9. In 
addition, President Chirac warned that he "would not allow France to become a 
sanctuary (... ) for the fundamentalists and that [the government would] do everything 
in its power to eliminate them. " 10 
Despite its contradictions, official discourse under the new French president 
seems to tilt back to the eradicator stand taken by the socialist Bdrdgovoy government 
in early 1993 and by Balladur's right-wing government from April 1993 to September 
1994. Censorship of the FIS seems to confirm this trend. Yet, as I suggested above, 
the motives may no longer be the same. As Balladur's foreign minister, Jupp4 had 
come to the conclusion that, despite all the negative consequences that accepting the 
FIS back in the political game might have on regional stability, on Franco-Algerian 
relations and on France itself, conciliation was the only way out for Algeria. In 
Autumn 1994, he was extremely critical of the eradicators in the Algerian government. 
Juppd, indeed, compared them to the bloodthirsty extremist Islamists operating within 
the Islamist armed groups. Very soon, however, he stripped his speeches from these 
harsh words against Algerian eradicators. I argued earlier that if Juppt ceased to use a 
language that was considered offensive in Algiers and if he did not urge conciliation in 
Algeria it was, in part, because he feared reprisal actions from the Algerian Military 
Security. It seems to me that today's tough stand on the FIS can be understood in the 
same light. The Juppd government blows cold when arguing that genuine presidential 
elections are needed in Algeria, but it also blows hot when being tough on the FIS. It 
blows hot because it strives to ward off state-sponsored terrorism. 
Since terrorist attacks were carried out against France, the French government 
has publicly privileged the "Islamist track". However, the media have pointed out that 
some of the attacks could be as much the work of extremist Islamists linked to the 
GIAs as that of the Algerian Military Security11. The Saint-Michel underground 
presidential elections whose first round is due in November 1995. (Le Monde, 30 aoQt 1995). 
In Geopolis, France 2, June 25,1995. 
10 Quoted in Le Monde, 14 juillet 1995. 
11 See e. g Le Monde, 19 aoüt 1995. 
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station bombing is a particularly intriguing case. It was "prophesied" by an Algerian 
newspaper said to be close to the Algerian Military Security, La Tribune. This 
newspaper also forecasted Sahraoui's murder. In relation to its prediction about a 
wave of terrorist attacks in France, La Tribune designated an ideal suspect : an 
Islamist activist exiled in Sweden and managing the GIA Al Ansar bulletin. As things 
now stand, the suspect seems to have good alibis for not having been in the Paris tube 
with a bomb in his bag. It is quite obvious that the French government will not accuse 
the Algerian regime without proofs. Nevertheless, we should note that, while 
channelling public attention on Islamist networks, the French government has never 
maintained that the hypothesis of an involvement of the Algerian Military security (or 
some of its clans) was far-fetched and thus to be excluded. Several months before 
Jupp6's September 1994 change of heart, I was implicitly told by someone close to 
the government that the latter feared as much terrorist attacks from the GlAs as from 
the Algerian regime : 
"For a long time, we thought that there would not be any attack against French nationals in 
Algeria because we thought that radical forces -- whether on the side of the Islamists or on 
the side of the Military Security -- would not dare stepping over this threshold since this was 
to risk vigorous reactions on the part of counter-powers. It was done and, as a consequence, 
one does not see what would hold them from doing the same thing one day (... ), elsewhere, 
in Southern Europe. "12 
Today, the terrorist attacks in France suggest that Marianne is exposed to 
crossfire. To all appearances, some people in the Algerian regime seek to turn the heat 
on the French government so that it will, if not bless, at least not denounce the result 
of the coming Algerian elections. Others, in the Islamist nebula, also seek to bring 
pressure to bear on the Chirac Administration precisely to force it not to recognise the 
legitimacy that the elections are supposed to bring to the winner. France may now be 
paying the price of its shifting Algeria policy. But then again, was it predictable back 
in January 1992 that the marginalisation of the Islamist current would turn into a 
12 The reader will understand why the identity of the speaker, who is not listed in the 
acknowledgements and who was not referred to elsewhere in this paper, is not revealed. 
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fratricidal war and that the FIS might prove much more flexible than its radical 
political discourse suggested ? 
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